Safety and resilience engineering in Saudi Arabian industries by Sayed, Mohamed
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety and Resilience Engineering in Saudi Arabian 
Industries 
by 
Mustafa Sayed 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the University of Sussex 
 
 
School of Engineering and Informatics 
Department of Informatics 
University of Sussex 
Brighton 
BN1 9QT 
 
 
April 2016 
 
 
I 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
The work described in this thesis, carried out in the School of Engineering and 
Informatics, is that of the author and has not been submitted in any form for any other 
degree at this or any other university. 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed _____________________ 
 
Mustafa Sayed 
 
 
Copyright © 2015 
University of Sussex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Engineering and Informatics 
Department of Informatics 
University of Sussex 
Brighton 
BN1 9QT 
II 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Chris Chatwin and Dr. 
Rupert Young and everyone in the School of Engineering and Informatics who have 
provided support and guidance in the completion of this degree. 
Additionally, I would like to thank my mother and father who supported me all the way. 
Special thanks to my brother Eng. Shadi Sayed for providing help and support that 
made this thesis possible. 
Many thanks go out to all family, Mousa Kobrani, and all friends for their 
encouragement and social support throughout this journey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
 
Safety and Resilience Engineering in Saudi Arabian 
Industries 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
June 2016 
Mustafa Sayed 
 
Abstract 
 
Large industrial accidents attract attention due to their catastrophic effects on human 
lives, economic growth, and the environment. Early studies on accident causations have 
concluded that 98% of all industrial accidents are preventable, and 88% can be 
prevented through the enforcement of a proper control system.  There have been 
relentless efforts to develop models of accidents to understand this phenomenon and 
minimise the catastrophic outcomes of mishap events. These efforts have led to the 
development of systematic models of accident causations; in which accidents causations 
are viewed as dynamic processes that interact in a non-linear fashion. One of these 
systematic models is Resilience Engineering (RE), which takes a holistic view of the 
organisation and its natural abilities to maintain the system in a dynamically stable state 
under either stresses or normal operations.  
This research attempts to explore safety of industrial corporations by evaluating 
resilience in the Saudi Arabian process industry. The Saudi Arabia context is 
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substantially different from the Western cultures where resilience concepts were 
developed and studied. The rapid expansion of the petroleum industries has had a major 
impact on the development of the Saudi socio-economic dynamics. The unique national 
culture dimensions of the Saudi Arabian society (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
and individualism) will help in understanding cultural influences on resilience and 
safety in general. Therefore, this research is conducted to identify the main contributing 
factors to resilience in the Saudi Arabian context. 
The outcomes of the research help engineers and administrators in industrial 
organisations to engineer resilient systems that minimize the risks of mishaps and 
recover quickly to a normal state of operations. The findings support the influence of 
the national culture in different countries on organisational safety culture, which is 
extended to individuals’ behaviour towards safety. Evidence has shown that 
collectivism, on the contrary to the common belief, has a positive impact on both 
resilience potential and safety culture in the process industry. In addition, the process 
industry in Saudi Arabia is characterised by resilience of the second type, where there is 
good ability to respond and monitor but a low ability to learn or anticipate. The main 
contributing factors to this resilience are: effective communication, information 
availability, control over work tasks, and dealing with external pressure. Lastly, the 
findings suggest an association between management commitment to safety and both 
resilience optimisation and organisational safety culture. 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
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Overview: 
 
Why do accidents occur? How can we prevent losing lives every year in large industrial 
complexes? Are recurrent catastrophic deaths and injuries indicators of failure to 
implement safety measures? What does that failure imply for safety management 
theorists, regulators, and administrators in the future? These questions have provoked 
several debates in the public and scientific literature. Large industrial accidents attract 
attention due to their catastrophic effects on human lives, economic growth, and the 
environment. A clear example of the tragic consequences of mishaps is the BP 
Macondo blowout and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 2010; where 11 people were killed 
and 17 other injured in the explosion, and over 8,000 animals (birds, turtles, mammals) 
were reported dead after 6 months of the oil spill. The oil spill had led to the loss of 4.9 
million barrels of oil and 18.7 billion USD in fines. Some observers have blamed the 
issue on flawed practices by big companies who cut corners and favour production and 
profits over safety of their own employees. Others have argued that the governing 
bodies should step up and enforce tighter regulations on the industries. Investigations 
point towards failure of leadership and organisational commitment to safe operations.  
The growing public concerns of accidents in industrial facilities have attracted scholars 
from various disciplines to further investigate this phenomenon. James T. Reason is one 
of the leading scholars who influenced the discussions on safety and risk management 
in‎ human‎ systems.‎Reason’s‎ principal‎ area‎ of‎ research‎ has‎ been‎ human‎ error‎ and‎ the‎
way people and organisational processes contribute to accidents. His early work in the 
field of psychological error mechanism (Reason 1975; 1976; 1979) provided important 
insights into complexity as the cause of accidents [1], [2]. By 1990, he developed the 
accident‎ causation‎model,‎which‎ is‎quite‎distinct‎ from‎ the‎Pearson‎ ‘active‎errors’‎and‎
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system ‘latent‎ errors’‎ approach‎ to‎ mishaps.‎ The‎ model‎ has‎ gained‎ widespread‎
acceptance and recognition by both scholars and experts. Before the Accident causation 
model, it was believed that accidents happened due to individual operator error solely 
(See: Heinrich, 1931 and Bird and Germain, 1985) [3], [4]. The significance of 
Reason’s‎model‎(commonly‎known‎as‎the‎Swiss‎Cheese‎Model)‎is‎associating‎accidents‎
to‎wider‎systematic‎organisational‎factors‎(latent‎conditions).‎‎In‎‘Managing‎the‎risks‎of‎
organisational‎accidents’‎ (1997), Reason developed a comprehensive model of system 
safety (see Figure 1.1) [5]. In practice, professional safety investigators adopted 
Reason’s‎model‎and‎shifted‎their‎focus‎from blaming individuals at the sharp end of the 
system to a no-blame approach. 
 
Figure ‎1-1 Reason Model of System Safety (Reason, 1997) 
 
The realisation that systematic environmental factors contribute to mishap events have 
refocused the efforts to study these issues. This has led to the assumption that errors can 
be categorised and contained. More recently Erik Holnagel, who was focusing on 
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human/cognitive reliability and the human/machine interface, introduced a new way of 
thinking about accident modelling. In his view, accidents were unforeseeable and thus 
the focus on setting more safety barriers and defences is misplaced. Organisations are 
complex systems, as they include a large number of subsystems and components that 
interact nonlinearly. Humans, technology, latent conditions, and safety barriers, each 
contribute with a‎little‎negative‎effect‎on‎the‎system‎as‎a‎whole.‎ In‎his‎book‎‘Barriers‎
and‎ Accident‎ Prevention’‎ (2004),‎ Hollnagel‎ introduced‎ the‎ Functional‎ Resonance‎
Accident‎Model‎(FRAM)‎in‎an‎attempt‎to‎allow‎the‎organisations‎to‎be‎‘error‎tolerant’‎
[6]. He transfered the organisational efforts from searching for more accident causes to 
monitor the whole system and control it instead. The FRAM model presents a view of 
how different functions within an organisation are linked or coupled in the normal state 
operation. By monitoring the variability in different functions within the organisations 
and how they interact nonlinearly, we could steer the system away from accidents.   
In 2006, Hollnagel et al. introduced the concept of Resilience Engineering (RE) to 
overcome the limitations of existing approaches to system safety and risk assessment 
[7].‎ In‎ the‎ authors‎ view,‎ “safety‎ is‎ created‎ through‎ proactive‎ resilience‎ rather‎ than‎
reactive‎barriers‎and‎defences”.‎Resilience‎engineering‎relies‎on‎the‎system’s‎ability‎to‎
anticipate surprises and adapt to potential failures. With the aim of making 
organisations safer, the resilience concept relies on providing workers and managers 
with information about changing vulnerabilities within the system to develop ways to 
avoid them. Several scholars were interested in this paradigm shift of viewing accident 
modelling and safety management systems, therefore; studies were conducted at 
railways, nuclear power plants, aviation, and in the petroleum industry. The Resilience 
Engineering concept is still relatively new and attracts researchers to study it in different 
industries or cultures.  
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1.1 Research Question:  
 
This research attempts to understand further the safety of industrial corporations by 
evaluating resilience in the Saudi Arabian process industry. The Saudi Arabia context is 
substantially different from the Western cultures where resilience concepts were 
developed and studied. The rapid expansion of the petroleum industries has had a major 
impact on the development of socio-economic dynamics. The unique context of Saudi 
Arabia regarding power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and time orientation influences 
the safety climate including organisational practices and views on safety. Studying 
resilience engineering in such a context will help in understanding cultural influences 
on resilience and safety in general. Therefore, this research is conducted to identify the 
main contributing factors to resilience in the Saudi Arabian context.     
Although the energy sector contributes 90% of export earnings to the Saudi economy, 
studies on safety are mostly concerned with the construction sector. Jannadi and Assaf 
(1998) have studied the level of safety as a function of the project size. Their study 
included items such as site safety administration,‎ employee’s‎ health‎ and‎ welfare,‎
trenching and excavation, power tool machines, and the use of heavy equipment [8]. 
The study results have indicated a variation of safety level in accordance with the 
project size. Safety scores were consistently high in large projects; whereas small 
projects score low in fire prevention, as well as health and welfare and safety 
administration. In another study, Jannadi and Bu-Khamsin (2002) have listed around 20 
factors and 85 sub-factors of safety at industrial contractors in KSA [9]. The survey 
included 28 companies involved in constructing large industrial structures to determine 
the main causative factors to safety. The authors have identified management 
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involvement, personal protective equipment, and emergency/disaster planning and 
preparation as the main contributing factors to safety. In a more recent study, Al Haadir 
and Panuwatwanich (2011) examined critical factors affecting the successful 
implementation of safety programs [10]. The study suggested seven factors that help in 
implementing safety programs for Saudi construction projects. Those factors are: (1) 
management support; (2) clear and reasonable objectives; (3) personal attitude; (4) 
teamwork; (5) effective enforcement; (6) safety training; and (7) suitable supervision. 
Other safety studies in KSA included road safety (Ansari et al., 2000; Bendak, 2005), 
health care sector (Walston et al., 2010), and a few other sectors [11]–[13].  
Regarding the manufacturing sector, Noweir et al. (2013) evaluated the progress of 
occupational health and safety in Jeddah Industrial Estate (West of Saudi Arabia) [14]. 
With the aim of assessing the progress of safety, the paper compared results of two 
studies: the first study was conducted in 1990, and included data on 52 plants 
employing 5830 workers, while the second was conducted in 2010, and included 135 
plants employing 18351 workers. Over that 20-year period, improvements to safety 
practices were much less than what was anticipated or required. However, 
improvements were made regarding exposure to physical and chemical factors, applying 
engineering controls, and occupational medical services. On the other hand, the 2010 
data reveals a substantial drop in the safety performance in general. The authors have 
concluded the following remain as challenges in developing occupational health and 
safety programs in Saudi Arabia: 
 General lack of understanding of occupational safety and health. 
 Lack of information of occupational safety and health needs. 
 Shortage of occupational safety and health specialists. 
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 Inadequate legislation or even inadequate enforcement of the existing safety 
laws. 
 Diversity of agencies responsible for occupational safety and health. 
 Lack of systematic appraisal of occupational safety and health. 
 Plenty of small and medium-size plants.  
 Diversity and rapid turnover of expatriate workers in industry from a wide 
spectrum of countries, language, ethnic groups and culture. 
On the topic of resilience, Alshehri et al. (2013) have studied the sociological 
community resilience in Saudi Arabia after natural disasters [15]. Nevertheless, 
Hollnagel concepts of resilience engineering in industrial complexes have not been 
explored so far. This research attempts to explore resilience engineering in the Saudi 
context and will investigate Hollnagel concepts in the process industry all over the 
Kingdom. The overall quest of the research project can be formulated as follows: 
What are the main contributing factors to resilience engineering in the Saudi 
Arabian Process industry? 
The energy industry includes the following sectors: petroleum, natural gas, electric 
power production, and supporting industries to these sectors. The energy sector provides 
the country with its essential needs of fuel, electricity, basic materials, and water. 
According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014, Saudi Arabia was the 
world's 12th largest consumer of total primary energy in 2013. This is the motivation for 
the selection of the energy companies and contractors to be the subject to this project. In 
addition, the lack of literature on safety in that sector has created a knowledge gap that 
needs to be addressed. The leading companies in this sector are: 
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1- Saudi Aramco (formally, the Arabian-American Oil Company), is the Saudi 
Arabian national petroleum and natural gas company, which is based in Dhahran 
(East of Saudi Arabia). ARAMCO is the world's largest oil company in terms of 
oil reserves and production. The company owns many plants scattered around 
the country.  
2- Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC): 70% of the company is owned by 
the government, and 30% by the private sector. SABIC businesses are broadly 
grouped into five primary sectors: basic chemicals, intermediates, polymers, 
chemical fertilizers, and metals.  
3- Saudi Electricity Company (SEC): is mainly owned by the state (80%) and the 
public owns 20% of the shares. SEC is the largest provider of electricity in the 
Saudi Arabia, with a total available generating capacity of 65.5 GW (SEC 
Report, 2014) [16].  
4- Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC): government owned corporation 
provides‎ most‎ of‎ the‎ Saudi‎ Arabia’s‎ desalinated water as well as being the 
second-largest generator of electricity in the country. SWCC owned and 
maintained 28 desalination plants spread over 17 locations on the eastern and 
western coasts. The total desalinated production amounted to 3.6 million cubic 
meters a day which represent 60% of the Kingdom’s‎output (Bloomberg, 2014) 
[17]. 
These companies are major employers of Saudi nationals and have various partnerships 
with the private sector both nationally and internationally. Therefore, the safety of these 
industries is crucial for future planning and sustaining the growth in the country. For 
that reason, the energy sector is the subject of analysis in this study. 
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 In order to answer the research questions presented above, the following stages are 
pursued: 
1. Evaluate the safety climate in the Saudi Arabian energy industry. 
2. Develop an appropriate methodological framework to measure the potential of 
resilience in the Saudi energy sectors. 
3. Identify critical aspects influencing potential resilience in the energy sector. 
4. Extract the main contributing factors to resilience in Saudi energy sectors. 
   
Evaluating the safety climate will provide a starting point to understand the problem at 
hand and to recognise gaps of knowledge that need careful consideration. At this stage, 
reviewing the literature will provide a basic understanding of industrial safety and other 
related theories and concepts (organisation theory, culture, and behaviour). In the Saudi 
case, many researchers have indicated that there is a lack of publication on the topic (e.g. 
Noweir et al., 2013, Idris, 2007) [14], [18]. Therefore, the first part of this research 
includes exploratory methods (observation, interviews, case study). Regarding 
measuring the potential of resilience, Hollnagel et al. (2006, 2011) has outlined the 
methodological framework which will be implemented in this project [7], [19]. To 
identify what influences resilience in industrial complexes; a combination of literature 
review and the empirical work will help in qualifying most relevant factors to the Saudi 
energy sector. The filed work will also help in adjusting the original framework by 
Hollnagel to fit the Saudi context.  
The second part of this study addresses developing a questionnaire based on the 
findings of the exploration stage. The questionnaire will assess the potential of 
resilience‎in‎Saudi’s‎various‎companies‎working‎in‎the‎energy‎sector.‎The‎target‎sample‎
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of the questionnaire includes sharp-end operators, engineers, and managers at different 
levels of the organisations. The data collected will be analysed qualitatively by using 
factor analysis to extract the main contributing factors to resilience in the Saudi energy 
sectors. 
1.2 Research outline: 
 
So far in this chapter, an overview of safety status and the core research question has 
been presented. This section will guide the reader on the content flow of the thesis 
chapters with a brief introduction to each one.  
Chapter One: Introduction 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the problem of safety in industrial facilities. 
Information about accident models and the development of safety management systems 
is provided. Some of the knowledge gaps were then briefly introduced, leading to the 
formulation of the research question as well as defining the steps to answer it.  
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Discussions of safety often include a variety of related concepts and theories. With the 
aim of clarifying those theories, this chapter will provide the main theories about 
industrial organisation and safety. Moreover, resilience engineering and the 
development of safety and accident modelling will be introduced. The literature review 
will also discuss some aspects of the Saudi context, which will help the reader in 
understanding factors influencing the business environment there.  
Chapter Three: Methodology 
11 
 
The methodology chapter will discuss the philosophical arguments to investigate the 
problem and detail the research strategy. The question of using a qualitative or 
quantitative approach will be debated to select the most appropriate approach to address 
the problem. Research methods, techniques, and procedures will be outlined as well as 
the development of the questionnaire, which will measure the potential of resilience in 
the Saudi energy sector. 
Chapter Four:  Results 
The results chapter presents the data collection process including the preparation for the 
analyses (e.g. sampling adequacy tests). The results of the exploratory stage (on-site 
observation, informal interview, and case study) will be presented first. Afterwards, the 
main tables and figures will be highlighted.  
Chapter Five: Analysis 
This chapter discusses how to interpret the findings of the study in the light of the 
research question. The main contributing factors to resilience engineering in the Saudi 
energy industry will be introduced. The findings are then compared to other studies and 
the implication of the theory and practice is reviewed. The main contribution to 
knowledge, limitations, and future work will finally be examined.  
Chapter Six: Conclusions 
This chapter will bring together the arguments in the literature with the results of this 
research project, and the main extracted factors which influence resilience are decided. 
In the light of the findings, the chapter highlights the implications and suggests 
recommendations for practical and theoretical future work.   
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Summary: 
  
In‎ today’s‎ world, managing businesses is influenced by the integration of various 
dynamics of social, technological, and environmental issues. Striking the right balance 
between production demands and safe operations is crucial and requires efficient 
management of resources and trade-offs. Over the last few decades, numerous efforts 
were dedicated to understand these challenges and examined ways for improving 
systems safety. Subsequently, significant advances have been made on various scientific 
fronts with promising potentials to address organisational performance and occupational 
health and safety. This thesis is an effort to investigate some of the new concepts related 
to that field. This study evaluates in particular the influences on the occupational health 
and safety in the Saudi process industries by testing resilience engineering concepts 
there. The aims of this research are summarised as follows: 
1- Explore safety development at industrial complexes in the light of the 
unique socio-economic culture. 
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2- Test RE concepts in a new context and highlight influences of cultural 
factors on it. 
3- Identify the main contributing factors to resilience in the Saudi Arabian 
context.  
  
2.1 Introduction:  
 
The historical development of societies and organisations have simultaneously 
presented numerous solutions to raise standards of living, and disclosed new challenges. 
The rapid growth of human societies urges industrial systems to become increasingly 
large and complex. Accordingly, mishaps turned out to be more tragic causing loss of 
lives, damage to the environment, and damaging economic growth. Thus far, a wide 
range of safety management approaches were developed to identify risks and prevent 
catastrophic consequences. These safety models, however, still fail in real complex 
socio-technical environments. Clear examples of such large-scale failures are the 
Chernobyl accident in 1996, the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, 
and Fukushima power plant Japan 2011. Such disastrous accidents indicate a systematic 
failure and emphasize the need for more comprehensive models of risk assessments and 
safety management. Given the volume and variety of management approaches that deals 
with safety, it is important to recognise the theoretical roots of those tools to use them 
appropriately. The literature on organisational theory provides a suitable starting point 
to grasp how safety is viewed differently in management studies. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the significant literature on 
industrial organisation and the development of accident models. The overview will help 
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in highlighting gaps of knowledge that motivated this enquiry. This study aims to 
contribute to the dissections on safety of industrial organisations through the following 
questions: 
What are the main factors that influence organisational safety culture in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia? 
Is the Saudi Arabian process industry resilient? Under‎which‎category‎of‎‘system-kind’?‎ 
Does the Saudi national culture affect resilience engineering within industrial 
organisations there? 
What are the main contributing factors to resilience engineering in the Saudi Arabian 
process industry? 
To answer these questions, this chapter starts by presenting the historical development 
of accident models. Since accident models are closely related to the development of 
management theory, the first section will introduce major ideas that form organisational 
and management studies. After that we will explore the development of accident models 
and their relation to management theories. A full section will be dedicated to explaining 
resilience engineering (RE) concepts as a new approach to view the problem of safety. 
Following that the chapter will go into more detail, presenting a literature review of 
organisational development and culture. The relationship between national, 
organisational, and safety cultures will be explored in order to understand the dynamics 
by which they affect each other. After that, safety culture will be described including 
previous studies on the matter. Lastly, since this thesis is concerned with the Saudi 
Arabian context, a portfolio on the country will be presented to understand the culture 
there in general.  The portfolio will include historical, economical, geographical, and, 
most importantly, cultural details. This will help in highlighting gaps of knowledge 
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regarding the macro influences on industrial establishments and the value systems of 
individuals working there. The following chapters will concentrate on testing RE 
concepts in KSA including methods to measure it, and analysing RE relations to 
national, organisational, and safety culture in the Kingdom. However, in order to 
understand how risks and safety are thought of in practice, the next section will present 
the development of accident models. Following this, the resilience engineering concept 
as new way of thinking about risks and safety will be revealed. The section on RE will 
respond to many of the debates and paradoxes that are presented in this chapter. 
 
2.2 Models of accidents: 
 
2.2.1 Organisations and management theories: historical overview 
 
This section starts by presenting the historical context of safety and discusses the 
development of accident models. This will help in understanding accidents phenomenon 
and the challenges of managing systems safety in industrial context. Understanding the 
nature of accidents in complex industrial systems depends on the interaction of 
technical, human, social, organizational, managerial and environmental factors [20], 
[21]. The study of organisations was originated from the studies of social sciences, 
which are devoted to understanding social order and social change. The term sociology 
first appears around the beginning of the 19th century referring to the study of society 
and culture. The publications of Karl Marx (1848), Emile Durkheim (1897), and Max 
Weber (1905) have had major influence on forming basic theories of sociology [22]–
[24]. Modern organization theory is rooted in concepts developed during that era. 
However, the importance of organization theory started with the industrial revolution.  
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Prior to the industrial revolution, people were either self-employed or working in small 
groups. The introduction of mechanised production processes instead of hand 
production transformed the industrial landscape. Since the industrial revolution (1760 - 
1840) the science of management and organisation started to emerge.  Frederick Taylor 
(1914) founded the scientific management by breaking down complex tasks into simpler 
steps [25]. Taylor was occupied with thinking of ways to organise work better and 
improve efficiency. The scientific theory of management postulated that increasing 
efficiency is achieved by measuring the time for industrial processes with the aim of 
eliminating‎ wasteful‎ motions.‎ In‎ 1922,‎ Max‎ Weber‎ extended‎ Taylor’s‎ work‎ and‎
developed the theory of bureaucracy by which the need for standardized organisations 
with hierarchical structure became evident [26]. Henri Fayol coined the first 
comprehensive theory of management in 1947 [27].‎ Fayol‎ established‎ the‎ ‘universal‎
applicability’‎ of‎ management‎ concept‎ across‎ all‎ types‎ of‎ organizations. In addition, 
Fayol defined the five management functions as: 
• Planning 
• Organising 
• Commanding 
• Coordinating 
• Controlling 
 
This approach of organisational theory (Classical Organisation Theory) has the 
following major assumptions (perceptions) about the organisation: 
• One‎‘best‎way’‎to‎carry‎out‎the‎task 
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• Specialisation and division of labour 
• Workers are motivated by money 
 
A great deal of criticism against this approach was due to the implication of the 
motivation of employees. Although these assumptions reflect the economic hardship at 
that time; many argue that classical theory of organisation consider the human worker 
as‎ a‎ ‘simple‎ entity’ motivated only by means of financial rewards. Workers were 
thought of as another part (machine-like) of the organisational production process. The 
firm standardised control disregarding their individuality and suppressing creativity. 
The‎lack‎of‎‘humanness’‎within‎the‎classical‎organization‎theory‎had‎led‎to‎the‎‘Human‎
Relation‎ Movement’‎ around‎ 1930’s.‎ A‎ neoclassical approach to organization theory 
started to emerge acknowledging the importance of social aspects in motivating 
employees.  
Elton Mayo (1933) was the first to link work environment to the efficiency of an 
organization [28]. Mayo investigated the workers efficiency in different intensities of 
the‎light‎at‎the‎‘Hawthorne’‎factory.‎The‎importance‎of‎his‎findings‎lays‎in‎challenging‎
the classical approach of the organization theory. Workers efficiency seemed more 
complex‎ than‎ a‎ linear‎ process.‎ In‎ another‎ study,‎ Mayo‎ asserts‎ ‘solidarity’‎ between 
workgroups increased their satisfaction; therefore, he argues that the social aspect is 
prior to organizational structure. In addition, employees could be motivated by means 
other than money. In 1938, Chester Bernard published his book on the Function of the 
Executive in‎an‎attempt‎to‎form‎a‎notion‎of‎‘behaviour’‎in‎formal‎organizations.‎Bernard‎
argued that the role of an executive is to provide a sense of purpose[29], and bring in the 
cooperation and ethical vision as the heart of the organizations. The author argues that 
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employees should be stimulated to cooperate. The motivation issue appeared again in 
Abraham‎Maslow’s‎work‎A Theory of Motivation in 1943[30].  Maslow introduced a 
hierarchical dynamic of human needs through his theory. The hierarchy of human needs 
model (figure 2.1) suggests that people tend to fulfil innate needs in priority one level at 
a time. 
 
 
Figure ‎2-1 Maslow's hierarchy of needs, represented as a pyramid with the more basic needs at the bottom. 
 
Bolmand and Deal (1991) summarize the major assumption of neoclassical organization 
theory as follows[31]: 
• Organizations exist to serve human needs.  
• People and organizations need each other. 
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• The‎ ‘fit’‎ between‎ individuals‎ and‎ the‎ system‎ affects the organizational 
wellbeing. 
 
At the core of management science, increasing performance was what occupied 
managers (e.g. Frederick Taylor, 1914). The classical approach of management viewed 
accidents as a control problem, where many discussions led to the importance of 
standardizing‎ tasks‎ and‎ procedures.‎ It‎ was‎ commonly‎ believed‎ that‎ employees’‎
performance could be controlled through supervisory role (authority). The supervision 
intends‎ to‎ reduce‎ employee’s‎ slackness‎ and‎ reward‎ hard‎ work.‎ In‎ the‎ light‎ of‎ other‎
studies (see Foyal 1948) performance seems to have more factors influencing 
employee’s‎efficiency. With the rise of the human relations movement, more attention 
was given to aspects that could compromise employee attention. The human relations 
movement‎ studied‎ the‎ effect‎ of‎ workplace‎ environment‎ on‎ employees’‎ performance.‎
Better physical work environments seem to have a positive effect on the overall 
performance. This view became common, and more attention was given to employees 
working environment. Those conclusions give rise to consider many other factors that 
could influence performance. Those factors vary from the size of organization, structure, 
and type of industry, leadership style, and many more. The results of these studies 
seemed to lack consistency by which performance appears not to be a simple matter. 
Most of the studies and discussion led to consider different levels of performance being 
influenced by different contextual factors. Both classic and human relation approaches 
seemed not enough to understand performance. Organizations seemed to behave as open 
systems with complex interaction with the wider environment.  
These ideas have formed the basis of management science and stimulated professionals 
and scientists to build up new thoughts on organisations and how to run industrial 
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establishments. The development of occupational health and safety, and accident 
models is closely related with the rise of management science. The next section will 
view the chronological development of accident models. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Accident models’ development: 
 
Ever since the beginning of the industrial revolution, thousands of deaths and 
disabilities occurred because of occupational accidents. Accident consequences were 
(and still are) a strong motivator for tackling system safety and preventing mishap 
occurrence. Accident causation models attempt to understand the factors and processes 
involved in accidents in order to develop strategies for accident prevention. The 
different models are based on a different perception of the accident process. This section 
provides an overview of the main ideas on system safety and accident causation. Some 
fundamental concepts from the broad literature on these subjects is highlighted, as well 
as the ways these ideas have evolved over the last few decades.  
Safety is closely related to other concepts such as injuries, errors, risk, and performance. 
Definitions of safety in the industrial context have evolved with the development of 
approaches that describe accidents. Over the years, there has been considerable overlap 
in the development of the various conceptual approaches to accident modelling. 
Therefore, it is essential to provide the reader with the historical context to indicate the 
origins of these views. Figure 2.2 illustrates a summary of the main development of 
accident modelling over the years. This section will introduce some important 
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definitions of these concepts and provide background knowledge on the development of 
system safety.  
 
 
 
Figure ‎2-2 Summary of a history of accident modelling [19] (Hollnagel, 2010) 
 
 
2.2.3 Sequential Models of Accidents:  
 
Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, accident prevention was part of the culture 
in hazardous industries. Perhaps the earliest attempt to prevent accidents in the 
industrial context can be traced back to the 19
th
 century at the Du Pont explosives 
factories. Klein (2009) documented consistent effort by Du Pont to understand the 
causes of the catastrophic explosions in order to prevent them [32]. Some of these 
efforts included creating a safety division to carry out inspections, special investigations, 
and analyse accidents. By 1915 Du Pont had established the idea of zero injuries by 
eliminating hazards. Accident research started with statistical analysis of injuries at 
industrial factories by Newbold in 1926. Other studies at that time have investigated 
working conditions such as working hours and absenteeism rate. During 1930s, 
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researcher’s‎ attention‎ started‎ to‎ shift‎ towards‎ human‎ output‎ and‎ individual‎ accidents‎
proneness. Accident causation modelling was a product of this shift. 
 
The first major work on understanding accidents was developed by Herbert Heinrich 
in1931[3]. Under the title of Industrial Accident Prevention, Heinrich studied 75,000 
injuries and illness as well as engineering‎ reports‎ from‎ the‎ 1930’s‎ era.‎ The‎ findings‎
indicated that 88% of the accidents were due to unsafe acts of workers, 10% were 
caused by unsafe mechanical or physical conditions, and only 2% were unpreventable. 
In other words, 98% of all industrial accidents are preventable, and 88% can be 
prevented through the enforcement of proper supervision. Heinrich was thinking of a 
scientific approach to avoid preventable injuries. His approach started with detecting 
causes of these injuries and eliminating them. In his view, accidents were merely a link 
in the chain, and injuries happen due to natural culmination of series of events. These 
events follow a fixed logical order. Therefore, his model for accident causation was also 
known‎as‎the‎‘Domino‎theory’‎which‎illustrates the idea of linear sequential factors that 
leads to injuries. Figure 2.3 illustrates the Heinrich domino model including the five 
sequential factors: 
 Ancestry and social environment.  
 Fault of person. 
 Unsafe act or condition. 
 Accidents. 
 Injuries. 
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Figure ‎2-3 Heinrich domino model of accidents. 
 
Domino theory hypothesises that removing one of these factors must be sufficient to 
break the knock-down effect and thus stop the preventable injuries. The theory is 
credited as the first scientific method of injury prevention. Safety professionals 
generally agree that Heinrich has had a significant impact on the practice of safety and 
his theory was widely accepted as a central concept of safety science for decades. 
 
By‎ the‎ 1970’s,‎ and‎ as‎ a consequence of the advances in technologies, industrial 
production had become more complex. Industrial units grew in size, and mass 
production‎was‎ necessary‎ to‎meet‎ societies’‎ demands.‎ Therefore,‎ the‎ coordination‎ of‎
efforts and resources was required to improve performance. It was evident, at that stage, 
for‎this‎complexity‎to‎be‎reflected‎on‎Heinrich’s‎model.‎Building‎on‎the‎domino‎model,‎
Bird and Germain (1986) developed a new model which incorporates management 
relationships as a cause of accident loss [4].‎ The‎ ‘Loss‎ Causation‎ Model’‎ kept‎ the‎
notion of linear sequential factors but added multiple causes to the pattern. The model 
(Figure 2.4) was again represented by five blocks (dominos) in sequence, each included 
a range of factors. Although the‎ loss‎causation‎model‎ introduced‎ the‎multiple‎cause’s‎
idea, the fundamental approach to prevent accidents remained the same. Sequential 
accident models rely on identifying causes of accidents, and either eliminate them or put 
barriers in place to encapsulate their effects.  
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Figure ‎2-4 Loss Causation Mode by Brid and Germain (1985)[4]. 
 
2.2.4 Epidemiological Models of Accidents:  
 
The causal series has influenced the development of several accident models during that 
period. Research was primarily focused on attribution of human characteristic and 
behaviour to injuries. An outstanding exception to the preoccupation of the behavioural 
approach‎ was‎ the‎ result‎ of‎ Gibson’s‎ (1961)‎ work.‎ Under‎ ‘The contribution of 
experimental psychology to the formulation of the problem of safety’,‎Gibson‎adopted‎a‎
natural science approach to safety issues [33]. For the first time, accidents were thought 
of in terms of energy within the system. This energy is transferred in a variety of ways 
and quantities, and at different rates, which damages inanimate or animate structures. In 
his view, injury problems are conceptualized to result from interactions among the host, 
agent,‎and‎environment.‎Gibson‎elaborated‎on‎this‎notion‎by‎classifying‎injury’s‎agents‎
with reference to various forms of energy. For an injury to occur, a person must be 
exposed to an injurious influence– a form of energy (mechanical, thermal, electrical, 
etc.). In the Energy-damage model, the hazard is a source of potentially damaging 
energy and accidents occur due to the failure to control it. Harmful objects were 
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redefined as vectors/vehicles that carries potentially harmful energies. Therefore, a 
preventive mechanism had to be invented in order to control the harmful energies.  
 
The Energy-damage model is closely related to epidemiological science where the focus 
is on the study of disease epidemics and the causal factors around their development. 
The relationship between epidemiology and accident prevention is traced back to the 
work of Gordon (1949) [34]. In The Epidemiology of Accidents; Gordon states that an 
accident‎“is‎a‎combination‎of‎forces‎from‎at‎least‎three‎sources,‎which‎are‎the‎host‎[…],‎
the agent itself, and the environment in which both the host‎and‎agent‎find‎themselves”.‎
This epidemiologic triangle (agent-host-environment) was transferred to accident 
prevention modelling. Gibson based his model on the idea that injuries are the result of 
energy‎ transfer‎ that‎ exceed‎ the‎ body’s‎ threshold.‎ In‎ the‎ same‎ vain,‎ Haddon‎ (1980)‎
introduced his matrix for injury prevention and control (Figure 2.5) [35]. The control 
mechanism includes physical, or structural containment including barriers, processes, 
and procedures. In addition, Haddon systemised the formerly known principles of 
accident prevention into the following ten strategies: 
1. Prevent the creation of the hazard in the first place. 
2. Reduce the amount of the hazard brought into being. 
3. Prevent the release of the hazard that already exists. 
4. Modify the rate or spatial distribution of release of the hazard from its source. 
5. Separate, in time or space, the hazard and that which is to be protected. 
6. Separate the hazard and that which is to be protected by interposition of a 
material barrier. 
7. Modify the basic relevant qualities of the hazard. 
8. Make what is to be protected more resistant to damage from the hazard. 
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9. Begin to counter the damage already done by the environmental hazard. 
10. Stabilize, repair, and rehabilitate the object of the damage. 
 
 
Figure ‎2-5 Example of Haddon matrix for injury prevention and control. 
 
The‎energy‎model‎and‎Haddon’s‎strategies‎have‎had‎enormous‎impact‎on‎risk‎analysis‎
and machinery safety. They are central components of developing other models such as: 
Occupational Accident Research Unit (OARU), Management Oversite and Risk Tree 
(MORT), Safety Management and Organisation Review Technique (SMORT), and 
TRIPOD models (Kjellen, 2000) [36].  Another contribution to the development of 
epidemiological accident modelling has been proposed by Benner (1975) [37]. Benner 
introduced‎the‎idea‎of‎‘multilinear‎events‎sequencing‎methods’‎as‎an‎alternative‎to‎the‎
linear causal series that dominated accident investigations for decades. Benner 
emphasised the significance of understanding how multiple factors within a system 
combined contribute to an accident instead of identifying several causal factors. Based 
on his findings, Benner‎ asserts‎ that‎ “a‎ realistic‎ accident‎ model‎ must‎ reflect‎ both‎ a‎
sequential and concurrent nonlinear course of events, and reflect event interactions over 
time”. In his view, agents and environmental factors together could have negative 
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impact on the hosting environment. This development has led the discussion towards 
the contextual factors of the organisation. 
 
In the late 1970s and 1980s many catastrophic accidents occurred including 
Flixborough, Challenger, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and Chernobyl. Each of these 
accidents have been extensively investigated by professionals. The investigation reports 
pointed towards local workplace conditions and upstream organisational factors as the 
underlying causes that led to human error.  The contextual system argument were 
articulated by many researchers during that period including Charles Perrow (1984) and 
Barry Turner (1978), amongst others [38], [39]. Charles Perrow (1984) started to argue 
that technological advances have made industrial production inherently complex and 
tightly coupled. According to Perrow, tightly coupled systems have little tolerance to 
small disturbances, which‎makes‎the‎occurrence‎of‎accidents‎‘normal’‎in‎such‎systems.‎
Therefore,‎Perrow’s‎normal‎accident‎theory‎postulates‎that‎tightly‎coupled‎systems‎are‎
inherently unsafe. Complex system components are linked by multiple means, these 
parts interact and affect each other in unexpected ways; therefore, errors are inevitable. 
In‎ Perrow’s‎ view,‎ large‎ failures‎ relate‎ to‎ organizational‎ factors‎ rather‎ than‎ operator‎
errors. The system accident may begin with trivial events that cascade through the 
system to create a large event with severe outcomes. Furthermore, normal accident 
theory moved the attention to the weakness of using in-depth defences in complex 
systems. Such an approach adds to the complexity, tight coupling, and creates 
redundancies in the system. Other valuable accident models, during that period, were 
proposed by Rasmussen & Jensen (1974) [40]. The early work of Carl Rasmussen 
focused on studying how human error can be described and analysed in accident 
investigation. The product of this line of thought was the development of the skill-rule-
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knowledge model of human error. Further work of Rasmussen (1981; 1986) 
incorporated cognitive science with the aim of analysing human error in operations [41], 
[42]. 
 
In 1990, James Reason (1990) added crucial contribution to the understanding of human 
error role in accidents [43]. Reason distinguished between two types of human error: 
active errors (the consequence immediately follows the cause) and latent errors. Reason 
used‎ the‎ term‎ ‘latent’–borrowed from the epidemiological studies- to indicate 
similarities‎ between‎ ‘pathogen’‎ related‎ diseases‎ and‎ the‎ catastrophic‎ accident‎ in‎
complex organisations  [43]. The resident pathogens are biological agents in the body 
that causes disease or illness to its host when combined with external triggering factors. 
Reason used the term to indicate that the cause of some errors exists naturally in the 
system, however when they interact with other factors they could breach system 
defences.‎To‎illustrate‎this‎idea,‎the‎model‎uses‎the‎‘Swiss‎Cheese’‎analogy,‎where‎each‎
safety barrier has some holes in it (Figure 2.6). The breach of defences occurs due to 
interaction between inherent features of the system (resident pathogens) and external 
triggering events. The resident pathogens, in the author view, are more open to detection 
than local triggering events. Therefore, concentrating on detecting these pathogens and 
neutralizing them is more likely to minimize the risk of accidents. In his book, Human 
Error,‎Reason‎ asserts‎ “simple‎ human‎ error‎ can‎ be‎ foreseen‎ and‎ contained‎ by‎ built-in 
defences, but theses engineered defences offer little protection against certain 
compensation‎ of‎ system‎ pathogens‎ and‎ local‎ triggers”.‎ Therefore, efforts should 
concentrate on hazards, defences, and losses, instead‎ of‎ searching‎ for‎ an‎ individual’s‎
contribution to errors. Opposing the underlying concept that dominated accident 
investigations for decades, Reason drew attention to the failure to recognize hazards 
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within the system. Such a shift from human behaviour contribution to the error 
mechanism has created a no-blame approach to safety investigations. Regarding human 
error, he continued the discussion from a managerial perspective. Reason recognised the 
impracticality of total eradication of human error. Therefore, barriers design must take 
into account the normality of human operation error. The study of humans in the system 
moved away from the individual to groups of individuals working in that system. More 
emphasis was given to studying normal human behaviour and decision making in 
relation to the environment. By 1997, Reason introduced his model for system safety 
which incorporated the Swiss Cheese model to the whole system (Figure 2.7) [44]. In 
Reason’s‎view, an accident could be prevented by building up a variety of defences to 
the effects of upstream organisational factors. 
 
 
Figure ‎2-6 Reason’s‎‘Swiss‎Cheese’‎Model. 
 
31 
 
 
Figure ‎2-7 The Reason Model of System Safety (Reason, 1997) 
 
2.2.5 Systematic Models of Accidents: 
 
Reason’s‎ work‎ demonstrated‎ the‎ complexity‎ of‎ accident‎ causation‎ and‎ moved‎ away‎
from the emphasis on human error. The discussion on the complexity of accident 
causation has led researchers to think of effective ways to overcome growing 
complexity in industrial systems. Leveson (2004), an expert on system and software 
safety, introduced‎a‎paper‎titled‎‘A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems’‎
[45]. The new model uses system theory to divide the organisation into hierarchical 
levels with control processes operating at the interfaces between levels (Figure 2.8). Her 
model‎‘System-Theoretic‎Accident‎Model‎and‎Process’‎(STAMP)‎views‎accidents‎as‎a‎
control problem. The model builds on the no-blame approach and views systems as 
interrelated components in a dynamic equilibrium state. The systems remain in that state 
through feedback loops of information and control. Accidents occur due to a failure in 
an adaptive feedback function to meet a complex set of goals and values. The STAMP 
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model advocates investigation of system control failures to detect or prevent accident 
triggers.‎Leveson‎states‎“instead‎of‎defining‎safety‎management‎in‎terms‎of‎preventing‎
component failure events, it is defined as a continuous control task to impose the 
constraints necessary to limit system behaviour to safe changes and adaptations”.‎
Leveson’s‎ model‎ introduced‎ a‎ dynamic‎ proactive‎ approach‎ to‎ safety‎ through‎ safety‎
performance indicators.  The basic concepts in STAMP are: constraints, control loops 
and process models, and levels of control. Although the STAMP model provides a new 
approach to safety, it had little success in the safety community (OHS, 2012) [46]. 
Roelen et al. (2011) questioned the usefulness of such an approach because it does not 
fit with the current practice of safety data collection and analysis [47]. Although 
Leveson’s‎ model‎ was‎ not‎ popular‎ in‎ practice, a new paradigm started to emerge 
challenging the fundamental view of accident modelling. A novel systematic view to 
accident modelling, which considers the performance of the system as a whole.  
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Figure ‎2-8 General form of a model of socio-technical control (Leveson, 2004) 
 
Erik Hollnagel, a cognitive systems engineer, proposed a new approach to safety 
analysis and accident modelling. In Barriers and Accident Prevention (2004), he 
challenged the idea of linear cause-effect sequences, which was a core concept of 
accident modelling since its development by Heinrich in1931 [6].‎ Hollnagel’s‎ non-
linear systematic approach to safety views accidents as an emergent phenomenon. Using 
the resonance (frequency) analogy, Hollnagel distinguishes between control signal as a 
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property of the system and noise as a property of the environment. Although noise may 
seem completely random (stochastic resonance), it is determined to a large extent by the 
variability of the functions of the system. In this regard, accidents could be viewed as 
‘functional‎ resonance’‎which‎ is‎ a‎ consequence‎ of‎ functional‎ couplings‎ in‎ the‎ system.‎
Based on this concept, the author suggested the Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) as an accident analysis model and risk assessment tool. The model uses the 
idea of resonance arising from the variability of everyday performance to describe 
system’s‎outcomes.‎Both‎failures‎and‎successes‎are‎emergent.‎The‎accident‎occurs when 
variability from multiple functions combines in unexpected ways. FRAM basic analysis 
principles are as follows: 
 Identify and characterise essential system functions; the characterisation can be 
based on the six connectors of the hexagonal representation (figure 2.9). 
 Characterise the potential (context dependent) for variability using a checklist. 
 Define functional resonance based on identified dependencies among functions. 
 Identify barriers for variability (damping factors) and specify required 
performance monitoring. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2-9 A graphical representation of a generic functional entity. 
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FRAM‎ take‎ a‎ ‘breadth-before-depth’‎ approach‎ in‎ order‎ to‎ build‎ organisational‎
functional model. The breadth-first principle relies on the understanding of the everyday 
functioning of a system (the breadth). As a first step of developing the FRAM, all the 
functions within the system must be identified. The aim of this step is to recognise 
organisational functions in an everyday situation and its variability (instead of going 
directly to identify root causes of risks) to understand what may go wrong. This is a 
fundamental difference from the traditional safety analysis method. The breadth-first 
principle shifts the focus to identifying all functions and considers how activities are 
usually carried out. The next step is to describe essential aspects of each function. At 
this step, each function could be described in terms of the following criteria (see figure 
2.7): 
• Inputs (I): what is needed to perform the function? 
• Outputs (O): what is produced by the function? 
• Resources (R): what is needed to process the inputs? 
• Controls (C): what are the restrictions? 
• Preconditions (P): what conditions must be fulfilled before a function 
can start? 
• Time (T): What is the duration of the function? 
 
Since FRAM adopts the breadth-first principle, the simplest description of a function 
could be made through its input(s) and output(s). This helps in focusing the efforts on 
understanding the system as a whole, while avoids complexity and redundancies of 
going into too much detail. The inputs and outputs of each function helps in 
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understanding the interactions of organisational subsystems and tasks. It is necessary to 
iterate the former two steps (if needed) until an acceptable FRAM is achieved.  
 
A year after that, Hollnagel (2005) identified a fundamental characteristic of human and 
organisational performance which is responsible for balancing demands and resources 
[48]. The author refers to this ability as a trade-off between efficiency and thoroughness 
to reach performance goals. The Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off (ETTO) principle 
states‎ that‎ “in‎ their‎ daily‎ activities,‎ at‎ work or at leisure, people (and organisations) 
routinely make a choice between being effective and being thorough, since it rarely is 
possible to be both at the same time. If demands for productivity or performance are 
high, thoroughness is reduced until the productivity goals are met. If demands for safety 
are‎high,‎efficiency‎is‎reduced‎until‎the‎safety‎goals‎are‎met”‎(Hollnagel‎and‎Goteman,‎
2004) [49].  Therefore, the author advocates the notion of resilient performance to 
maintain a dynamically stable state under normal operation or stress.   
 
2.2.6 Resilience Engineering: 
 
The‎term‎‘resilience’‎was‎used‎in‎different‎disciplines‎with‎similar‎meanings.‎The‎early‎
use of the term described the ability of materials to withstand severe conditions. Many 
years later, the term was used in ecology to express the ecosystem capacity to resist 
damage and recover quickly in response to turbulences. Psychologists used the term in 
the‎1970’s‎to‎refer‎to‎an‎individual’s‎ability‎to‎properly‎adapt‎to‎stress‎and‎adversity.‎By‎
the year 2000, it was used in economics to maintain continuous business operations by 
rapidly adapting and responding to business disruptions. Hollnagel (2011) defines 
Resilience Engineering as "the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior 
to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required 
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operations under both expected and unexpected conditions" [19]. Resilience 
Engineering takes a holistic view of the organisational functions by looking at the 
intersection of people, technology, and how they function together as a system. 
According to the former definition, the goal of a resilient organisation is to attain 
resilience performance that avoids undesirable risks and catastrophic outcomes. In order 
to achieve resilience, Hollnagel propose the following four basic abilities (Figure 2.10):  
 Anticipate: how an organisation anticipates risks/opportunities, potential 
changes, and their consciences in the future. The author calls this the ability to 
address‎the‎‘potential’.‎ 
 Respond: how an organisation reacts to disruption (normal and abnormal) 
earthier by a planned response or by adjusting its function to the disturbances. 
This‎factor‎looks‎at‎the‎organisational‎ability‎to‎address‎the‎‘actual’.‎ 
 Monitor: how to observe and assess threats within the system itself or the 
environment.‎In‎other‎words,‎organisational‎ability‎to‎address‎the‎‘critical’.‎ 
 Learn: how to extract knowledge from previous failures and successes. The 
ability‎to‎address‎the‎‘factual’.‎ 
 
 
Figure ‎2-10 The four cornerstones of resilience (Hollnagel, 2011) 
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Safety under resilient systems goes beyond the traditional view of zero mishaps risks. 
The traditional view entails an inverse correlation between the level of safety and the 
number of undesirable outcomes (accidents, incidents, work time injury, work related 
illnesses, etc.). Under this view, organisations‎take‎a‎‘protective’‎approach‎to‎safety‎to‎
protect and prevent the system from adverse outcomes. Hollnagel (2014) refers to this 
type‎ of‎ safety‎ as‎ ‘Safety-I’‎ to‎ distinguish‎ it‎ from‎ how‎ safety‎ is‎ defined‎ in a resilient 
system [50].‎ RE‎ defines‎ safety‎ as‎ “the‎ ability‎ to‎ succeed‎ under‎ varying‎ conditions”‎
(Hollnagel, 2015) [51].‎ In‎ the‎ author’s‎ view,‎ the‎ ability‎ to‎ succeed‎ under‎ varying‎
conditions will produce fewer undesirable events and robust performance in general. 
This‎ view‎ of‎ safety‎ is‎ called‎ ‘Safety-II’‎ where‎ safety‎ is‎ ‘productive’‎ instead‎ of‎
‘protective’.‎Resilience‎is‎something‎the‎organisation‎‘does’‎rather‎than‎something‎the‎
organisation‎‘has’.‎Thus,‎resilience‎helps‎organisations‎to‎avoid‎failures‎and‎losses,‎and 
responds effectively after these have occurred. The proposed four abilities provide the 
basis for resilient performance. This discussion leads us to the question of how to 
develop these four abilities within a system. 
 
Engineering resilience into a system in practice is all about constructing the former four 
capacities into the system. RE and systemic models in general have their roots in control 
theory (Sheridan, 1992) and emphasise the need to base accident analysis on an 
understanding of the functional characteristics of the system [52]. Unlike sequential and 
epidemiological‎models,‎the‎systematic‎models‎consider‎a‎holistic‎view‎of‎the‎system’s‎
performance. Therefore, instead of putting barriers and defences in place, efforts must 
focus‎ on‎ a‎ system’s‎ ability‎ to‎monitor‎ and‎ control‎ any‎ variances‎ in‎ its‎ basic‎ abilities‎
(monitoring, anticipating, responding, and learning) of the organisation. Accidents 
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happen when the system is unable to tolerate variances in its operating mode. Humans 
and their social systems is also a source of variability in the system. Thus, there is a 
particular emphasis on the human to adjust and manage demands on time and efficiency. 
It‎is‎managers’‎responsibility‎to‎implement‎safety‎management‎and‎ensure‎an‎adequate 
performance‎ level‎ in‎ the‎ organisations.‎ By‎ evaluating‎ the‎ organisation’s‎ ability‎ to‎
monitor,‎anticipate,‎respond,‎and‎learn,‎the‎managers’‎role‎is‎crucial‎to‎ensure‎resilient‎
performance. 
  
In order to evaluate the extent of each ability that provide the basis for resilient 
performance, Hollnagel (2011) proposed a Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) [19]. The 
RAG uses a quantitative method in the form of sets of generic questions to determine 
how well a system performs on each of the four basic abilities. These questions can be 
tailored to be used in specific application to build a profile of the system's potential for 
resilient performance. The RAG profile provides managers with the state of resilience 
and safety in specific groups or departments. Several RAG profiles can be analysed and 
used as the basis for managing the organisation and following the consequences of 
planned intervention. By analysing the RE four abilities the organisation can fall into 
one of the following system-types proposed by Hollnagel (2016) [51]: 
 Systems of the First Kind: these types of organisations rely heavily on reacting 
when something unexpected happens. Failure to react appropriately to 
unexpected events will lead (sooner or later) to the 'death' of the system. 
Managers in such system must take action to develop a more active approach to 
safety. In such organisations, it is necessary to improve the learning and monitor 
the ability of the organisation in order to be resilient. While the ability to 
respond is fundamental, systems of the first kind are not really resilient. 
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 Systems of the Second Kind: are organisations that can learn from previous 
response experiences. An organisation under this type can respond to 
unexpected events and adjust what it does in the future. Learning what to look 
for in the future and how to manage it is necessary to survive in an unstable 
environment. Managers should use the learning ability in order to improve 
monitoring and response abilities in the future. 
 
 Systems of the Third Kind: are able to detect situations before they become too 
serious. By analysing the developments in the environment around, these 
organisations can anticipate changes and prepare themselves as well as possible. 
Anticipation is used to make predictions about the future, which allows 
managers to take actions before mishaps occur. Organisations that plan in 
advance and organise recourses efficiently have better chances of surviving 
dynamic environments.   
 
 Systems of the Fourth Kind: meets all the criteria of resilient performance. They 
are able to respond, monitor, learn, and anticipate therefore able to succeed 
under varying conditions. Organisations of the fourth kind are resilient and 
could improve by considering what happens within the system and between the 
system and its environment. 
 
Resilience as a concept for safety engineering is in the early development stages and has 
not been used much formally, although informally many of the ideas have existed 
within safety management circles under different rubrics (Sheridan, 2008). Resilience 
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Engineering is still an evolving concept that attracts many professionals and scholars to 
test it. Testing RE in various organisations and industries continues to develop our 
understanding of accident causation and organisational performance in general. The 
rapid continued growth in complexity and the development of technology adopted by 
the process industry offer a good case to test the concept.   
 
On the account of these new developments in viewing safety and RE four kinds of 
system, this research asks the following questions: 
 
 Is the Saudi Arabian process industry resilient? Under which category of 
‘System-kind’ does it fit?  
 
 What are the main contributing factors to resilience engineering in the 
Saudi Arabian energy industry? 
 
So far, this section reviewed the development of industrial organisation in management 
studies. The main schools that influences organisation theory and hidden assumptions 
about management roles and employees were discussed. The development of accident 
models was closely influenced by the development of management theory. The views 
on safety started with the sequential casual model where accident prevention was linear 
and simple. The mounting evidence of influences of the environment led to the 
development of more complex linear models of accidents. However, a new school of 
thought has challenged the linear view of accidents and moved towards adopting a non-
linear systematic model. Resilience Engineering adopted that view and offered a 
different way of thinking about safety. RE approaches to safety and risk assessment 
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advocate a holistic view of the organisation and all it functions. Within RE, safety is 
defined as the freedom of mishap risk. The goal of a resilient organisation is to keep all 
its interrelated functions in a state of dynamic equilibrium. This can be achieved 
through developing and supporting for basic processes: monitoring, anticipating, 
responding, and learning. In the light of these four abilities an organisation can fall 
under four different classes that were defined by Hollnagel. This research attempts to 
examine the concepts of RE in a new culture, which will review new strengths and 
weaknesses of the theory. In addition, this will help in understanding cultural influences 
on RE and the main contributing factors to the Saudi Arabian process industry. The next 
section will view the literature on organisational and safety cultures and explore the 
influences of national culture on them. 
 
2.3 Organisational Culture and Safety Culture: 
 
This section will introduce the concept of culture and its relations with organisations 
and safety. In addition to the development of the concept in organisational and 
management studies, we will present debates concerning the relationship of national, 
organisational, and subcultures in the literature. Safety culture will then be defined and 
discussed. 
2.3.1 Organisational Culture 
 
Organisational culture as a concept has been used by psychologists for a long time.  
Psychologists studied the norms within certain groups and sometimes referred to it as 
‘climate’‎(e.g.‎Lewin‎et.‎al.,‎1939)‎ [53]. The concept was transferred to organisational 
studies when organisational psychologists began to study work groups and whole 
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organisations instead of focusing on individuals as the analysis unit. Schein and Bennis 
(1965) noticed a pattern of norms and attitudes that cut across a social group [54]. With 
this shift from individuals to groups it was essential to think of organisations in terms of 
‘systems’.‎ System‎ theory‎ and‎ system‎ dynamics‎ provided‎ important‎ theoretical‎
foundations for the development of organisational and cultural studies (Schein, 1990) 
[55].‎ The‎Tavistock‎ Institute‎ developed‎ the‎ concept‎ of‎ ‘socio-technical‎ systems’‎ as‎ a‎
concept that includes the new unit of analysis. Katz and Kahn (1978) has used this unit 
of analysis to study organisations [56]. In The Social Psychology of Organisations, the 
authors discussed the existence of roles, norms and values that are present within 
organisations.‎ The‎ application‎ of‎ ‘culture’‎ as‎ a‎ concept‎ within‎ certain‎ societies‎ and‎
organisations was developed during‎the‎1980’s.‎‎That‎period‎witnessed‎growing‎interest‎
in organizational culture and management. Several books were published, such as: In 
Search of Excellence (Peters  et al. 1982) and Corporate Cultures (Deal & Kennedy 
1982), where they advocate the role of culture to improve performance [57], [58]. 
‘Strong‎ culture’‎ was‎ found‎ to‎ be‎ of‎ great‎ importance‎ particularly‎ if‎ management‎
emphasized basic values and common goals. It was suggested that culture can be used 
as a control instrument and as an alternative to other forms of control in organizations 
(such as bureaucratic control). However, a great part of what was written about 
organizational culture and management in the 1980s was influenced by Japanese 
organizational philosophy, but it is relatively obvious that many of the measures 
implemented in Japanese industry would not be desirable or even possible in Europe, 
specifically because of cultural differences (Haukelid 2008) [59]. In the same vain, 
Ouchi (1981) tried to study differences between organisational performances cross-
cultures (Japanese and US companies) [60]. It was noticed that organisational 
performance was also different within a society, which indicates that national culture 
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was not enough of an explanation. Therefore, organisational culture was developed 
mainly to explain variation in patterns of organisational behaviour; and levels of 
stability in groups. In other words, measures that are implemented to improve 
organizational culture neither can, nor should, be considered in isolation from the 
national culture.  
Schine (2004)‎defines‎organisational‎culture‎as‎“The‎pattern‎of‎basic‎assumptions‎that‎a‎
given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have worked well 
enough to be considered valid; therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way‎to‎perceive,‎think,‎and‎feel‎in‎relation‎to‎these‎problems”‎[55].‎Hofsted’s‎approach 
to organisational culture is a derivative of the idea that organisations are subcultures of a 
larger cultural system. His study of work related values indicated distinctive patterns of 
the collective value systems in different countries. Whereas Schein’s‎work‎highlighted‎
that these differences derived from core assumptions held by members of an 
organisation and represent what they believe to be reality.  Socially constructed reality 
is more complex because it consists of sub-world contexts, therefore these assumptions 
are running deep and manifested as values and behaviours. Culture, however, is taken 
for granted and remains unquestionable. Members of an organisation tend to confirm to 
the existing culture and do not challenge it. Members adapt to the value system of the 
organisation and act accordingly. One significant influence of values on cultural 
members takes place through defining norms for behaviour. Values can be defined as 
the social principle, goals and standards that cultural members believe have intrinsic 
worth. It dictates their priorities and guides them to distinguish what is right and wrong.  
On the other hand, norms are the expression of the values. They are the unwritten rules 
that allow members to know what is expected from them. In reality, this is translated 
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into variety of social behaviours, such as dress code, the formality of communication, 
and ways to resolve conflicts. In short, norms outline what is conceded to be normal or 
abnormal‎behaviour.‎According‎to‎Schein’s‎theory,‎the underlining assumptions held by 
members nurture their values and norm; in turn, values and norms support activities that 
produce cultural artefacts. 
 
Further studies on the impact of culture on organisational performance have indicated a 
significant relationship between cultural strength and organisational performance 
(Kotter and Heskett, 1992) [61]. In addition, this relation is much stronger when cultural 
values are supported by organisational adoption to the environment. In a different study, 
Denison (1990) argued the importance of aligning the environment not only with the 
national culture but also to the strategy of the organisation. In his findings, Denison 
emphases the rule of value flexibility, organisational adaptability, and organisational 
commitment to succeed in a rapidly changing environment [62]. The debate on the 
relationship between organisations and the environment leads us to the larger discussion 
about boundaries of the organisations. Prior to the general system theory, a close system 
view dominated management theories where influences of work environment were 
neglected. General system theory introduced the notion of level of analysis not only in 
terms of national and organisational levels but also in terms of hierarchical subsystems 
within an organisation. Although this debate falls beyond the scope of this thesis (for 
more see Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013), we undertake a symbolic-interpretive view to 
determine the level of analysis [63]. Symbolic-interpretive organisational theorists are 
concerned with studying cultural symbols to understand groups and group dynamics. 
Within this view, institutional theorists typically take the position that institutions are 
relatively durable social systems where actors can be individuals, groups (as in this 
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study) or organisations. Within this group individual actions and interactions produce a 
distinctive pattern of relationships. These relationships when analysed at organisational 
level appear as structure. In this thesis, we will investigate working groups (operators, 
managers), and analyse the result from an organisational point of view. Within such a 
group we will investigate the pattern of behaviour regarding safety including their view 
on top management commitment to safety, beliefs about the value of safety, reporting 
accidents, risk taking tendencies, and patterns of behaviour when a mishap event occurs. 
This will provide us with a general feeling of the safety culture in the process industry 
in Saudi Arabia.   
 
2.3.2 Safety Culture 
 
Just as you can analyse an organisational culture as a subsystem of national culture 
context, you can examine safety culture as subculture of the organisational culture 
context (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013) [63]. Accordingly, Van Maanen and Barley (1984) 
articulate that subcultures exist within organisations harbouring segments of relative 
diversity within a generally approved organisational plan [64]. Subcultures may form 
around similar interests (e.g. professional, gendered, and occupational) or sheared place 
or equipment (e.g. cafeteria, photocopiers, and toilets). These subcultures may compete 
with the organisational plan by offering alternative priorities or goals to its members. 
Therefore, Siehl and Martin (1984) label subcultures according to their relationship with 
organisational culture to enhancing: subculture, orthogonal subculture, and 
counterculture [65]. Enhancing subcultures are supportive of the organisational culture, 
while orthogonal subcultures are neutral where they neither boost nor stand against 
organisational culture, and countercultures actively challenge values and beliefs of the 
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organisational culture. Safety culture could challenge some production goals or compete 
with organisational resources, subsequently it could create a paradox for top 
management in some cases. This issue has major implications for implementing an 
effective safety culture.  
The main purpose of any business is to create more value to the shareholders. 
Consequently, organizations constantly aim to cut their expenses to increase the 
revenues. As a result, managers, as well as employees, feels pressured more and more to 
execute projects with limited resources and to a tight schedule. The investment in one 
area, usually, creates greater squeezes in other areas. Thus, operators, usually, decide to 
take short cuts to save time or resources. More often than not, they consider safety 
practices redundant or even an obstruction to carry out tasks. Safety under such an 
atmosphere is considered as something that acts against efficiency and productivity. 
Certainly, this reduces (if not provoks) safety margins and puts at risk the integrity of 
system processes.  
In such an environment, when accidents occur, investigators view these short cuts from 
sharp-end operators as one of the main reasons for the event (if not the prime one). 
From an organisational level, the existence of short cuts by the operators is viewed as an 
unsafe culture. Top managers who believe in the causal model tend to react by 
introducing tougher regulations. However, many empirical studies have shown that a 
considerable number of employees had not followed the standard procedures to carry 
out their tasks. McDonald (2005) asserts that most commonly technicians reported that 
the alternative methods were better and faster [66]. Perhaps more surprisingly, is that 
such practice is widely accepted among employees and managers. Researchers might 
highlight the gap between formal requirements and what happens.  
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Operational managers usually think of safety in terms of LTIF (lost-time injuries per 
million man hours) as the centre of their attention. For them, around 90 percent of 
accidents‎ are‎ due‎ to‎ ‘human‎ error’‎ (Reason,‎ 1997)‎ [44]. Given the range of human 
involvement in a complex environment, front-line operators are usually considered as 
the prime reason for accidents. Therefore, the majority of managers treat employees 
with the ‘carrot‎and‎stick’‎rule.‎However,‎such‎a‎view‎lacks the proper understanding of 
accidents or the dynamics of a safety culture. Resilience engineering pursues safety as a 
value to the system (process or output). Safety measures must involve the product as 
well as the processes that made it. This could be achieved by linking error management 
with the total Quality Management. RE takes a holistic view of the wider issues that 
leads to such pattern of behaviours. Instead of thinking of short cuts taken by operators, 
RE takes account of the reasons that lead to the need for these short cuts. Pressure on 
employees to meet deadlines and resources conditions are understood, and managers 
should think of how to balance production goals and safety efforts of the operators. 
Hollnagel (2009) emphasized the importance of achieving balance between the 
organisational goals and safety requirement in order to ensure safe operation [67]. 
Resilience engineering incorporates the ETTO (efficiency-thoroughness trade-off) 
principle as a tactic to overcome such paradoxes. 
Much of this discussion on safety management echoes the interest in organizational 
culture in the 1980s. The debates within safety management literature focuses greatly on 
the connection between the organizational cultural and safety performance in the 
organization.‎Among‎these‎debates:‎what‎do‎we‎mean‎by‎‘safety‎culture’?‎Do‎we‎deal‎
with one unitary culture within an organisation, or many subcultures? Can it be 
managed or controlled? The academic interest in the relationship between culture and 
safety dates back to Barry Turner's (1978) influential book Man-Made Disasters [39]. 
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However, the concept of safety culture was not introduced into the mainstream until 
1986‎with‎the‎ International‎Atomic‎Energy‎Agency’s‎investigation‎into‎the‎Chernobyl‎
accident (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986) [68]. Since then, many safety 
researchers and practitioners have turned to the concept (Vaughan 1996; Reason 1997; 
Pidgeon 1998; Cooper 2000; Cox & Cheyne 2000; Hale 2000; Richter & Koch 2004; 
Schaufeliet al. 2006) [44], [69]–[75]. Here, we accept the general definition proposed by 
the‎Advisory‎Committee‎on‎the‎Safety‎of‎a‎Nuclear‎Installation‎(ACSNI)‎which‎is‎“the‎
product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and 
patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, 
an‎ organization’s‎ health‎ and‎ safety‎ management”‎ (ACSNI,‎ 1993)‎ [76]. Under this 
definition, safety culture is multidimensional and closely related to the management. 
Generally speaking, culture can influence safety in two ways: first, by providing the 
frames of reference through which information about risk is interpreted (Turner, 1978) 
[39]. Second, culture influences safety by constituting conventions for behaviour, 
interaction and communication.  
On the question of can managers control safety culture in organisations, Frost (1985) 
asserts that‎ “Culture‎ cannot‎ be‎ managed;‎ it‎ emerges. Leaders‎ don’t‎ create‎ cultures;‎
members‎of‎the‎culture‎do.‎Culture‎is‎an‎expression‎of‎people’s‎deepest‎needs,‎a‎means‎
of endowing their experiences with meaning. Even if culture in this sense could be 
managed,‎ it‎shouldn’t‎be‎(.‎ .‎ .)‎ it‎ is‎naive‎and‎perhaps unethical to speak of managing 
culture”‎ [77]. A number of organizational studies support this view. The problem, 
however, is that several subcultures compete within a single company, and those who 
work on the shop floor will often have‎ a‎ ‘counterculture’‎ that‎ conflicts‎ with‎
management’s‎ goals‎ and‎ values‎ (e.g.‎ Krackhardt‎ & Kilduff 1990; and Thompson & 
McHugh 2002) [78], [79]. These studies conclude that culture cannot be managed or 
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controlled, but that to a certain degree, it may be influenced. On the contrary, Reason 
(1997) takes the view that safety culture can be socially engineered [44]. He argued that 
gradual and persistence by top managers are essential for successful implementation of 
an‎‘effective’‎safety‎culture.‎This‎approach‎suggests‎a‎sequential‎model‎of‎safety‎where‎
identifying, fabricating, and assembling essential components of safety culture is 
possible. In contrast, a control theory view does not see organisations as a static design 
of components. It rather accepts that a system is a set of constantly changing and 
adaptive processes to achieve multiple goals (Dekker, 2011) [80]. Of course, there are 
many interesting studies of organizational culture in which culture is treated like the 
complex phenomenon that it is. What is worth emphasizing here is that safety culture is 
a useful concept, but much of the management literature (and some organization theory) 
often takes an instrumental and superficial approach to it. To achieve a deeper 
understanding of this complex phenomenon, the analysis should be holistically oriented 
and‎cover‎various‎levels‎from‎the‎manifest‎and‎discursive‎to‎ the‎more‎essential‎‘taken‎
for‎ granted’.‎ Resilience‎ engineering‎ takes‎ a‎ holistic‎ view‎ of‎ the‎ organisation‎ and‎
attempts to keep all its interrelated functions in a state of dynamic equilibrium. 
Therefore, managers must make sure that safety culture is adaptive to the organisational 
culture and flexible to differences between subcultures that exist in the organisation. 
Such an approach can result in an effective safety culture across the organisation. 
Assessing organization culture should provide some basis for making judgments about 
how‎safe‎or‎unsafe‎an‎organization‎is,‎as‎well‎as‎some‎sort‎of‎‘prediction’‎as‎to‎whether‎
the organization is prone to having accidents in the future. The predictive value of 
culture surveys has not been the subject of much discussion or empirical investigation in 
the literature. Although some authors have addressed the topic (e.g., Zohar 2000; 
Kathryn Mearns et al. 2003; Cooper & Phillips 2004; Hofmann & Mark 2006), 
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publication of the relationship between culture surveys and safety is rather limited [81]–
[84]. On a more theoretical level, culture may influence safety in two ways: first, by 
providing the frames of reference through which information about risk is interpreted. 
This is a view on culture that is influenced by the views of Turner (1978) [39]. An 
organization’s‎culture involves a field of vision, where some risks are visible, but where 
there may be blind spots regarding others. Second, culture influences safety by 
constituting conventions for behaviour, interaction and communication. This aspect of 
culture pertains to the informal work practices that usually exist alongside the formally 
prescribed‎structures‎of‎work.‎Finding‎appropriate‎ways‎to‎ ‘measure’‎different‎aspects‎
of culture has been a recurrent problem for both practitioners and researchers interested 
in safety culture. Several researchers and institutions have developed questionnaires 
containing items that are meant to be indicators of cultural traits regarded as important 
for‎safety.‎Examples‎of‎existing‎survey‎tools‎include‎the‎‘A‎guide‎to‎measuring‎health‎
& safety‎performance’‎(Health‎Safety‎Executive‎2001),‎the‎‘Safety‎Culture‎Assessment‎
Toolkit’‎(Cox‎&‎ 
Cheyne‎2000),‎and‎‘Risk‎Level‎on‎the‎Norwegian‎Continental‎Shelf’‎(Tharaldsen‎et‎al.‎
2008) [72], [85], [86]. The apparent hope is that the use of such assessment tools will 
provide the basis for a proactive analysis of risk. The need for such proactive 
assessments has been emphasized by high liability theorists (e.g. Roberts 1993), and 
more recently by (Hollnagel et al. 2006) in their book Resilience Engineering [87], [88]. 
The‎ first‎ step‎ towards‎ building‎ resilience‎ is‎ ‘to analyse, measure, and monitor the 
resilience‎of‎organizations‎in‎their‎operative‎environments’‎(Hollnagel‎et‎al.‎2006)‎[88]. 
This has to do‎with‎an‎organizations’‎ability‎ to‎ recognize‎when‎situations‎ fall‎outside‎
the limits of acceptable risk, and thus has the organizational foresight that is an 
important part of resilience engineering. How one is to analyse and monitor the social 
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part of socio-technical systems is, however, not explicitly discussed. As the practical 
value‎ of‎ safety‎monitoring‎ rests‎ on‎ its‎ ability‎ to‎ describe‎ current‎ and‎ ‘predict’‎ future‎
performance, this is a very important question for safety research.  
 
2.4 Saudi Arabia: 
 
This profile on Saudi Arabia aims to guide the reader on some cultural context and 
business environment in the country. The profile will introduce historical, geographical, 
economical aspects of the Saudi context; which helps in understanding the 
psychological and social influences on employees working in the Kingdom. In addition, 
a review of the business environment and labour market regulations is presented to 
understand the contextual macro influence on organisations operating there. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) was chosen because: 
 It is the largest producer of oil in the world. 
 One of the top 25% best environments for business in the world (World Bank 
report, 2015) [89].  
 A new cultural context to implement a Resilience Engineering framework. 
Since the aim of this research is to test resilience in the Saudi context and identify the 
main contributing factors to resilient performance in the process industry. This section 
will provide contextual aspects of the Saudi Arabian values and behaviours.  
 
2.4.1 Overview of Saudi Arabia:  
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is the largest Arab state in Western Asia and the 
second-largest geographically in the Arab world. It occupies an area of 2,149,690 
square kilometres and have a population of more than 27,752,316 people with 1.46% 
growth rate. Since its foundation (modern Saudi state), in 1932, the economy of the 
country relied mainly on its natural resources. The export of fossil fuels has led the 
country to become one of the fastest growing economies in the world (CIA, 2016) [90].  
The kingdom is categorized as a high income economy with a high Human 
Development Index (HDI) (Human Development Report, 2014) [91]. Islam is the main 
religion in the country with over twenty-five million population most of them are young. 
In‎2014,‎Saudi‎Arabia’s‎gross‎domestic‎product‎(GDP)‎was‎estimated‎to‎be‎$1.6 trillion, 
which‎ make‎ the‎ Kingdom’s‎ rank the 15th in the world (CIA, 2016).  Recently, the 
Kingdom has been undergoing a series of social and economic changes in order to 
diversify its economy and to employ more Saudi nationals. Initiatives are proposed by 
the government to attract foreign investment, encouraging the growth of the private 
sector, and there is great investment in power generation, telecommunications, natural 
gas exploration, and petrochemical sectors. There are over 6 million foreign nationals 
living‎in‎the‎country‎and‎they‎play‎an‎important‎role‎in‎country’s‎economy,‎particularly‎
in the oil and service sectors (CIA, 2016) [90]. 
Saudi Arabia is proud of its Islamic heritage, where it devotes a large effort to Islam's 
two holiest mosques in Mecca and Medina. Mecca is the birthplace of Islam and hosts 
around 2 million people from all over the world per year to complete their pilgrim 
rituals (Hajj). Islam has a great influence on all aspects of life in the country. This 
influence‎was‎reflected‎in‎the‎country’s‎first‎article‎of‎the‎basic‎law‎of‎the‎governance‎
which states: 
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“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion shall 
be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God and the Sunnah (Traditions) of 
His Messenger, may God’s blessings and peace be upon him (PBUH). Its language 
shall be Arabic and its capital shall be the city of Riyadh.”.‎ 
The influence of Islam on the Saudi society was observed by studies on culture and 
business in the Kingdom. Idris (2007), for instance, describes the Saudi culture as 
‘fairly‎ homogenous’‎ due‎ to‎ Islamic‎ teachings‎ [18]. The author argues that Islam 
influences‎all‎aspect‎of‎Saudi’s‎life‎including‎business‎decisions.‎Additionally,‎Cassell‎
(2012) cited the importance of understanding the Saudi culture for businesses to thrive 
in that culture [92].  
Besides the influence of Islamic teaching, the Saudi society is also bonded by tribal 
traditions inherited over the years. Tribes in the Arab world used to be the basic form of 
organisations -way before Islam- therefore, tribal traditions influence the Saudi culture 
in a profound way.‎As‎Kostiner‎(1990)‎asserts‎“Tribes‎were‎also‎important‎as‎a‎source‎
of the Saudi values system, which stemmed from the tribal segmentary organization that 
dominated the chieftaincy [93]. Political decentralization, minimal administration, kin-
related‎political‎behaviour,‎social‎solidarity‎and‎economic‎cooperation‎[….]”. The tribal 
traditions are still incorporated to the power structure of the Saudi society.  
 
2.4.2 Geography of Saudi Arabia: 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is in the south-west of the continent of Asia bordering 
the Arabian Gulf in the east and the Red Sea in the west, with shared borders with 
Yemen in the south (Figure 2.11). The main cities in Saudi Arabia are: 
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- Riyadh - the capital and seat of government and located in the centre of the 
Kingdom. The estimated population is more than five million people. 
- Jeddah - the second largest city of Saudi Arabia and considered the economic 
capital of the country as well as the gate to the two holy mosques. The estimated 
population of Jeddah is more than three million people.  
- Dammam is located on the east coast. It is a port for the country's east, 
overlooking the Arabian Gulf. After discovering the first oil filed there, 
Dammam became the centre of the oil exploration and extraction operations. 
- Mecca – holy city and the birthplace of Islam, is located in the western province 
of the Kingdom. Its population is estimated at more than 1.5 million people. 
- Medina – is also a holy city located in the west of the country.  It is the incubator 
for the 2
nd
 holy Mosque of the Prophet Mohammed. The population of Medina 
is estimated at more than one million people with thousands of visitors. 
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Figure ‎2-11 Map of Saudi Arabia illustrating geographical location and main cities (maps.google.co.uk) 
 
2.4.3 Saudi Culture: 
 
The culture of a country has a major implication on individuals, organisations, and the 
laws of that country. In order to explore the cultural context in Saudi Arabia, this profile 
refers‎to‎the‎Hofstede‎framework‎for‎cultural‎dimensions.‎Geert‎Hofstede’s‎initial‎work‎
started‎around‎the‎70’s‎to‎study‎employees behaviour in large organisations [94]. As the 
manager of the personnel research department at IBM, Hofstede introduced employee 
opinion surveys to understand individual personalities. The cross-cultural study covered 
over 70 national branches of IBM around the world. After a few years of collecting and 
analysing data Hofstede released the effect of contextual factors on individuals. The 
focus of the study was then shifted from studying individual personalities to the effect 
of national cultures on individuals. The cultural diminution model was introduced in 
1980 to illustrate the cultural influence on work-related values.  The original theory of 
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cultural dimensions proposed four dimensions (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, and masculinity) that affected the value system within a society and 
behaviours of its members. Further research revealed an additional two dimensions 
(time-orientation‎and‎ indulgence).‎ ‎Hofstede’s‎work‎ is‎widely‎accepted‎by‎ researchers‎
and consultants in many fields related to organisations and international management. 
Hofstede’s‎six‎dimensions‎include:‎‎ 
 Power Distance: this dimension is the power distribution within members and 
organisations of that culture. 
 Individualism:‎ indicates‎ individuals’‎ degree‎ of‎ interdependence‎ from‎ the‎ local‎
society.  
 Masculinity: reveals motivation within the collective value system. It measures a 
culture of competition verses the quality of life.  
 Uncertainty Avoidance: measures social ability to deal with ambiguity through 
the‎value‎system‎and‎people’s‎intuitions.‎ 
 Long Term Orientation: the time-orientation of a society describes how people 
maintain links with their past to face challenges of the present and the future.  
 Indulgence: measures the extent of controlling individual desires and impulses. 
 
Hofstede’s‎ model is used in this research to understand the characteristics of Saudi 
national‎culture.‎Understanding‎ the‎contextual‎effects‎of‎ the‎Saudi’s‎value‎system‎and‎
behaviours provides a starting point to develop knowledge on employees and 
organisations working in Saudi Arabia. The characteristic of Saudi national culture is 
illustrated in figure 2.12. As the figure shows, Saudi society is a collectivist nation, and 
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Saudi’s‎exhibit‎great‎respect‎for‎customs‎and‎traditions.‎This‎is‎manifested in a strong 
commitment to family, work groups, and friendships. The society is, also, highly 
hierarchical and tends to have centralised organisations by which roles are well defined 
and accepted by the majority. People within such a culture value security, and hard 
work is applauded. Hence, competition and performance are highly prized. Saudi 
society, also, promotes an assertive decisive management style and personnel feel an 
emotional need for rules. Generally, employer/employee relationships are perceived in 
moral terms and managers take responsibilities for fellow members of their group. The 
downside of such a society includes inherent inequalities and uphold autocratic 
leadership. This can yield rigid codes of belief and behaviour and brings about 
resistance to change and new ideas. Therefore, normative thinking is not criticised and 
the focus is devoted to accomplishing quick results. Comparing the Saudi Arabian 
context‎to‎European‎cultures‎(where‎Hollnagel’s‎(2006)‎resilience‎engineering‎concepts‎
were developed and tested) can reveal significant insights. 
 
Figure ‎2-12 Hofstede six dimensional characteristic of Saudi national culture [95]. 
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These indications of cultural features are unique to each country; therefore, we could 
hypothesise the existence of different behaviour towards resilience in Saudi Arabia in 
comparison with other western cultures.  In fact, the edition of the Time-orientation, for 
instance, was a result of cross-cultural study of the Hofested model. This research 
attempts to test resilience constructs in non-western culture using the example of Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, the following questions needed to be answered before testing and 
extracting main contributing factors to resilience in the Saudi industries. 
 
What are the general features of safety climate in Saudi Arabia? 
What are the factors that influences organisational safety culture in the Kingdom? 
Does Saudi national culture effect resilience engineering within industrial 
organisations there? 
 
So far, studies on resilience have been conducted mainly in western societies (e.g. 
Hansson et al., 2009 in North Sea, Albrechtsen and Besnard, 2014 in Norway, Gomes et 
al., 2009 in Brazil) [96]–[98]. Within the Middle East, Shirali et al. (2012) conducted a 
similar study on chemical plants in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The study indicated 
gaps of knowledge in system safety and challenges in building resilience there [99]. 
Therefore, the current work aims to assess the potential of resilience in the 
manufacturing and process industry in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The formation of 
process and manufacturing in the Kingdom, however, is closely related to the discovery 
of the oil. Most of the industries in the country rely primarily on oil and its derivatives. 
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Hence the next section will explore the discovery of oil and how it relates to industries 
and the economy of the country. 
2.4.4 Saudi Arabian Economy and Oil discovery: 
 
The development of industries in Saudi Arabia is strictly connected to the discovery of 
oil in the country. Thus, in this section the history of this development is presented. The 
story‎ of‎ the‎ oil‎ in‎Arabian‎Peninsula‎ started‎ in‎ 1930’s.‎Oil‎was‎ discovered‎ in‎ nearby‎
Bahrain in 1931. During that period, the country was struggling to recover from the 
great recession of global markets. The Kingdom had given exclusive rights to the 
American company Standard Oil of California (Socal) (later renamed Chevron) to 
explore and extract petroleum from the eastern province. In 1938, further exploration 
and test wells revealed additional discoveries of oil deposits north of Dammam and in 
Abqaiq. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the development had set-backs 
due to shortages of personnel and materials (steel in particular) (McHale, 1980) [100]. 
In 1944, Socal formed a partnership with The Texas Company (Texaco) and established 
the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). The realisation that the large and 
increasing magnitudes of the Saudi Arabian oil deposits required capital investment, 
ARAMCO decided to invite Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) and Standard 
Vacuum Oil (now Mobil) to share development costs and become part owners (McHale, 
1980). With time, ARAMCO crude oil production increased to reach nearly a million 
barrels a day in 1955. The successful exploration of oil reserves in Saudi continued 
rapidly‎ to‎ become‎ the‎ backbone‎ of‎ the‎ Saudi‎ economy.‎ In‎ the‎ 60’s,‎ Saudi‎ Arabia‎
formed the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) with cooperation with 
other countries (Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait) to secure the best price available 
from the major oil corporations. OPEC aimed to ensure stability and eliminate 
fluctuations in oil prices by unifying petroleum policies among its members. 
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After the Second World War ended, oil income exceeded all other sources of 
government revenue. The oil sector provided the government with over three-quarters of 
its revenue and foreign exchange earnings, in addition to two-thirds of the gross 
national product (GNP). Saudi Arabia were producing around 3.5 million barrels a day 
by 1960. During that period, the country were recognised as the world's largest 
exporters of oil (McHale, 1980) [100]. Saudi Arabia has taken steps to expand the 
energy sector and encourage greater investment, especially by foreign companies. The 
government had made an effort to expand its exportation capacity. By 1980, the 
Kingdom had been producing oil at the rate of 95 million barrels a day to the 
international market. This investment has paid off generously where Oil exports 
contributed 98% of all the Kingdom's export earnings, and 90% of the total government 
revenue (CIA, 2015) [90]. In terms of national income, revenues from oil production 
have transformed the Saudi cash economy completely. On a GNP per capita basis, 
Saudis during that period have doubled the income of the Americans and almost five 
times‎the‎income‎of‎the‎average‎Briton.‎Currently,‎Saudi‎Arabia‎is‎ the‎world’s‎ largest‎
producer and exporter of oil, and has one quarter of the‎world’s‎ known‎ oil‎ reserves.‎
Although there are different ways to measure oil reserves, experts have estimated the 
Saudi oil reserves to be more than 260 billion barrels. Most of the oil deposits are 
located in the Eastern Province, including the large onshore field in Ghawar and the 
large offshore field at Safaniya in the Arabian Gulf. Due to technical factors involving 
field size, well-production rates, and reservoir, pressure have made the cost of 
extracting the oil in Saudi Arabia competitive by comparison to any other place in the 
world. Moreover, the close proximity of the production areas facilitates the 
transportation and save costs.   
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Currently, Saudi Arabia possesses about 16% of the world's proven petroleum reserves, 
ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC (CIA, 2015) 
[90]. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2015) estimates Saudi oil reserves 
are around 267 trillion barrels with 63.6 Reserves-to-production ratio [101]. In 2014, 
Saudi Arabia produced around 11.5 thousand barrels/day, and consumed about 3.4% of 
what it produces (three thousand barrels/day). The revenues from this production 
contributes the majority of the $1.616 trillion estimated budget in 2014 (CIA, 2015). 
During the past five years, Saudi Arabia has seen remarkable growth, which included 
the growth or the proportion of the urbanized areas to more than 40%. Furthermore, 
roughly 70% of the population of Saudi Arabia are under the age of 30. 
On the downside of relying on oil and oil derivatives, the Saudi economy is threatened 
by the fluctuation of oil prices. As Kemp (1999) stated, the problem the Saudi economy 
is facing is “buoyed‎by‎oil,‎bound‎by‎its‎uncertainty”‎[102]. The drop of oil prices since 
the mid-1980’s,‎for‎instance,‎has‎hindered‎the‎country’s‎economic‎growth‎and‎has‎had‎a‎
direct effect on job creation (Budhwar and Debrah, 2001) [103].  A more recent 
example of world oil prices affecting the‎Kingdom’s‎economy has happened in 2014. 
World oil prices were fairly stable at $110 a barrel. In mid-2014 the price of Brent crude 
oil dropped to below $48 a barrel. The Saudi economy has suffered and it ran into its 
first budget deficit since 2009 (CIA, 2015). The effect of the drop in oil prices was also 
reflected on the unemployment figures in the country. According to Trading Economics 
(2015), unemployment figures have risen from 5.5% in early 2014 to reach around 6% 
near the end of the year. In order to lessen its dependence on oil, the Saudi government 
has committed since the mid-1990’s‎ to‎ diversify‎ sources‎ of‎ income.‎The‎ government‎
has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), invited foreign investors and 
encouraged the private sector to take responsibility in developing the economy. Despite 
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the government efforts, large state corporations still contribute the majority of the GDP. 
These firms include Saudi ARAMCO, the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), 
The Saudi Telephone Company (STC) and several other large firms (Budhwar and 
Debrah, 2001) [103]. 
Besides oil exports, Saudi Arabia is also developing its additional energy resources, 
sauch as the natural gas that once flared off oil wells is collected and used; and the 
Kingdom has become a producer of refined oil products and petrochemicals such as 
kerosene, diesel oil and gasoline. In addition, the country has other mineral deposits. 
Gold, silver, copper, iron-ore, phosphate and chrome mining has been carried out in the 
past and there are plans restart this sometime in the future. However, due to scarce 
supplies of water in the country, mining such materials in commercial quantities is 
problematic.  
Since 1970, the kingdom adopted a 5-year planning approach to set out the general 
guideline of socio-economic development. The plan addresses the political strategy, 
government funded programmes, resources required, expected major challenges and 
how to meet those challenges. The United Nations (2015) lists the following issues that 
hinder the development of the country:  
- Raising standard of living and improving quality of life. 
- Diversification of economic base. 
- Enhancing non-oil revenues. 
- Balanced regional development. 
- The move to a knowledge-based economy. 
- Enhancing competitiveness. 
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- Development and productive employment of human resources. 
- Sustainability of natural resources. 
Despite those challenges, the country has achieved 3.4% annual growth rate over the 
period 1999-2010. Concerning forging alternative trading sectors, the non-oil 
merchandise exports share in total exports increased from around 8.5% in 2000 to some 
14.3% in 2010 (UN, 2016) [104]. The government commitment to resolve these 
challenges appear to have had positive outcomes and the integration with the global 
market will help in creating a healthy socio-economic environment.   
 
2.4.5 Business environment 
 
The World Bank (2015) has released the annual report that evaluates the effect of 
regulations on the business environment in different countries [89]. Under the annual 
“Doing‎Business”‎report‎series,‎the‎World‎Bank‎Group‎presents‎quantitative‎indicators‎
that measure the effect of regulation on the business life cycle in 189 economies. Saudi 
Arabia is ranked at 49, which is considered high with comparison to the regional 
average. For instance, when comparing the Saudi business environment to other 
regional oil producing countries such as Iraq or the Islamic Republic of Iran, we find 
those countries are ranked at 156
th
 and 130
th
, respectively. Figure 2.13 illustrates the 
ease of doing business in Saudi Arabia with comparison to other regional countries. 
According to the report, Saudi Arabia is committed to improve the business 
environment and encourages new businesses to open. For instance, in 2010 the 
government introduced a one-stop centre at the Ministry of Commerce that merged 
registration procedures and simplified publication requirements. Regarding trading 
across borders, most indicators point to governmental efforts to introduce tools to 
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facilitate‎ trade‎ and‎ boost‎ firms’‎ international‎ competitiveness.‎ On‎ the‎ labour‎ market‎
regulation, employees are required to work around 50-hours/week (6 days/week) with 
the right of health insurance paid by the employers. The trends in the Saudi business 
environment are improving, and government efforts appear to cut bureaucracy and 
encourage new businesses to flourish. The overall effect of governmental regulations 
stands to support a healthy environment for both organisations and employees to 
perform well in the market (World Bank, 2015) [105].  
 
Figure ‎2-13 Saudi Arabia ease of doing business compared with regional economies (World Bank, 2015). 
 
To sum up, Saudi Arabia has a distinctive cultural, geographical and economic 
environment. The country is among the richest in the world, and has a lot of experience 
in producing oil and industries that relay in large on its derivative; however, this 
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industrial progress was not accompanied by legislative and regulatory reforms. In 
addition, the distinctive cultural dimensions regarding high power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, collectivism and short-time orientation makes an interesting case in which to 
assess the safety climate and culture. Thus, this research can contribute considerably to 
the body of knowledge regarding safety culture, safety management and cross-cultural 
organisational studies.  
The next chapter will present the research methodology, which will present a general 
discussion of research philosophy and how to choose appropriate experimental design. 
This will include types of data and data collecting methods in addition to the pre-
analysis criteria and how data is processed. After that, we will look at the way to assess 
the results and the method chosen to analyse the results. 
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3 Chapter Three: Methodology 
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Summary: 
 
The problem of safety cannot be understood without combining social, managerial, and 
organisational factors. Therefore, this study uses an inductive approach in order to 
achieve the research objectives. In the first part, exploratory methods were employed to 
gain deeper understanding of the safety problem in the Saudi context. Those methods 
include literature review, on-site observation and unstructured interview. The 
information obtained from the exploratory approach was used to develop a survey that 
measures the potential of resilience. The aim of this step is to test and validate basic 
resilience in a new cultural context. The survey method was suggested by the Hollnagel 
et al. (2011) framework [10]. The questionnaire was tailored to suite process factories 
working in the Saudi context. The survey included twenty-two contributing factors to 
resilience. It measured factors that characterise resilient and non-resilient systems. The 
results from the survey are used to determine the system-types that dominate the process 
industry in the Kingdom. The questionnaire has 5 sections representing the key aspects 
of potential resilience within organisational processes. The data were collected and 
analysed using a statistical method that describes correlation among the contributing 
factors. By assessing the underlying correlation between those factors, the most relevant 
factors to our data set could then be extracted. The next chapter will present the way the 
data were analysed and shows the main results of the survey. 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
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Research can be defined as a systematic effort in the search for pertinent information on 
a particular topic to gain new knowledge (Kothari, 2004) [106]. The systematic way of 
answering research questions is the methodology of the research. Each research study 
has its own purpose; therefore, the test of hypotheses and discovering answers relies on 
choosing an adequate means of conducting the research. The occurrence of accidents 
with adverse outcomes has inspired many scholars to investigate this phenomenon in 
order to prevent loss of lives and damage to the environment. The Saudi context is of 
special interest to this study as it lacks proper regulations regarding occupational health 
and safety (see chapter two). The lack of studies investigating safety of industrial 
complexes in this country has motivated this study as it may reveal new insights. The 
outcome of this enquiry contributes to the literature of safety in Saudi Arabia, besides 
providing recommendations on how to engineer resilience in that specific context. The 
objectives of this research can be summarised as follow:   
 To gain familiarity with the status of safety at industrial corporations working in 
Saudi Arabia in order to identify core difficulties with safety there. 
 Test and validate resilience engineering concepts cross-culturally. 
 Characterise resilience (system-type) in the Saudi Arabian process industries. 
 Identify the main contributing factors to resilience in the Saudi Arabian process 
industries. 
 
In order to achieve these objectives, this chapter will start by presenting the research 
philosophy which guides the choice of investigation methods and tools. Many writers 
have‎emphasised‎the‎role‎of‎the‎chosen‎‘paradigm’‎[research‎philosophy]‎as‎being‎more‎
important than the research methodology itself (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) [107].  
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The chosen research philosophy provides some assumptions about the nature of 
knowledge and its development. Those assumptions assist in forming a research 
strategy that underpins practical considerations of the methods used. It influences the 
relationship between knowledge and the process by which it is developed. The 
differences between those assumptions are mainly in the region of the nature of reality 
(Ontology) and the nature and scope of knowledge (Epistemology). These differences 
will be discussed in the next section as well as the development of research philosophies 
from a management and industrial‎ organisation’s‎ perspective.‎ The‎ philosophical‎
discussion highlights the strength and weakness of each paradigm in addition to 
justifying the adequacy of the chosen methods. The research methods will be discussed 
in section 3.2 followed by the procedures to be implemented in the context of this study. 
Since the main enquiry of this study is to assess resilience of the KSA process industry, 
the development of measurement tools will be explained in section 3.4. Furthermore, 
details on data collecting and preparation for analysis will be established.  
 
3.2 Philosophical Perspective: 
 
Paradigm as a term is commonly used in the literature with multiple meanings and 
contexts. It is the concept that incorporates the distinct pattern of knowledge or 
thoughts. Therefore, it is important to present some of its different manifestations within 
the scope of this research. The literature underlying organisation research methods can 
be divided into two main approaches. The first was developed in the natural sciences, 
which looked into the objective truth of a natural phenomenon. Therefore, there is great 
focus on experiments to measure quantifiable observables. Experiments help to discover 
relations between variables and their interactions. Those relations are, then, generalized 
to form the universal principles or laws (Brewerton and Millward, 2001, p. 7). This 
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method,‎ generally‎ known‎ as‎ ‘Positivism’,‎ has‎ had‎ great‎ successes‎ and‎ therefore‎
considered the best practice model available for a long time. Influenced by natural 
science,‎Frederick‎Taylor‎(1914)‎published‎‘The Principles of Scientific Management’‎
as a study of time and motion [25]. Time and motion studies continue to mature with the 
work of Frank and Lillian Gilbreth (1919) who constructed techniques to implement the 
ideas on the shop floor [108]. Those studies are now the cornerstone of business 
efficiency measurement. 
 
Challenging this view, the second approach originated in social science using the study 
of psychological and sociological phenomena. Elton Mayo (1945), a human relations 
scholar, emphasised the importance of the non-rational aspects of employees [109]. The 
human relation movement believes that individuals should not be thought of as 
economic entities, and contextual factors must be taken into account. Thus, studies of 
social phenomena are better to be conducted subjectively relying on induction from 
quantitative data. Surveys and interviews are instruments used to collect data; and 
subjective interpretation helps in analyzing it. Attached to this method is the assumption 
that reality cannot be explained by direct reference (cause-effect) to universal laws. This 
approach is generally‎ known‎ as‎ ‘Interpretivism’‎ and‎ it‎ has gained considerable 
momentum, especially among social scientists and organisation theorists. Table (3.1) 
shows the main emphasis of each approach. 
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Table ‎3-1 Major differences between deductive and inductive approaches to research. 
Deductive emphases Inductive emphases 
 Scientific principles.  Gaining an understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to events. 
 Moving from theory to data.  A close understanding of the 
research context. 
 The need to explain causal 
relationship between variables. 
 The collection of qualitative data 
 The collection of quantitative data.  A more flexible structure to permit 
changes of research emphasis as 
the research progresses. 
 The application of controls to 
ensure validity of data. 
 A realisation that the researcher is 
part of the research process. 
 The operationalisation of concepts 
to ensure clarity of definition 
 Less concern with the need to 
generalise. 
 A highly-structured approach.  
 Researcher independent of what is 
being researched. 
 
 The necessity to select samples of 
sufficient size to generalise 
conclusions. 
 
 
Another point of debate emerged from studying the relationship between systems and 
their environments. Classical management theory, for instance, devotes effort to the 
internal‎ design‎ of‎ organisations.‎ Therefore,‎ organisations‎ are‎ viewed‎ as‎ ‘closed’‎
mechanical systems, paying little attention to interactions with the contextual 
environment. The classical view, originating from the natural sciences, tends to divide a 
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system into its simple component parts, each to be examined in detail. Understanding 
and then integrating those parts should be sufficient to control and predict the system 
behavior. This view, however, ran into difficulties, as organizations became more 
complex working in ever changing environments. The close system view was 
challenged by the study of Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1957) on biological organisms 
[110]. Bertalanffy noticed that for an organism (or organisation) to survive, it must 
sustain an appropriate relation with its environment.  Therefore, organisms must be 
‘open’‎ to‎ interaction‎ with‎ their‎ environments.‎ Based‎ on‎ his‎ findings,‎ Bertalanffy‎
developed the principles of General System Theory as a new way of thinking about 
systems of all kinds. 
 
The open-system approach focuses on the environment in which organisations exist. 
Social scientists have always recognised the importance of the contextual environment. 
The‎relationships‎between‎systems’‎internal‎functions‎and‎variations‎in‎the‎surroundings 
are major subjects of their research (e.g. Weiner, 1985) [111]. In order to sustain an 
effective relation with the environment, Morgan (2006) describes the living organism as 
“…‎ ‘open systems’‎ characterised‎ by‎ a‎ continuous‎ cycle‎ of‎ inputs,‎ internal‎
transformation (throughout), output, and feedback (whereby one element of the 
experience‎influences‎the‎next).‎[]…‎A‎living‎organism,‎organisation,‎or‎social‎group‎is‎
a‎fully‎open‎system.”‎[112].  
 
Drawing from these debates, both approaches highlight different features to assess by 
researchers in dealing with scientific enquiries. Although those philosophies may seem 
intuitively contradictory, the fact is that many studies stress the resourcefulness of 
integrating both paradigms. Saunders et al.,‎ (2009)‎argue‎ that‎ “choosing‎between‎one‎
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position and the other is some-what‎unrealistic‎in‎practice”‎[113]. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate‎ to‎ think‎ of‎ the‎ philosophy‎ adopted‎ as‎ a‎ “continuum‎ rather‎ than‎ opposite‎
positions”.‎A‎pragmatic‎position‎promotes‎a‎mixed‎method of positivist and interpretive 
philosophies. Therefore, mixing both deductive and inductive approaches is highly 
appropriate within one study. Saunders et al., (2007) suggests a continuum (Fig 3.1) 
illustrating the nature of business and management research projects [113].  
 
 
Figure ‎3-1 The‎research‎‘onion’:‎layers‎underlying‎the‎choice‎of‎research philosophies. 
 
This research acknowledges the multidisciplinary nature of the questions in hand. 
Keeping‎ in‎ mind‎ each‎ philosophy’s‎ strength‎ and‎ weakness,‎ this‎ research‎ adopts‎ an‎
inductive approach where the nature of the data is qualitative. Therefore, in order to 
gain knowledge on safety in Saudi Arabia exploratory methods are used including 
reviewing the literature, observation, and interviews. The qualitative data will be 
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collected using a survey; however inductive and deductive tools are used to analyse the 
data collected (See section 3.3). Table 3.2 illustrates the design of research approaches 
to achieve the research objectives. The mixed method approach is common in complex 
social phenomena such as organisation, business, and management literature. The next 
section will provide more details on the specific methods used at different stages on this 
study. 
 
Table ‎3-2 Research tools used to achieve research objectives. 
Research Questions Research Objectives Research Tools 
What are the general 
features of the safety 
climate in Saudi Arabia? 
What are the factors that 
influences the 
organisational safety 
culture in the Kingdom? 
Does Saudi national 
culture affect resilience 
engineering within 
industrial organisations 
there? 
Explore the safety climate in Saudi 
Arabian industrial organisations.  
Deductive 
(literature 
review, 
observation, 
interview) 
Is the Saudi Arabian 
process industry resilient? 
Under which category of 
‘System-type’? 
Examine resilience concepts and identify 
the system-type in the Saudi Arabian 
process industries. 
Deductive 
(survey) 
What are the main 
contributing factors to 
resilience engineering in 
the Saudi Arabian energy 
industry? 
Identify the main contributing factors in 
the Saudi Arabian process industry. 
Inductive 
(factor analysis) 
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3.3 Research Methods: 
 
Quantitative and qualitative methods have different ways of collecting data and have 
analysis processes. This thesis uses a mixed method approach to collect and analyse 
data. This approach is increasingly advocated within the business and management 
literature. With the intention of answering the questions of this research, this 
investigation starts with exploratory research to identify core difficulties with safety in 
complex organisations working in KSA. Secondary data, in the form of literature 
review, is also used. The source of these data includes books, academic journals, and 
academic theses. Different data bases are used to explore occupational health and safety 
in Saudi Arabia, such as: Google Scholar, Science Direct, JSTOR, IEEE and SCOPUS. 
The literature review (Chapter 2) includes a brief outline of accident model 
development as well as the main theories that are in-use to analyse the phenomena. In 
addition, a background on management and organisational theory was presented in the 
literature review to understand the complexities within the process industry. The main 
focus of the review illustrates the relationship between the organisation and its 
environment, including the challenges of quantifying the social (human) aspects of 
complex organisations. 
 
In order to achieve the first objective of this research and gain knowledge on safety in 
the Saudi context, an explanatory approach is used. A combination of on-site 
observation and unstructured interviews were used. Both methods provide insights into 
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the organisational culture and dynamics of the employee/manager relationship. 
Furthermore, it permits explanation of the relationships between the organisations at 
different levels within its environment. Primary quantitative data on employees is linked 
to the state of the organisational safety system. To test concepts of resilience within 
industrial complexes and identify the type of resilience, the study uses a generic survey 
that was proposed by Hollnagel (2011) [19]. The survey was tailored and translated into 
Arabic for the process industry in the Kingdom. Surveying is the most commonly used 
deductive approach. It allows the collection of large amounts of data from a sizeable 
sample. In addition, it helps in answering a wide range of questions which makes it 
appropriate to analyse complex phenomena such as the one in hand. The data is then 
analysed quantitatively using inferential statistical tools. The following paragraphs will 
introduce the methods used in more details.  
 
3.3.1 Observations: 
 
In an attempt to collect primary data on site, observation was required to get a feeling 
for safety in the Saudi context. There are qualitative and quantitative types of 
observations; both involve systematic observation of people in order to analyse and 
interpret their behaviour. The participant observation is a qualitative method that 
emphasises discovering meanings that people attach to their actions; whereas structure 
observation put the emphasis on the frequency of those actions. Participant observations 
enabled the researcher to acquire insight into the organisational culture. The data is 
collected through sharing the experience with people within targeted organisations 
which helps in designing the experiment (survey), and in interpreting their answers 
afterwards. Participant observation has deep roots in social anthropology but this 
method is not commonly used in management and business research. However, 
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Resilience Engineering relies on the breadth-before-depth principle which emphasises 
the understanding of the system as a whole (see Section 2.2.3). Therefore, Hollnagel 
(2006; 2011) advocates the use of this method at an early stage [7], [19]. This will help 
in forming general ideas on how the system works and what to look for when designing 
the survey.   
 
The participant observation method is a valuable tool, especially when used in 
combination with other methods. In this research, the observation method was used 
besides a literature review and informal interviews as an exploratory method. All these 
methods serve the intended exploration process of safety in the Saudi context. 
Additionally, since there is little published in the literature about safety and 
organisational culture in the Saudi context, participant observation is applied to obtain 
knowledge about people working in the process industry and learn their symbolic world. 
As‎Delbridge‎and‎Kirkpatrick‎ (1994)‎assert‎“in‎ the‎ social‎ sciences we cannot hope to 
adequately explain the behaviour of social actors unless we at least try to understand 
their‎meanings”‎[114]. Besides, Saunders et al.‎(2007)‎state‎“participant‎observation‎is‎
very high on ecological validity because it involves studying social phenomena in their 
natural context”‎which‎is‎important‎to‎estimate‎the‎boundaries‎of‎the‎enquiry‎[113].   
 
The on-site observation was conducted in a small chemical plant in the Jeddah industrial 
area (a western province of Saudi Arabia). Since the research is concerned with safety 
and resilience, it was expected that participants will be reluctant to provide information 
about it. This issue was documented in many other studies where the blame culture is 
the norm (e.g. Shirali et al., 2012) [99]. Therefore, it‎was‎important‎to‎gain‎employees’‎
trust‎ to‎ get‎ an‎ accurate‎ assessment.‎ This‎ study‎ used‎ the‎ ‘participant‎ as‎ observer’‎
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technique by which the purpose of the visits was revealed to the participants.  Because 
the goal of the visits was disclosed, employees were cooperative and helpful in 
providing valuable information on the safety of the organisation. The participant as 
observer technique was also necessary to pave the way to conduct informal interviews 
with the workers. The results from the observation stage will be discussed in detail in 
the results chapter.  
  
3.3.2 Interviews  
 
The use of interviews can assist in gathering relevant reliable primary data. 
Nevertheless, the practical implementation of this method should be consistent with the 
purpose of the research and research strategy. Interviews may vary due to the level of 
formality and structure. Saunders et al. (2007) suggest three types of interviews which 
are: 
 Structured interview. 
 Semi-structured interview. 
 Unstructured or in-depth interview. 
 
The aim of using the interview in this study is to explore the general topic of safety in 
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, unstructured interviews are used in this study to seek insight 
and gather data on the safety culture in the process industry. The interviews were 
conducted face to face and informally with no predetermined list of questions. The 
interviewee was given the opportunity to guide the conduct of the interview and talk 
freely about safety of the organisation, accident events, behaviours, and beliefs 
regarding safety. When the interviewee reveals something interesting, he was asked to 
elaborate on the issue.  Informal interviews offer the interviewee a relaxed environment 
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to provide information freely and provide the researcher the opportunity to direct the 
interview when necessary to gain in depth data. The unstructured interview also 
supports the breadth-first principle by not focusing on details but the normal state of the 
system as a whole. The main participants of the interviews were operators, their 
immediate supervisors, engineers, and a production manager. 
 
 
3.3.3 Summary 
 
In order to explore the safety climate in Saudi Arabian industrial complexes, three 
methods were used: reviewing the literature, on-site observation and in-depth 
interviews. Each of these methods were implemented carefully to gain the required 
knowledge and establish the scope of the problem. This exploration process provided 
the base for examining resilience through adequate procedures, which will be discussed 
next.   
 
3.4 Research technique and procedures: 
 
One of the aims of this project is to assess contributing factors of resilience engineering 
in the process industry.  While resilience is the core concept here, this section will 
highlight its main attribute and measurement tools before going into details of the 
procedures. The resilience of a system relies greatly on its adaptive capacity. Adaptive 
organisations attempt to improve their performance by reacting to variations in their 
environment or disturbance to their production. The basic abilities of resilience 
engineering (monitor, anticipate, respond, and learn) capture the adaptive capacity of 
organisations and their ability to function at their normal-state level of production even 
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after undesirable events (Hollnagel et al., 2011) [19]. The concept of resilience 
engineering attempts to sustain a balance among different organisational factors. Those 
factors might seem to contradict (such as: flexibility versus control). In order to survive, 
organisations must respond to arising new circumstances and change plans accordingly. 
At the same time, it is necessary to have appropriate governors over organisational 
processes with the aim of managing their activities. 
The concept of resilience has been studied for a long time in disciplines such as biology, 
psychology, and ecology (Dinh et al., 2012) [115]. However, this concept is still 
relatively new to complex industrial organisations. Therefore, ways to measure, test, 
assess, and validate data are still under developed (Shirali et al., 2012) [99]. Thus far, 
assessing resilience is mainly accomplished through quantitative methods.  Hollnagel et 
al. (2011) proposes a framework to assess potential resilience in a complex socio-
technical environment [19].  The framework consists of identifying key aspects of a 
system, selecting assessment parameters and electing resilience factors that are relevant 
to the context. 
In engineering systems, several studies have tried to use qualitative methods to measure 
the resilience of complex systems.  These methods have their origins in the natural 
sciences. For instance, Mitchell et al. (2006) assert a qualitative approach borrowed 
from materials science to create a resilient system [116]. In their view, resilience of a 
system is expressed as the amount of energy stored before the instability state, whereas 
Slocum and Mendelssohn (2008) measured resilience through the recovery rate [117]. 
This could be done by modelling an experimental disturbance to a system and then 
assessing the recovery rate. The result of the experiments is then compared to known 
stress gradients. Carvalho et al. (2008) used micro-incident analysis to assess nuclear 
plant resilience [118]. This kind of applied research tends to emphasise the local 
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environment and tests are very sensitive to small variations. Such approaches, however, 
maintain the sequential view of safety that understands system behaviour through 
comprehending its component parts. Hollnagel et al. (2006) criticised this approach and 
argued that societies and organisations exhibit an overwhelming degree of complexity 
[51]. Hence, most of these methodological efforts have focused on nominal resilience 
only.‎ In‎ the‎author’s‎opinion,‎ those‎attempts‎ look‎ terribly‎static‎and‎ linear‎and‎cannot‎
describe the dynamics of accidents. 
This research proposes a resilience engineering framework to understand the ability of 
sociotechnical systems to respond to unexpected events. Within this scope, a 
quantitative approach is used to measure the potential resilience of industrial 
organisations. A questionnaire that targets employees and managers was developed to 
explore factors of interest to improve safety. Hollnagel (2011) proposed a generic 
questionnaire for each basic ability of resilience [19]. Table 3.3 gives an example of 
questions that could be tailored to a specific context. The survey uses qualitative 
responses that could be quantified at a later stage. Additional information on the 
questionnaire will be discussed in the next section. A factor analysis (FA), is then used 
to identify the most relevant factors to the petrochemical sector. The result of the 
analysis is then compared with findings from other studies from the industry (e.g. 
Shirali et al., 2013) [99]. The key factors are then used to build a specific construct that 
suits the process sector. More on FA and data preparation will be explained in section 
3.5. 
 
Table ‎3-3 Examples of detailed issues relating to the ability to monitor (Hollnagel, 2011) 
Indicator list How have the indicators been defined? (By analysis, by tradition, by industry 
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consensus, by the regulator, by international standards, etc.) 
Relevance When was the list created? How often is it revised? On what basis is it 
revised? Who is responsible for maintaining the list? 
Indicator type How‎many‎of‎the‎indicators‎are‎of‎the‎‘leading’‎type‎and‎how‎many‎are‎of‎the‎
‘lagging’‎type?‎Do‎indicators‎refer‎to‎single‎or‎aggregated‎measurements? 
Validity How is the validity of an indicator established (regardless of whether it is 
‘leading’ or‎‘lagging’)?‎Do‎indicators‎refer‎to‎an‎articulated‎process‎model,‎or‎
just‎to‎‘common‎sense’? 
Delay For‎‘lagging’‎indicators,‎how‎long‎is‎the‎typical‎lag?‎Is‎it‎acceptable? 
Measurement 
type 
What‎is‎the‎nature‎of‎the‎‘measurements’?‎Qualitative or quantitative? (If 
quantitative, what kind of scaling is used?) 
Measurement 
frequency 
How often are the measurements made? (Continuously, regularly, every now 
and then?) 
Analysis / 
interpretation 
What is the delay between measurement and analysis /interpretation? How 
many of the measurements are directly meaningful and how many require 
analysis of some kind? How are the results communicated and used? 
Stability Are the measured effects transient or permanent? 
Organisational 
support 
Is there a regular inspection scheme or schedule? Is it properly resourced? 
 
 
3.4.1 Measuring organisational resilience: survey design  
 
Resilience is a family of related concepts that challenge internal and external forces. 
Those forces are dealt with through different organisational mechanisms. Organisational 
internal processes and functions exhibit the main concept of resilience, which allow for 
it to be adaptive. Therefore, measuring the potential of resilience could be attained using 
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a qualitative approach. This research uses a questionnaire to assess the potential of 
resilience in the industrial sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A pilot questioner 
was designed based on the Hollnagel et al. (2011) study for the UK rail infrastructure 
[19] (Appendix A). The questionnaire includes concepts that characterise resilient and 
non-resilient systems.  The questionnaire has 4 sections representing the key aspects of 
resilience functions within organisational processes in addition to a section on key 
demographic information (age, gender, nationality, etc.).  Twenty-two factors relating to 
the basic four abilities were examined. The 22 factors were selected based on two 
studies conducted in the UK and Islamic Republic of Iran (Wilson et al., 2009; Shirali et 
al., 2013) [99], [119]. In the Wilson et al. study, the authors found two factors that are 
less correlated than the other 20. These two factors were included in the study to 
validate the results and identify differences across industries. A comparison between the 
similar study of chemical plants in Iran (Shirali et al., 2013) and the process industry in 
the KSA could shed light on whether resilience constructs are consistent across 
industries and cultures [99]. In addition, if different industries have similar results this 
would validate the result of the original study. 
The pilot study was conducted at a chemical plant in the Jeddah industrial complex. The 
aim of the pilot study is to acquire key relevant aspects of the systems operating in the 
process industries. This is the second step of the Hollnagel et al. (2011) suggested 
framework [19]. The results from the pilot study indicated some important changes that 
could be made. For instance, the phrasing of the questions needed more suitable 
language for the industry and the targeted audience. An important change to the scale 
used was necessary.  Hollnagel et al. (2011) used a scale of 6 to measure the 
respondent's‎opinion.‎However,‎based‎on‎the‎pilot‎study,‎an‎additional‎“not‎applicable”‎
was found to be important for some responders. Therefore, the questionnaire would use 
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a scale of 7 (1: Strongly disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Slightly disagree, 4: Slightly agree, 
Agree, Strongly Agree, 7: N/A). The pilot study also showed the sensitivity of 
conducting‎such‎studies‎in‎different‎languages.‎Translating‎the‎questionnaire‎“word-for-
word”‎ resulted‎ in‎ respondent‎ confusion‎ and‎ a‎ large‎ variation‎ in‎ the‎ results‎ when‎
compared to studies from different parts of the World. Therefore, when translating, it is 
important to account for the cultural factor in different locations.  This issue was also a 
concern to Hollnagel and his colleagues. A copy of the translated questionnaire could be 
found in Appendix B.  
The number of responses was based on an average of 7 people for each one of the 22 
factors. Whereas a rule of thumb it should be between 5 to 10 respondents to each item. 
This average is widely used and an acceptable range for this survey. The same range 
was used in the study on the UK rail infrastructure and some other studies (e.g. Wilson 
et al., 2009). Thus, the acceptable number of responses needed is between 110 and 220. 
The target samples for the survey are floor shop worker, maintenance, engineers, and 
managers, all working at different levels in the related sectors. The survey was 
distributed in two forms: hard copies and an online survey. The target samples were 
approached either personally, or through online media. The respondents were given a 
brief introduction about the study and estimated time to fill in the questionnaire. The 
hard copies were collected personally; whereas, online responses were transferred to 
excel format and prepared for factor analysis.  
 
3.4.2 Principle Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
While methods of analysing raw data may differ depending on the subject at hand, this 
section describes the process of extracting meaningful information from the survey 
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responses. This process of systematically applying statistical and/or logical techniques 
to describe and illustrate, condense and recap and evaluate the data is called data 
analysis (Shamoo and Resnik, 2003) [120]. Data analysis is common practice to ensure 
data integrity and distinguish the phenomenon of interest from the noise (statistical 
fluctuations). Factor analysis (FA) is a statistical method used to describe correlated 
variables in terms of a potentially lower number of unobserved variables called factors. 
It is widely used to develop or evaluate tests or extrapolate measurements of a particular 
constructs or knowledge areas. There are two main uses of FA: 
a) Exploratory: with the aim of gathering information about relationships among 
variables.  This approach helps in developing a theory. 
b) Confirmatory: to test a hypothesis by looking at a set of variables. 
Therefore, FA was selected for this research in order to test resilience at a complex 
industrial level. In addition, it will help in identifying underlying trends between various 
safety factors. 
FA includes many techniques to capture linear correlations from variables. It reduces 
the number of variables so we can study the variability within these correlations. 
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is an advanced technique of FA. PCA transforms 
the original variables into a smaller set of components that have strong linear 
correlations.  This technique allows the researcher to investigate the variance in all the 
variables, whereas, the Standard Factor Analysis (SFA) only allows the study of shared 
variance between variables. When using FA, it is important to keep in mind that 
relationships between components are not necessarily independent. PCA has three main 
steps: 
1- Assessing the suitability of the data. 
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2- Component extraction. 
3- Component rotation and interpolation. 
 
1- Assessing the data 
To conduct PCA, the data must be in a suitable form to use FA on them. This requires a 
sample size sufficient to carry out the analysis. There is great debate on what size is 
sufficient; however, a rule of thumb is used in this research where each item needs 
between 5 to 10 subject responses. Another factor to insure the suitability of the data is 
to test the strength of relationships between the variables. Only strong loading factors 
are chosen (whereby r > 0.3). 
2- Component extraction 
One of the challenges when using PCA is to select a sufficient number of components 
that best represent the interrelationships among the original variables. The difficulty lies 
in striking a balance between two conflicting needs. One is to find a simple solution, 
therefore the need to reduce the number of components chosen. The second is to explain 
the variance in the original data comprehensively. This means adding more components 
to get a detailed and complete picture. Balancing the efficiency and the depth of the 
analysis is not an easy task. Therefore, there are few ways that can be used to ensure the 
adequate level of analysis in choosing the number of components. This research uses 
Horn’s‎ (1965)‎ Parallel‎ Analysis‎ (PA),‎ which‎ assesses‎ the‎ validity‎ of‎ the‎ underlying‎
factor structure through comparing the eigenvalues of the real data obtained with a 
random sample of the same size [121]. 
3- Component rotation and interpolation 
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After choosing the optimum number of components, we need to understand the 
correlation between the components. The components might be uncorrelated and in this 
case the items are more independent and easy to interpret.  If the components are 
correlated it will be harder to interpret the results. Rotating the components does not 
change the solution but shows the loading of the correlations. Both correlated and 
uncorrelated are similar and the researcher should choose the easiest method to explain 
the phenomena. 
All‎the‎data‎will‎be‎fed‎to‎SPSS‎to‎conduct‎the‎PCA.‎The‎‘Varimax‎rotation’‎method‎is‎
used to minimise the number of the original variables. SPSS is a predictive analytics 
software package used for statistical analysis. The result of the data analysis will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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4 Chapter Four: Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
. 
 
90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary: 
 
In this chapter, we presented the main results of the factors affecting Resilience 
Engineering in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In order to gather information about the 
process industry in the Saudi context, it was necessary to use on-site observation and 
unstructured interviews. The observation revealed superficial understanding of safety 
among employees. Safety measures are limited to fire extinguishers and safety banners. 
Safety manuals are outdated with no real authority to enforce rules. In addition, safety 
training only takes place after incidents occur with no specialised personal on safety or 
comprehensive safety management systems in place. The informal interview showed 
that concerns about safety are common among the staff; however, this did not have an 
effect on the daily practises. Employees still prefer to get the task done even if it means 
taking short-cuts. Some safety measures exist such as safety shoes and helmets; 
however, rules appear to be relaxed. Supervisors struggle to enforce such safety 
measures on employees because the majority of them think it will hinder getting the job 
done. Managers seem to understand the risks and their way of dealing with it is to 
conduct safety issues on the agenda after the occurrence of a mishap. The investigation 
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into the accident points towards many factors regarding organisational, managerial, 
technological, and human issues. Those factors could be a concise way of viewing 
safety as a control problem and, therefore, more safety measures, and control over those 
factors (small agents) is recommended to fix it. The discussion of those results show the 
failure of the linear model and will be presented in the next chapter.  
A survey was conducted incorporating 119 blue collar workers and managers at 
different positions in the process industry. The survey measures 22 items under five 
themes in resilience engineering framework. The data were analysed though exploratory 
Principle Components Analysis.  The initial results showed seven main components that 
explains the variance within the data set. The further analysis indicated a four-factor 
solution with 10 highly interrelated items. The final four factors explain the majority 
(65.6%) of the variance within the data set.  
The analysis of the data indicated an optimal three-factor solution to resilience in the 
KSA process industry. The extracted three factors are: efficient communication, 
information availability, and the ability to deal with external pressure. Those items 
correspond‎to‎the‎organisation’s‎ability‎to‎be‎flexible‎under‎various‎working‎conditions‎
and adjust to disruptions.  Managers need to have control over working activities, and at 
the same time have efficient communication channels with workers. Communicating 
changes to work plans whenever problems arise is essential to the safety of the 
organisation. In addition, safety training and manuals should help the organisation to 
minimise mishap risk. Focusing on production and relying on outdated manuals can put 
organisations at risk of losing people and disrupting productivities. Employers should 
be given enough time to plan, reflect, and carry out their activities. 
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Regarding the similarities across industries, the findings are not conclusive. Further 
studies should account for all variants within the experiment. Although the final 
analysis shows that factors extracted have comparable loading factors, this was not 
reflected on the order of the constructs. The variability suggests that different industries 
have different contributing factors. This could also be the case for different 
organisations in the same sector. Perhaps these findings reflect the flexible nature of 
resilience where it attends to organisation specific needs.  
Finally, we find that the energy sector in the KSA appears to be resilient. Further study 
should examine whether this resilience is systematic or casual. The observation seems 
to suggest the latter. Additional investigation is needed to clear up the maturity level of 
resilience of the organisations working in the KSA. The next chapter will discuss the 
findings in more detail, the limitations of the experiment and summarise the main 
conclusions. 
 
4.1 Exploratory Results: 
 
The methodology chapter explained a mixed approach strategy to answer the questions 
of this study.  Qualitative techniques comprise most of the tools used especially for the 
exploratory part. The first section of this chapter will discuss the results of the 
exploratory part of the study, which includes on-site observation and informal 
interviews. Next, the case study will be presented, followed by illustrating how the data 
were collected and then analysed.  
4.1.1 Observations: 
Starting with the observation, the on-site observation was conducted through visits to a 
chemical plant in a specialised industrial area in the western province of Saudi Arabia. 
93 
 
The western province has a few refineries that are specialised in producing oil 
derivatives including various grades of fuel oil and gasoline. The contact was 
established after having an interview with a production manager working there. In the 
meeting, the purpose of the study was explained and a permission to access and observe 
was agreed on. The work force of the company was estimated to be around 200 
employees. The plant uses a divisional structure where each department specialises in a 
predefined organisational management hierarchy. The organisational workplace was 
designed to support a positive work environment with workflow sequence in mind. The 
products move easily from one department to the next, and the work place is well lit and 
ventilated. On the safety management front, the plant had few personnel that were 
responsible for safety in the production line but they had no authority to enforce it on 
their fellow operators. The organisation had no safety management system in place nor 
was it part of a quality management system. Safety measures and indicators were not 
integrated in the product design or as a part of the product quality. The lack of safety on 
the conceptual level gave the impression that safety was defined in terms of 
occupational‎ injuries‎ and‎ damage‎ to‎ the‎ company’s‎ property.‎ This‎ view‎ of‎ safety‎ is‎
clearly outdated and adopts a passive approach to accident prevention. The existence of 
a passive sequential view of accidents insinuates that organisational accident 
investigations focus on hunting down broken components to improve safety.  
Nevertheless, the plant has some safety measures in place such as safety banners and 
fire‎extinguishers‎at‎operators’‎disposal.‎Operators‎were‎not‎allowed‎to‎work‎if‎they‎had‎
no safety shoes and gloves always; however, in some cases, operators were allowed to 
work without them. The lack of consistency in implementing safety rules indicates a 
trade-off between safety and production line performance. Safety manuals were found 
with some of the supervisors but were hard to find with operators. The manuals appear 
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to have basic information about safety but most of it was outdated‎(1990’s).‎There‎were‎
no periodic meetings to discuss safety, with safety only being discussed once an event 
has occurred (either an accident or a near miss). The general organisational culture 
seemed to favour production over safety. The lack of safety culture was noticed also 
through‎ the‎ absence‎ of‎ safety‎ rhetoric‎ in‎ the‎ company’s‎wall‎ charts‎ and‎ posters.‎ The‎
wall‎ charts‎were‎mainly‎ informative‎about‎ the‎plant’s‎own‎products‎ and‎partnerships.‎
Regarding employee/ supervisor communication, informal communication appeared to 
be the main channel even with the existence of formal channels (emails, letters, etc.).  
In general, the observation gave the impression that safety was not a priority to the 
organisation; however, there was some safety instruction in place. This study adopts the 
breath-first principle (see section 3.2.1) which advocates a holistic view to understand 
the normal functioning of the system. The breath-first principle emphasises general 
discovery of behaviour patterns and the meaning behind them. Within this scope, a 
participant observation method was used to gain general knowledge and understand the 
normal function of the organisation. The on-site observation was exercised at a 
chemical plant in Saudi Arabia to acquire insight into contextual factors relating to 
safety in the process industries. Regarding resilience, the observation pointed to a poor 
safety culture to support resilience. This provides a basis to go deeper into 
understanding the organisational function as a whole. However, exploring more areas 
related to safety will help in explaining some of the contradictions that were observed. 
The interviews will examine how safety is defined there and check the existence of 
resilience abilities within that system. Moreover, the interviews will shed light on the 
nature of trade-offs that operators, managers, and supervisors have to make normally.  
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4.1.2 Unstructured interviews: 
 
The interview method was used to collect data concerning safety at a chemical plant 
working in Saudi Arabia.  The unstructured interviews were selected to ensure a relaxed 
environment were personnel feel free to guide the interview. When an area of interest 
came up, the interviewees where asked to elaborate on the issue. The informal 
interviews with personnel helped in clarifying the picture. Operators talked freely about 
their concerns with the safety of the plant; however, no one had read safety manuals or 
seemed to believe that it would help in preventing accidents. The majority found those 
manuals‎useless‎in‎real‎life‎and‎some‎expressed‎the‎view‎that‎accidents‎are‎the‎‘will‎of‎
God’‎ and‎ cannot‎ be‎ prevented.‎ When‎ asked‎ about‎ previous‎ accidents,‎ many‎ of‎ the‎
operators tell you a story about it and many more a near-miss event. They 
acknowledged the‎ manager’s‎ efforts‎ after‎ those‎ events‎ in‎ promoting‎ safety‎ and‎
conducting meetings; however, they found those meetings bureaucratic and just a form 
of control over their work. Moreover, the observation of operators did not reflect any 
safety mechanism except common sense. They view the instruction in manuals as 
rigged and a hindrance to getting the work done. That was reflected in their practices of 
short cuts where some of them are proud of developing new ways of reducing the time 
needed to get the work done. It was concerning that some workers have said that they 
did not have safety training. When they were asked to elaborate, they said they believed 
that‎ ‘it‎ is‎ a‎ waste‎ of‎ time’‎ and‎ they‎ can‎ carry‎ out‎ the‎ work‎ fine‎ without‎ it.‎ Some‎
supervisors have expressed their frustrations about operators not following simple 
safety measures such as wearing safety shoes. However, supervisors seem to worry 
more about getting the work done so they turn a blind eye when rules are twisted. When 
asked about safety most of the interviewees think of fire safety and not many seem to 
realise the general concept of safety even with those who attended safety training. Since 
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most of the safety practices are outdated, no one has heard of resilience engineering 
even on the managerial level. Managers do understand the importance of safety; 
however, they focus more on production efficiency. When asked about safety training 
and manuals, managers believe that the current programmes are adequate and do the job. 
Many of them have emphasised the learning obtained from previous accidents and the 
near miss events. When such events occur, they conduct special meetings to discuss and 
inform employees of the actions taken.  
 
4.2 Survey Results: 
 
This thesis tries to find the most relevant factors affecting resilience in the process 
industry. In order to do that, a survey was published covering 22 factors under five 
themes of resilience engineering. The questionnaire was aimed at floor-shop workers 
and managers at different levels of industrial organisations. The sample size was chosen 
as 5 responses for each of the 22 items with a total of 119 participants. The data were 
collected as hard copies and in digital form. In order to analyse the data, SPSS was used 
to identify the association between factors relating to safety in the process industry. An 
overview of the data analysis process is shown in Figure 4.3. A principal component 
analysis (explanatory factor analysis) was used to identify the correlation between the 
22 variables. This chapter presents the summary of the data collected, discusses the 
analysis process, and highlights the significant findings. 
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Figure ‎4-1 Overview of the steps in a factor analysis. Rietveld & Van Hout (1993). 
 
4.2.1 Initial Analysis  
 
4.2.1.1 Measures of appropriateness of Factor Analysis  
The first stage in the analysis is to make sure that the data set is suitable for conducting 
PCA. This is done in two steps. First, we test the data using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
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(KMO)‎test‎of‎sampling‎adequacy‎and‎the‎Bartlett's‎‘Test‎of‎Sphericity’.‎The‎value‎of‎
the KMO measure of sampling adequacy for this set of variables is .638, which would 
be‎labelled‎as‎‘mediocre’.‎The‎Bartlett's‎test‎is‎used‎to‎compare‎the‎observed‎correlation‎
matrix to the identity matrix (null hypothesis). The test helps to check if there is a 
certain redundancy between the variables that can be summarised with a few number of 
factors. If the Sig. value for this test is less than our alpha level, we reject the null 
hypothesis. The Sig. value for this analysis leads us to reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that there are correlations in the data set. In other words, the data set is 
appropriate for factor analysis. The results of the KMO and Bartlett's test is highlighted 
in Table 4.1. In addition, we examine the correlation among the items with loading r > 
0.3. Having items that correlate with 0.3 or above ensures that PCA is suitable for our 
data.  
 
Table ‎4-1 KMO and Bartlett's Test. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Determine the number of factors to retain  
After making sure that the data set is suitable to be analysed using PCA, the second 
stage is to select a sufficient number of factors to be extracted. This task is challenging 
since there are no fixed rules to follow. The researcher has to reach a balance between 
the number of components extracted and interpretability of those components. Choosing 
a large number of components will explain the variance in the data better; however, it 
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will make the interpretation of those components problematic.  On the other hand, 
choosing fewer components makes the analysis easier but might not explain the 
majority of the variance within the data set due to the loss of details by omitting further 
factors.  
Although there is no standard way of selecting the ideal number of factors to be 
extracted, there are three main steps to decide on the number of components extracted 
which are as follows: 
1- Using a Kaiser Criterion of eigenvalue > 1.00. 
2- Looking for dramatic changes (Breaks) of the line graph from the Scree Plot. 
3- Using Parallel Analysis to compare the eigenvalues of our data with randomly 
generated ones. 
Using the Kaiser Criterion of eigenvalue greater than 1, Table R.2 displays the total 
variance explained by all the factors. The first column in the table shows seven 
components of the required eigenvalues.  Those 7 components explain around 67% of 
the total variance in the data set (3
rd
 column in Table 4.2). In other words, the majority 
of the variance is explained by those seven factors.   
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 Table ‎4-2 Total variance explained for components with eigenvalue greater than one.  
 
  
The second step is using Scree Plot (Figure 4.4) to look for any breaks in the line graph. 
The Scree plot displays the eigenvalues associated with a component or factor (in this 
research we use both words interchangeably) in descending order versus the number of 
the component or factor. The plot is a visual tool to allow the researcher to check which 
components explain most of the variability in the data. Since we are using PCA as an 
exploration technique, there are no clear-cut rules to choose the ideal number of 
components. Therefore, the researcher should use his/her best judgement and then 
reiterate the analysis. Figure 4.2 shows one obvious break at the 2
nd
 factor. This means 
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that the first two components capture much more of the variance than the reaming 
components. Another less noticeable change is after the 5
th
 factor. This makes a good 
case to extract the first two or the first five components in our analysis instead of seven. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-2 Scree plot of 22 factors. 
 
The third step is to use a parallel analysis to compare the eigenvalues in our data to 
randomly generate eigenvalues of the same sample size. Parallel analysis is a method 
for determining the number of components to retain from PCA. Since SPSS does not 
have a built in parallel analysis function, we use Monte Carlo PCA software to conduct 
the analysis. Depending on the number of variables and responses, the Monte Carlo 
software generates an average eigenvalue (the number of iterations used is 100) from a 
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random set of data of the same size as our data. By systematically comparing the 
eigenvalues in Table 4.2 with the corresponding randomly generated values (Table 4.3 
using Monte Carlo PCA) we can assess components that can be retained. Factors with 
eigenvalues greater than the randomly generated ones indicate the significance of these 
factors. In our parallel analysis, we find that the first four components have eigenvalues 
greater than the random ones. This indicates that we could retain the first four 
components instead of seven shown by the total variance (Table 4.2).  
 
Table ‎4-3 Monte Carlo PCA randomly generated eigenvalues.  
Root Means Percentile 
1 1.869047 2.019554 
2 1.709267 1.819885 
3 1.593962 1.689961 
4 1.48495 1.574664 
5 1.399385 1.468939 
6 1.314733 1.373197 
7 1.238954 1.299919 
8 1.17093 1.219056 
9 1.102134 1.1515 
10 1.040196 1.095207 
11 0.976506 1.023401 
12 0.920375 0.969893 
13 0.860774 0.91627 
14 0.800942 0.860483 
15 0.745529 0.800845 
16 0.6954 0.744828 
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17 0.648046 0.691017 
18 0.59233 0.641738 
19 0.540567 0.593743 
20 0.492331 0.549899 
21 0.433975 0.488784 
22 0.369665 0.429793 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Criteria for selecting items  
So far, to determine which components to retain, we used the Kaiser Criterion of 
eigenvalue > 1.00, then looked for breaks of the graph from the scree plot and finally 
used Parallel Analysis. The analysis showed seven factors that explain the majority of 
the variance in the data. However, the scree plot indicated that the first 2 components 
explain the variance more than the remaining factors. Lastly, the parallel analysis 
indicates that the first four factors are more significant than the rest. After a few 
iterations, we find that a three-component solution is adequate to explain the variance in 
our data set. There are legitimate reasons to include more components; however, the 
results of other solutions were not convincing or less efficient for various reasons. For 
instance, when we compare a three-component solution to other solutions we find that 
the total variance is explained better in the three factors solution. In this study, we are 
interested in reducing the number of factors contributing to resilience engineering in the 
process industry. This will give the industry a chance to focus their efforts on the most 
significant factors. Our cautious approach of limiting the analysis to only three factors 
does not mean totally disregarding the other factors in practice.  
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In order to improve the results, the third stage of the analysis looks at the 
interrelationships between the selected components and the rest of the items. The goal at 
this stage is to include items which contribute to a meaningful measure of an underlying 
factor and to remove items that weaken measurement of the underlying factors. In this 
research, we are using the following criteria: 
 Communality of items with loading > 0.5. 
 Factor loading with each item: primary interrelation above 0.5, preferably above 
0.6. 
 Item cross-loadings: by assessing how strongly each item loads on each other 
factor (a gap of at least ~.2 between primary and cross-loadings). 
 Keeping items with meaningful and useful membership to a factor: by reading 
over the wording of each item and considering the extent to which the items 
appear to make a non-redundant contribution to the identified latent factor. 
 Reliability: by checking the internal consistency of each factor using Cronbach's 
alpha and checking the "Alpha if item removed" option to determine whether 
removal of any additional items would improve reliability. 
The communality Table 4.4 shows the interrelation between the 3 components and the 
rest of the items. By critically considering items with loading > 0.5, we can see that 
there are five items that satisfy the first criterion. After using the rest of the criteria, 
there were 10 items considered significant and retained for further analysis.  
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Table ‎4-4 Three components solution communalities. 
 
To sum up, the analysis shows that a four-component solution is the most appropriate 
for our data. Therefore, the next step is to force SPSS into using the data to create the 
four-component solutions. This was done by using the same method of dimension 
reduction and limiting the number of extracted factors to 3 instead of using the 
eigenvalue > 1.0.  For further information please find the full tables attached in 
Appendix C. The results of the final analysis are shown in the next section.  
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4.2.2 Final Analysis: Four factors solution 
 
This section shows the final results of the three-component solution. The results of the 
initial analysis point to a significant seven component solution. A further analysis was 
conducted to determine the appropriate number of components to keep. The analysis 
indicated that a three-factor solution is suitable for the data set. In addition, after 
assessing the communality table we excluded items that predetermine criteria. A 
summary of the final results are as follows.   
Table 4.5 shows the results of KMO and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity.  The KMO has 
improved slightly from 0.638 to 0.689, whereas the cumulative total variance explained 
has decreased from 67% for the seven factors to 65.6% for the four factors. This might 
be viewed as a down side of the component reduction. However, when comparing the 
cumulative total variance explained for the three factors we find that it has increased by 
over 22%. The total variance explained is shown in Table 4.6. The correlation matrix 
(shown in Table 4.7) describes the statistical relationship between the three factors. 
Table 4.8 illustrates the proportion of each variable's variance that can be explained by 
the three components solution (i.e. the underlying latent continua).  
Table ‎4-5 Three component‎solution‎KMO‎and‎Bartlett’s‎tests. 
 
Table ‎4-6 Three component solution total variance explained. 
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Table 4.7 The correlation matrix for four component solution. 
   
 
Table ‎4-7 Communalities for four component solution. 
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In addition, looking at the Component Correlation Matrix we assess the strength of the 
relationship between the four factors. Table 4.9 shows the results with the correlation 
matrix when using Oblimin rotation. The Oblimin rotation shows a significant 
interrelation between the 3 components. This means that using different rotation 
methods will produce a slightly different matrix. The output of the Varimax rotation is 
shown in Table 4.10.  
Table ‎4-8 Component correlation matrix for the Direct Oblimin rotation. 
 
 
Table ‎4-9 Component correlation matrix for the Varimax rotation. 
 
 
Finally, in order to interpret the result, we need to identify items with strong 
interrelation with the four components. The component matrix (Table 4.11) shows the 
factor loading for each item on those 3 components. Items with strong interrelation are 
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then linked to the general themes of resilience engineering.  The final result is attached 
in Appendix D. 
Table ‎4-10 Component matrix for four component solution. 
 
 
 
4.3 Analysis: 
 
This section discusses the interpretation of the results. The data were collected to assess 
the resilience constructs in the KSA and to identify the most relevant factors in the 
process industry in Saudi Arabia. The main questions under these two goals for the 
research are: 
1. Is the Saudi Arabian process industry resilient? Under which category of 
‘System-kind’?‎ 
2. What are the main contributing factors to resilience engineering in the Saudi 
Arabian energy industry? 
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To answer these questions, this research used a quantitative approach to assess and 
extract relevant factors to resilience engineering (RE) in the Saudi culture. Some of the 
results can be generalised to develop knowledge about the application of resilience 
engineering across cultures. The finding presented in this chapter evaluates the 
practicality of utilizing the RE framework in the KSA. The chapter will start by 
analysing the initial results, move on to the final solution analysis and finally give a 
broad conclusion to those findings.  
 
4.3.1 Field work and pilot study 
 
In order to design the questionnaire, field work took place at chemical plants on the 
western province in the KSA. The visits included informal interviews with operators 
and site managers. The main observation was that safety is not of concern to many 
employees. Only large corporations invest in developing safety systems. Most of the 
safety practices are outdated and support the leaner approach to safety. The observation 
from the visited sites indicated that many companies rely on risk assessment and 
accident analysis as their core concept of safety. The concept of resilience engineering 
was not clear to many professionals working in the process industry. Therefore, the 
survey had to have an introductory part explaining the concept to participants. Shop 
floor workers seem to have many concerns about safety at their work place; however, 
this was not shown in most of their daily practices. Similar observations were 
highlighted by Shirali et al. (2012) in a study that was carried in an Iranian chemical 
plant [99]. The state of the safety climate was also reflected from the pilot study where 
many have pointed out the absences of management commitment to safe practices and 
the lack of proper safety practice or training; thus, the‎survey‎had‎to‎have‎a‎“not‎
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applicable”‎option‎in‎the‎choices.‎The‎lack‎of‎management‎commitment‎was‎reflected‎in‎
reality as the reluctance to introduce up-to-date safety systems. The absence of up-to-
date safety manuals was not due to lack of financial resources as many employees have 
indicated. The majority of workers, during the informal interview, have criticised the 
safety manuals and the lack of spending on updating them. Shirali et al. (2012) pointed 
out‎many‎factors,‎including‎religious‎beliefs‎where‎people‎view‎accidents‎as‎an‎“act‎of‎
God”‎and‎they‎cannot‎stop‎them.‎It‎is‎worth‎pointing‎out‎that‎religious‎beliefs‎are‎
similar in both the Saudi Arabian and Iranian context.  
The informal interviews and the pilot study have helped in getting feedback to improve 
the experimental design. The survey included an introductory part explaining concepts 
about‎safety‎and‎RE;‎in‎addition,‎a‎“not‎applicable”‎(N/A)‎was‎introduced‎to‎the‎answer‎
options. The questionnaire can be viewed in Appendix B. 
4.3.2 The survey    
 
Initially, 320 surveys were sent out; 60 of them were in the form of hard copies and the 
rest were sent online. The response rate was 43% with a better response rate with the 
hard copies. Only 138 responses were retained, and 119 responses were considered to 
be legitimate for this research. Responses with incomplete information and clear outlier 
cases were excluded from the study. The survey assesses 22 factors under five RE 
constructs which are: adaptability & flexibility, awareness & preparedness, control, 
trade-offs, and time management (Appendix B). In the first part of the survey 
respondents were given a brief introduction to resilience engineering concepts, the aim 
of the study and some general information such as: age, gender, level of education, etc. 
In the second part the respondents were asked to give their agreement level (on scale 
from 1 to 6) with statements assessing factors contributing to RE constructs. The 
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majority of responses were collected from the eastern province in the KSA, where most 
of the Oil and Gas companies are located, and a few of the chemical plants in the 
western province. The occupations of respondents are mainly engineers, such as: 
engineers, support engineers, chemical engineers, control engineers, and test operators. 
The study also covers managers at different levels of the organization surveyed under 
the chemical, energy, process, extraction and utility sectors. The respondents were 
mainly males; 60% of them were between 35 and 45 years old with an average of 6 
years’‎experience‎in‎their‎organization.‎The‎age‎range‎is‎illustrated‎in‎Table‎4.12.‎This‎
study did not include females since the cultural factor does not support women to work 
in such sectors in the KSA.  
Table ‎4-11 Age range for participants (n=119). 
What is your age range? 
Answer Options Response (%) Response Count 
18 to 24 31.10% 37 
25 to 34 23.50% 28 
35 to 44 21% 25 
45 to 54 14.30% 17 
55 to 64 7.60% 9 
Prefer not to say 2.50% 3 
Total 100 119 
 
 
Although the field work and the pilot study indicated a poor safety climate, the general 
trends form a result indicating resilient behaviour for employees in the organizations 
surveyed in the KSA. However, although the results show some resilient responses, this 
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is not enough evidence to judge the whole system as resilient. Carvalho et al. (2009) 
distinguish between front-end operators in an uncontrolled manner and the constructed 
organisational factors in a controlled manner [118]. The authors oppose calling a system 
with uncontrolled systematic manner resilient. This discussion leads us to the point that 
systems could be safe without being resilient (Hale and Tom, 2006) [122]. Shirali et al. 
(2012) assert that resilience should be systematic rather than causal [99]. From 
observation of industries in the KSA we seem to have causal resilience where managers 
are focusing on traditional risk assessment tools such as fault tree analysis. By causal 
resilience, we refer to the lack of developing a systematic proactive adoptive capacity.   
4.3.3 Seven factors solution 
 
The initial results indicated seven elements in the solutions. Those seven elements 
indicate a strong correlation between resilience engineering constructs and the ability of 
an organization to bounce back to a normal state of operations after disruptions. The 
seven factors explain 67% of the variance of our data set. The loading of those seven 
factors is presented in the communality Table 4.12. The table shows the loadings of 
each item with the general themes of resilience engineering. Priority wise the result 
suggested the following descending order:  Time management, adaptability and 
flexibility, awareness and preparedness, control, and trade-offs. Table 4.13 shows the 
items with the most loading factors.  
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Table ‎4-12 Seven factor solution communality. 
 
Table ‎4-13 Corresponding constructs to the seven factor solution with loading factors. 
Resilience Themes Items 
Loading 
factors 
Time management 
Time to reflect on planning. 0.84 
Management support (by giving enough 
time to plan).  
0.83 
Adaptability and flexibility 
Management communicating new plans and 
information. 
0.76 
Ability to adapt to unexpected situations. 0.75 
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Ability to communicate efficiently. 0.74 
Risk assessment ability. 0.71 
Awareness and 
preparedness 
Readiness for future events.  0.74 
 
Regarding time given to employees to reflect on planning, half of the participants seem 
to have enough time to plan. Moreover, 65% feel that managers give them enough time 
to reflect on their planning. Time management construct relates to an organisational 
buffering capacity, whereby the system must have the necessary time and resources to 
respond to an arising problem. When comparing the loading factor components with 
Ferreira et al. (2008), we find similarities regarding time management aspects [123]. 
Despite the fact that the Ferreira et al. (2008) study was conducted in a different country 
and industrial sector (on the UK railway network), the time management loading factors 
are very close. The time management aspect appears to have a strong correlation in both 
studies. Table 5.4 shows the comparison between Ferreira et al. (2008) and our results. 
As the table shows, time to reflect on planning and management support seem to have a 
similar loading factor in both the railway and energy sectors. However, the rest of items 
are not close. Table 4.14 demonstrates that there are broad variances in the results. 
Those differences could be product of many factors such as the industrial sector, 
organisational culture or sample size. The differences suggest that RE constructs may 
change with the industries using the same concept. So far, the results are not conclusive 
and we will have to move to the final analysis of our data. 
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Table ‎4-14 Comparing loading factors with Ferreira et al. (2008). 
Loading factor for extracted seven items 
Items Our 
data 
Ferreira et al. 
(2008) 
I have enough time to reflect on my planning. 0.84 0.84 
I am encouraged to reflect on my planning. 0.83 0.53 
I revise my planning whenever new information arises. 0.76 0.2 
I can solve problems even when faced with unexpected 
situations. 
0.75 0.04 
I can communicate my decisions promptly to those that 
relay on them. 
0.74 0.09 
I can detect failures or errors in my planning before they 
create problems. 
0.71 0.16 
Because something has always gone well before, I feel 
confident that it will continue to go well in the future. 
0.74 -0.1 
 
4.3.4 Four factor solution 
 
The further analysis of the data revealed an optimum solution of three factors. The four-
factor solution explains 65.6% of the data variance. The optimization process highlights 
the importance of the following themes: adaptability and flexibility, control, awareness, 
and preparedness.  Table 4.15 summarize the extracted three factors with the 
corresponding RE concepts. 
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Table ‎4-15 Corresponding constructs for the four factor solution with loading factors. 
Resilience Themes Items Loading factors 
Adaptability and flexibility Efficient communication 0.63 
Control 
Information availability 0.6 
Control over work tasks 0.56 
Awareness and preparedness Ability to deal with external pressure 0.6 
 
Adaptability and flexibility concepts correspond to the system ability to adjust to 
external changes and pressures. The concept of adaptability covers a wide range of 
factors such as ability to work under pressure, ability to communicate with others, and 
ability to respond to irregular disruptions. The importance of flexibility was emphasized 
in the previous work of Costella et al. (2009). Flexibility can help an organisation to 
respond to input fluctuations which allow the system to operate in various conditions.  
Table 4.16 show factors corresponding to the adaptability concept and how participants 
agree with it.  
Table ‎4-16 Responses to the efficient communication item. 
I can communicate my decisions promptly to those that relay on them 
 Responses % 
Strongly Agree 37 31.09 
Agree 35 29.41 
Slightly Agree 21 17.65 
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Slightly disagree 7 5.88 
Disagree 10 8.4 
Strongly disagree 6 5.04 
N/A 3 2.52 
 
 
Figure ‎4-3 Responses to the efficient communication item. 
 
Our data indicate that the energy sector in the KSA is adaptable and flexible. Over 
three-quarters (78%) of the respondents can communicate their plans efficiently with 
their colleagues. As Figure 4.5 shows, 31% trust their ability to communicate with 
others. In addition, during the observation stage, it was noted that employees seem to 
have good informal ways of communicating with each other. Informal communication 
allows workers to obtain information about planning or confirmation about the task in 
hand. Such communication contributes to resilience by offering a fast and reliable 
channel to change plans and discuss issues as they arise. This trust is reflected in the 
remaining factors related to the adaptability concept. Communication issues have been 
31% 
29% 
18% 
6% 
8% 
5% 
3% 
I can communicate my decisions promptly to 
those that relay on them 
Strongly Agree
Agree
Slightly Agree
Slightly disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
N/A
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given particular attention in management studies. Informal communication was also 
highlighted by other studies in a different sector. Ferreira et al. (2008), for instance, 
studied resilience in the UK rail network, in which he emphasises the contribution of 
informal communication in the flow of information which is crucial to system resilience. 
The communication factor has the highest loadings in our data set. Another factor that 
had‎ the‎ highest‎ agreement‎ among‎ respondents‎ is‎ the‎ employees’‎ ability‎ to‎ anticipate‎
problems before they occur. The results show an overwhelming majority, with around 
85% agreeing on their ability to detect planning failure (Figure 4.6). This is a sign of 
resilient behaviour which helps the organization to overcome mishaps. The responses to 
the ability to discover failures and errors were unexpected since the literature review 
(Chapter 2) revealed the opposite.  Human error is accountable for 80% of accidents and 
20% is due to technological failure. However, there are 23% who find difficulty in 
communicating their plans and 2.5% with no channels to communicate with others.   
   
. 
Figure ‎4-4 High consciousness to failures and errors. 
85% 
13% 
2% 
I can detect failures or errors in my planning 
before they create problems 
Agree
Disagree
N/A
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The control concept refers to the system ability to control activities regardless of 
operational‎ conditions.‎ It‎ assesses‎ employers’‎ ability‎ to‎ follow‎ plans‎ and‎ anticipate‎
problems. The energy sector in the KSA seems to have great control over activities. On 
a system level, controllability refers to the ability to reach a specific desired state in a 
certain time. Controllability is dealing with the desired output of dynamic systems. 
Employers seem to have enough information about their tasks. However, there seems to 
be some contradiction about what was reported and the observed reality during the 
questionnaire design stage. Although, the observation indicated lack of training or the 
existence of standard safety systems, the results showed around 68% of the respondents 
seem to believe they have all the information they need to carry out their tasks. In 
addition, 66% finish whatever plans they had. The contradiction could be explained by 
looking at the loading factor associated with the items under this concept. We find the 
information about the work and finishing the plans have the highest loading factor, 
whereas the rest of the factors have below 0.5 loading. The rest of the factors are more 
concerned with potential planning failure and dealing with unexpected situations. 
Therefore, employers could have exaggerated their confidence level. Figure 4.7 shows 
how confident employers feel about the control of their work activities. In general, the 
findings indicate that employers in the process industry are able to steer their job 
activities even under unexpected situations.   
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Figure ‎4-5 Responses to control over work tasks. 
 
The third extracted concept relates to awareness and preparedness. The awareness and 
preparedness construct assess system ability to react to disruption to normal operation 
and the availability of appropriate information regarding performance standards. Items 
under this construct include the ability to adjust to external pressure, support of 
managers and feedback. The general outcome from our data set indicates that industrial 
sectors in the KSA are well prepared to face work pressures and changing plans 
accordingly. Within this construct, the ability to adjust according to external pressure 
has the highest loading factor with 0.59. Employers in the KSA seem to be highly 
prepared for unexpected external pressure. This was reflected in the data with 75% of 
responses agreed on their ability to adjust to pressure. On the other hand, 23% seem to 
have‎doubt‎about‎their‎organization’s‎ability‎to‎deal‎with‎external‎pressure.‎This‎small‎
fraction matches the findings from the observation stage. During the observation, 
employers seem to feel that their organizations are lacking preparedness to deal with 
external pressure. Many of them have expressed satisfaction with the information they 
25% 
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6% 
9% 
I feel in control of my work activities 
Strongly Agree
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122 
 
were given to finish their tasks. This might be reflected in the question about their 
confidence in the future occurrence of accidents. This question had the lowest 
agreement level of the employees where 38.7% feel less confident about the occurrence 
of mishaps in the future. Figure 4.8 illustrates responses to how confidant employees are 
about future accidents. 
 
Figure ‎4-6 Responses to how confidant employees are about future accidents. 
 
Those‎findings‎answer‎the‎first‎question‎in‎our‎research‎“What‎are‎the‎main‎contributing‎
factors‎that‎help‎industrial‎systems‎to‎restore‎a‎normal‎state‎operation‎in‎the‎KSA?”‎The‎
analysis revealed that efficient communication, information availability, ability to deal 
with external pressure and control over work tasks are the main contributing factors of 
RE in the KSA process industry. The main themes incorporating those extracted factors 
are:  
 Adaptability and flexibility 
 Control 
14% 
23% 
24% 
16% 
14% 
8% 1% 
Because something has always gone well before, I feel 
confident that it will continue to go well in the future 
Strongly Agree
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 Awareness and preparedness 
The factors extracted were emphasised in many other studies as the main contributing 
factors to resilient systems. This study confirms the importance of the extracted items in 
introducing resilient systems to current safety practices in chemical plants working in 
Saudi Arabia. Since this is the first research assessing RE in the KSA, those findings 
provide a starting point for further studies and applications in the Saudi context. In 
addition, it provides managers with an insight into the safety climate in the process 
industry. 
On the question of the similarities with other findings in different industries, there was 
no prior work in the KSA to compare with. Therefore, the results are compared to a 
study that was conducted in the rail network in the UK. When comparing the loading of 
the extracted three factors with Ferreira et al. (2008) we find no similarities (Table 4.17) 
[123].  The optimum solution, however, appears to have better results than the initial 
seven factors. The loading factors for the extracted four factors (under the three 
constructs) are not far off from Ferreira et al. (2008). Considering the differences 
between the studies, the findings suggest that RE constructs do vary according to the 
industry. Therefore, the answer to the second question is not conclusive. Further studies 
should be carried out across industries with control of all other variant factors (such as 
geographical location). 
Table ‎4-17 Comparing loading factors with Ferreira et al. (2008). 
Loading factor for extracted three items 
Items Our data Ferreira et al. (2008) 
I can communicate my decisions promptly to those 
that relay on them. 
0.63 0.32 
I have all the information that I need to do my work. 0.6 0.83 
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I manage to finish whatever plans I started. 0.56 0.66 
I can adjust my way of working according to 
external pressures. 
0.6 0.18 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Chapter Five: Discussions 
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Summary:  
 
In conclusion, the resilience engineering framework offers a non-linear systematic 
approach for accident modelling. The framework has developed tools to overcome the 
complexity of sociotechnical systems and focus on the dynamics of the organisation. 
Practically, the essence of resilience engineering is to use the intrinsic ability of an 
organisation (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state. This research 
tests the framework in the KSA process industry. The survey measuring resilience 
potential resulted in extracting three factors with most correlation with resilience 
abilities. Effective communication plays a major role in supporting sharing information 
within‎the‎system.‎This‎has‎led‎to‎the‎acquisition‎of‎a‎good‎ability‎to‎monitor‎systems’‎
functions and coordinate appropriate responses to regular and irregular disturbances.  
The effective communication and information availability has also contributed to the 
ability to share knowledge and experiences regarding safety. On the other hand, lack of 
awareness‎ and‎ preparedness‎ hinder‎ the‎ system’s‎ ability‎ to‎ anticipate‎ developments‎
further into the future. Knowing what to expect helps organisations to develop better 
strategies to deal with mishap risks. Our analysis shows that the Saudi Arabian process 
industry has resilience of the second type. Companies in KSA have a good ability to 
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monitor and respond; however, learning ability needs to be strengthened by extending it 
to change policy design functions.  
 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
 
This chapter relates the findings with the general aims and research questions. The first 
section of the chapter will start by discussing the underlying theory of safety and 
accident modelling. The debate will focus on the dynamic and nonlinearity of accidents. 
Following the theoretical aspect, the research attempts to highlight the knowledge gap 
about safety climate in KSA and its influence on organisations. This research reviews 
the safety climate in KSA and the safety culture in the process industries in the light of 
results from observation and interviews. The relationship between Saudi national 
culture and its influence on organisational safe/unsafe behaviour will be assessed 
including some personal views on the matter. The second section focuses on assessing 
resilience engineering and the possibility of utilizing it in KSA. The discussion includes 
the interpretation of the results and analysis of the data collected. The assessment of 
resilience identifies the most relevant factors in the process industry in the Kingdom. 
This chapter will end with an assessment of the future outlook and suggestion for 
further work. It will highlight some of the challenges that researchers should be aware 
of and offer some ways to overcome them.  
Is the Saudi Arabian process industry resilient? Under‎which‎category‎of‎‘System-kind’?‎ 
What are the main contributing factors to resilience engineering in the Saudi Arabian 
energy industry? 
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In order to answer these questions, this research uses a quantitative approach to assess 
and extract relevant factors to RE in the Saudi culture. Some of the results can be 
generalised to develop the knowledge about the application of resilience engineering 
across cultures. The finding presented in this chapter evaluates the practicality of 
utilizing the RE framework in KSA. The chapter will start by analysing the initial 
results, the final solution analysis, and final the broad conclusion from these findings.  
 
 
5.2 Theoretical Dissection:  
 
We start this discussion by expressing concern regarding the development of a 
comprehensive theoretical framework to view accident phenomena. Studying the 
development of accident models (See section 2.2) we can find two major turning points 
to this development. At the beginning, accidents were viewed as a linear process caused 
by physical elements. The first turning point was recognising the multi-linearity of 
accident phenomena. The second turning point was the acknowledgement‎of‎accidents’‎
non-linearity.  These two developments resulted in great confusion where fundamental 
questions about accidents and safety had to be reviewed. An indication of that confusion 
could be observed by vague definitions of safety and risks. In our view, this confusion is 
healthy and gives ground for new ideas to thrive and perhaps succeed. However, 
through examining accident prevention in an industrial context, we find there is a 
growing gap between theoretical and practical knowledge. The majority of industries 
appear to be satisfied with the conventional views therefore efforts to improve safety are 
limited. On the other hand, new frameworks are impractical either because they are 
complex or lack adequate tools to implement them in reality. On a deeper level, this 
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impracticality emerges from attempts to address the multi-linearity of accident causes or 
the struggle to define socio-technical systems (boundaries, behaviours, etc.). This leads 
us to argue that accident phenomena lack adequate generalisation that simplifies our 
understanding of safety and risk.  
Since the development of scientific management theory, performance was thought of 
purely in quantitative means. Scientific management developed efficient tools to 
measure the time needed to perform tasks and eliminate wasteful activities. However, 
further studies on performance indicated overwhelming evidence that imply wider 
social and environmental elements that govern human productivity at work. Up until 
that time, the need for systematic accident prevention was less justified, since industries 
were less complex where accidents occurrence was limited and consequences were less 
severe. The need for accident models grow with the increased number of injuries and 
fatalities that come with the development of complex industrial systems. This had led 
many to relate accident prevention with focusing on designing safer machines. Pursuing 
reliable technology with human safety in mind has helped in protecting operators from 
work related injuries to a certain degree. However, accident consequences in some 
industries presented significant challenges where single mishap events caused 
catastrophic loss of lives with broader impact on the environment. The modern 
approaches to accident prevention started with the pioneering study by Herbert Heinrich 
into injuries in industrial settings. Contrary to the general belief that physical and 
mechanical‎ failures‎ are‎ the‎main‎ cause‎ of‎ accidents,‎ Heinrich’s‎ study‎ discovered‎ the‎
role of human factors. Human error was found to be accountable for 88% of accident 
causes. Due to this fact, academics and professionals began to focus on the influence of 
human behaviour on safety performance. The shift towards social concepts, however, 
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posed a new set of challenges including explaining the dynamics that influence social 
organizations and human behaviour.  
The move towards understanding the psychology of human motivation and influences 
on social groups meant a change in the way that safety performance is measured. Since 
the industrial revolution, the reliance on machines to increase productivity has risen. 
Therefore, for a long time, managers related controlling efficiency to quantitative 
measures such as equipment specifications (e.g. life span, output/hour, and horsepower). 
Safer‎designs‎of‎production‎equipment‎were‎the‎best‎way‎to‎prevent‎operators’‎injuries.‎
However, process industries and its managers seem to struggle to integrate the 
qualitative measures. Using such tools meant vague measures that depend on 
knowledge and interpretation of safety culture status and influences on it. Safety experts 
tried to overcome this challenge by introducing a solution at four different levels: 
legislative, executive, managerial, and operational. The first level proposed global 
standards for different industries to support implementation of universal practices that 
protect business and public interests. The International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) is a prime example of such standards that provide practical guidelines to 
benchmarked organizational processes. The second relates to decision-making at the top 
level of organizations especially in hazardous industries. Administrators and 
shareholders were encouraged to declare commitment to employees’‎health‎and‎safety‎
in organizational charters (e.g. goals, mission, etc.). This meant executive influence on 
risk taking behaviours by managers to reduce the number of accidents and injuries. On 
the managerial level, specialists integrated safety measures into the quality procedures 
for the products to make safety an inseparable part of the product itself. Such a role was 
delegated into existing departmental organization structures, such as quality 
management or assurance or ad hock projects. On the operational level, employees had 
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to be certified to operate equipment and attend compulsory safety training courses to 
enhance safety awareness. The introduction of various mechanisms to motivate 
organizations to adopt safer behaviour had successes especially on the legislative and 
executive levels. However, implementing these measures in the industries has proven to 
be more challenging. In general, the introduction of legislative and executive 
commitment to safety was not reflected on managers’ or operators’ attitudes. In fact, 
most investigations into major accidents indicated systematic failure of the 
organizational safety culture.  
Case studies on BP provide an illustration of the failure of traditional safety 
management systems. It indicates major weaknesses of the linear approach in general. 
The investigation of previous accidents appears to point at the same factors repeatedly. 
This was obvious when comparing the accident reports of the Macondo blowout in 2010 
with the five-years-earlier explosion at Texas City. Investigators pointed at systematic 
failure of the safety management system, poor safety culture, and inadequate 
enforcement of procedures.  All these factors are viewed as results of inadequate control 
of the system. Since many mishaps have happened to numerous other organizations 
across various industries that use the casual approach (e.g. Exxon Valdez oil spill 
(1989), Fukushima nuclear accidents (2011)), this points to the failure of the linear and 
multi-linear approaches. The fundamental inadequacy either by the way BP 
implemented the casual model or the linear approach itself reveals the need for new 
ways of thinking about accidents. 
In the last few decades, the safety climate and culture was a subject of great interest to 
improve safety.  Attempts to integrate these concepts were renewed by introducing a 
systematic view of organization. The systematic views acknowledged that industrial 
organizations are open systems in a dynamic state.  Therefore, the performance of the 
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organization must take into account the function of the system as a whole. Factors from 
the environment, as well as from within the organization, influence different functions 
in undiscovered ways. This view has had major impacts on the way safety is viewed. 
Not only does it challenge the scientific view of classical management, but also the 
linear cause-effect relationship that dominated accident prevention models for decades. 
This approach is relatively new in the safety arena, therefore tools to implement such an 
approach are still underdeveloped. In this thesis, we have discussed two examples of the 
systematic view: STAMP by Leveson, and RE by Hollnagel. The STAMP reflected the 
complexity and challenges of controlling socio-technical systems [7], [45]. Although 
the Leveson model seems to have great potential on the theoretical level; it has had little 
success in reality because it still lacks the quantitative tools and measures that the 
industries prefer to work with in reality. On the other hand, RE relies on existing 
abilities that organizations have (learning, anticipating, monitoring, and responding); 
which might be easier to implement in reality.  This thesis chooses to investigate the RE 
concept in process industries to evaluate the practicality of using it as an alternative to 
the classical view of safety. Although we acknowledge that RE still uses qualitative 
measures and deals with qualitative concepts; it differs from other systematic models of 
accident by urging managers to use the existing abilities of the organization to improve 
safety and performance at the same time. This seems to offer a solution to the paradox 
of trading off production for safety, whilst at the same time encouraging the system to 
go back to normal operations after accidents.  
Opposing the traditional view, resilience engineering offers some advantages to the 
view of safety in a socio-technical environment. The first advantage is tied in with the 
use of system theory by taking a holistic view of the system and all its interacting 
functions. This shifts the emphasis from hunting for individual components of the 
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system to the dynamics of work processes. In order to evaluate the interactions of 
complex functions, the framework suggests the use of the breadth-before-depth 
principle to obtain a broad view of the organization as a whole. The overall view also 
provides a sense of the normal state of operation and the organizational culture 
expressed as common values among employees. The interactions between the various 
functions are then viewed at a deeper level of detail, where each function is explained 
by the elements it is possible to view (e.g. inputs and outputs). The framework 
introduces the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to reach an adequate 
level of analysis. With FRAM comes the second advantage of using RE, where it 
reduces the complexity of socio-technical system in favour of understanding 
interactions between functions. Lastly, the framework focuses on organizational ability 
to monitor variation in these processes, ability to react to disturbances, anticipate 
potential threats to its operation, and learning from previous failures and successes. 
These abilities exist naturally in most organizations; therefore it is easy to integrate RE 
into the organization. Assessment of these abilities, however relies on quantitative 
measures‎and‎managers’‎ability‎to‎interpret‎the‎data. This might be a challenge to adopt 
the framework by industries where they lack knowledge of the concept and prefer to use 
quantitative tools. In our view, this gap between the industry and social tools for 
measuring human performance present the main challenge in implementing the RE 
approach to organizational safety. 
The gap between the industry and academic progress is even more observable in the 
Saudi Arabian context. In most western cultures (e.g. USA and UK) there is a well-
established health and safety code of practice and organizations are require to follow it. 
On the other hand, industries in Saudi Arabia are still relatively new. Health and safety 
codes exists in local authorities (e.g. city councils), where most of these codes relate to 
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the construction sector. The industrial sector in Saudi Arabia makes an interesting case 
to study because it is relatively recent in comparison with UK for instance. In addition, 
the‎ Kingdom’s‎ industries‎ started‎ with‎ the discovery of oil, where oil exploration 
companies from the US mainly brought with them, their own standards of safety. The 
difference in culture between the countries makes an interesting case to study the safety 
climate in KSA, since not many have examined it. Moreover, the lack of governmental 
legislation regarding national codes of health and safety suggest a unique safety climate 
in comparison with other cultures.  Exploring safety culture in the Saudi process 
industry contributes to knowledge by furthering the understanding of influences on the 
safety climate and culture.  
 
 
5.3 Saudi National Culture and Safety Climate: 
 
The first aim of this thesis was to explore the safety climate in Saudi Arabian industrial 
complexes.   
To explore this goal, we asked the following questions: 
What are the general features of safety climate in Saudi Arabia? 
What are the factors that influence organisational safety culture in the Kingdom? 
In order to answer these questions, a survey of important articles, books and other 
sources was carried out. A summary of the main studies and research related topics 
were presented in chapter 2. Some evidence from the literature review indicated 
correlations between national culture and workforce attitudes toward safety and risk 
taking‎behaviour.‎In‎accordance‎with‎Hofstede’s‎(1994)‎cultural‎dimensions framework, 
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studies have shown an influence of individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, 
and power distance on workforce safe/unsafe behaviour [124]. Merritt and Helmreich 
(1996 & 1998), for instance, have argued that in cultures with high power distance (as is 
the case in KSA) organisations are expected to be highly hierarchical, which could 
result in a one-way flow of communication [125], [126]. Therefore, employees are 
expected to have passive behaviour and do not participate in creating a positive safety 
culture. The influence of national culture on the safety climate and performance were 
discussed broadly in chapter 2. To meet the first quest of this inquiry, the cultural 
diminution framework provides the following influences of Saudi national culture on 
organisational safety cultures, this is characterised as follows: 
 High power distance: Saudi Arabia score 95 in this diminution; which indicates 
that organisation operations are highly hierarchical and roles are well defined. 
The decision-making in such cultures is centralised and workforce have little 
influence on the decision-making process. In KSA this could be observed 
through the presence of few labour unions (e.g. Saudi Council of Engineers, 
which was founded in 2002). The leadership style is expected to be autocratic, 
with top-down communication channels. In such a culture, we expect 
management commitment to safety to play an essential role in ensuring safe 
behaviour by the employees. 
 Collectivism: on the individualism dimension the KSA score is 25. Hence, Saudi 
Arabia is a collectivist society, where relationships among group members are 
greatly valued. There is long-term commitment to family, extended family, and 
friends. These traits are manifested in the working environment by workforce 
loyalty to their organisations and group members have strong friendships. This 
has a positive influence on the safety climate and communication is less formal 
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as the flow of information is excellent. Employees are supportive to each other 
and avoid bringing shame to the group. In addition, employer/employee 
relationships are perceived in moral terms managers take decisions based on 
what is best for the group. 
 Masculinity: the score of 60 in this dimension suggests a masculine society to 
some extent. In a masculine society, people value hard work to achieve their 
goals. There is a great emphasis in the Saudi society on equity, competition, and 
performance. Mangers are decisive, assertive, and encourage competition. 
Regarding safety, managers focus on production and achievements more than 
safety. Therefore, managers in masculine culture are risk-takers, which could 
compromise safety in the organisations. However, empirical studies are not 
sufficient to draw conclusive correlation between safety performance and this 
dimension. 
 Uncertainty Avoidance: Saudi Arabia scores high (80) in this dimension, 
therefore, managers feel threatened by ambiguous situations. There are great 
tendencies to have more control and avoid uncertainty. In the Saudi culture, 
security is an important motivator to plan for failure in advance to avoid mishaps. 
However, workers tend to maintain the norms and following orders could hinder 
the organisational ability to adapt to a changing environment. The need to follow 
rigid codes of behaviours could result in great resistance to change and new 
ideas.  
 Short term orientation: the score of 36 on the time orientation diminution point 
to short term oriented society. The normative nature of Saudi Arabian society 
makes people value traditions and be suspicious about new initiatives. There is 
great emphasis on achieving quick results. The effect of this diminution on 
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safety performance is not fully understood in the safety context since it was 
added lately to the framework and not much research was published about it.  
 Indulgence: Saudi Arabia scores around 50, which does not point to a clear 
preference on this diminution. Therefore, we could assume that it has no effect 
on workforce behaviour towards safety.  
Our aim is to understand the way these cultural dimensions affect safety culture and 
resilience in the industrial context. In other words, we are looking for supporting 
evidence from our experiment by testing the former hypothesis in the KSA process 
industry. For instance, we expect to find evidence that power distance resulted in 
centralised decision-making processes regarding safety, where operators have little 
influence on the decision. On the resilience level, this will be translated in rigid roles 
and practices that are unable to adapt to safety stresses. The field work and the survey 
were conducted with the former hypothesises in mind. We argue that the national 
culture dimensions influence safety climate in the country, which in turn affects 
industrial safety culture including organisational behaviour towards safety. The 
influence of national culture on‎ organisations’‎ safety‎ has‎ been‎ supported‎ by‎ many‎
studies (e.g. Haukelid, 2008) [59]. However, few studies were published on the 
relationship between national culture and resilience (e.g. Shirali et al., 2012) [99]. This 
research contributes to knowledge by understanding the way national culture influences 
both resilience and safety culture in industrial complexes. It looks into the way that 
power distance, collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity affect 
organizational resilience potential and attitudes towards safety. Table 5.1 Summaries the 
findings of the influence of Saudi national culture on the safety climate in the process 
industry. 
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Table ‎5-1 Effect of Saudi National culture on the organisational safety culture in the process industry. 
Cultural Dimensions 
Index 
Score 
Effect on 
organisational safety 
culture (Theorised) 
Effect on organisational safety 
culture (Results) 
Power distance 95 
Negative: one-way 
communication and 
disengagement of 
employees. 
Positive: High commitment by 
top management moderate this 
dimension. 
Individualism 25 
Positive: more 
cooperation among 
working group and 
thinking about others 
safety. 
Positive: efficient communication 
and trust between group 
members creates healthy work 
environment. 
Masculinity 60 
Negative: risk-taking 
behaviour which 
favours production 
over safety. 
Negative: Risk-taking behaviour 
and prioritising achievements 
over safety. 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
80 
Negative: rigid system 
and resistance to 
change. 
No effect: the results are not 
conclusive. 
Long Term 
Orientation 
36 
Negative: less 
adaptation to changes 
in the environment. 
The study did not include this 
dimension since it was added 
recently. 
Indulgence 52 
No effect: average 
score. 
No effect: average score. 
 
Regarding power distance, the field work revealed evidence supporting the negative 
effect of this dimension on safety climate. The on-site Observation suggested a 
centralised decision-making process. During the visits, no mechanisms were found for 
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employees to express concerns about safety. Safety roles appeared to be communicated 
in a one way, top down, manner. These safety roles are usually communicated through 
outdated safety manuals and event-based safety meetings. Although, some safety 
training‎is‎required‎for‎operators;‎employees‎considered‎it‎as‎a‎‘form‎of‎organisational‎
bureaucracy’.‎All‎these‎observations‎suggest‎a‎centralised‎decision-making process and 
one way communication regarding safety. Regarding top management commitment to 
safety,‎ the‎ informal‎ interviews‎ indicate‎ that‎ operational‎manager’s‎ take‎ the‎ safety‎ of‎
their employees seriously, which could have a positive impact on safety. However, there 
is a clear lack of awareness to updated safety views and practices. This was also 
supported by the lack of human resources that have effective authority to train or 
enforce safety practices. Therefore, the general findings suggest that power distance has 
a negative effect on safety culture in industrial organisations. 
On the masculinity dimension, evidence was found to support the hypothesis of a 
negative effect on safety. This is mainly due to risk taking behaviours by employees. 
Short-cuts on the shop-floor were observed in terms of not wearing safety equipment all 
the time. Employees have admitted to carrying out their tasks even without following 
safety procedures. Risk-taking behaviour and prioritising achievements over safety 
seemed normal among operators. When asked about the use of short-cuts, many have 
expressed that it helps with getting the job done faster. In addition, some believe that 
following safety procedures will hinder the workflow and finishing the task on time. 
Operations managers also expressed understanding to easing safety roles under time 
pressure. Therefore, we conclude that there is evidence that masculinity have a negative 
influence on safety culture. However, we also suspect there are elements of a short-term 
orientation tide in with these observations, since no other conclusive evidence were 
found, support the focus on hard work values, equality, and/or high competition.  
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On the positive side, our field work also finds evidence that collectivism contributes 
positively to the safety culture in industrial organisations. The strong relationships 
among workers are easily observed on the production floors. Employees seemed at ease 
to ask for help from colleagues or when interacting with their supervisors. Informal 
communications seemed to save time and get information transmitted faster. Although 
these practices seem to counter safety practices, it has a major contributing role to safety 
in medium and small organisations. Supervisors and operation managers used the 
informal communication effectively regarding encouraging operators to follow safety 
practices (such as wearing helmets and safety shoes). In addition, the informality means 
that operators can report problems faster to their supervisor and get instructions on how 
to solve it. During the informal interviews, operators also have indicated strong 
relations among their working groups and support to co-workers. Therefore, the field 
work suggests a positive effect of collectivism on safety culture in KSA industries.  
Regarding uncertainty avoidance, the field work suggests some contradictory evidence 
in interpreting this dimension. We hypothesised a negative effect of this dimension on 
safety; however, no observation supported this proposition. Although employees prefer 
to maintain norms and not challenge management orders, our observations suggest that 
they are willing to adapt to new situations. Operators seemed open to changing plans 
and executing new production orders. During the informal interviews, many have 
expressed their adeptness to work plans and change in work routines. Moreover, 
managers did not appear to be concerned about control over work processes. Production 
managers seemed to be flexible and prepared to rearrange load and processes if it results 
in better outcomes. Past incidents did not result in major changes of their current 
procedures and changing safety practices. This may suggest resistance to change; 
however, employees’‎attitude‎did‎not‎reflect‎such‎resistance.‎Therefore,‎we‎did‎not‎find‎
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reliable evidence from the field work supporting the negative impact on safety culture in 
the organisation.  
To sum up, the findings of the field work suggest that power distance in Saudi Arabia is 
moderated by the management commitment to safety.  In general, high power distance 
has a negative effect on the safety climate. This is due to the autocratic style of 
leadership and operators little influence on decisions regarding safety. Employees tend 
not to engage constructively in improving safety practices. The one-way communication 
discourages such engagement. Moreover, the data suggests that masculinity in the Saudi 
culture contributes negatively to the safety climate. Focusing on achievement and 
production could tip the production/safety balance in favour of achieving production 
goals.‎ In‎addition,‎managers’‎ tendencies‎ in‎a‎masculine‎culture‎ is‎ to‎ take‎risks,‎which‎
could compromise safety standards. On the positive side, there was a great positive 
effect of collectivism to improve the safety climate for organisations working in the 
Kingdom. The tendencies to work in groups, thus providing social support to co-
workers, can alleviate work stress and create a healthy working environment. In 
addition, communications among individuals and groups are efficient. Managers in 
KSA should make the most of this diminution by promoting safety and create a 
supportive culture towards safety. The consideration of the group, also, helps managers 
to avoid blaming individuals and creates trust between managers and operators. Still we 
need to understand how this feature of Saudi national culture could influence 
organisational safety and resilience. 
 
5.3.1 Saudi National Culture and Resilience:  
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Following the discussion of national culture influences on the industrial safety climate 
this section extends the discussion to the RE framework. The discussion of this section 
will answer the question of: 
Does Saudi national culture affect resilience engineering within industrial organizations? 
Our survey was designed to measure the resilience potential in the KSA process 
industry. The survey evaluates the extent to which resilience abilities exist in the 
organisational processes in the normal operational state. The questionnaire asked 
working groups to give their opinions on organisational resilience abilities relating to: 
top management commitment to safety, the safety management system, safety 
information ambiguity, vigilance for future events, and rigidity of the system. Since 
there are relationships between cultural diminution and safety culture, we hypothesise 
that this influence extends to the organisational functions and abilities. Taking the 
features of the safety climate in the kingdom into account, we can hypothesis the 
following general relations between cultural dimensions and resilience: 
1. Power distance: high power distance hinders adaptability and flexibility of 
organisations and therefore have a negative effect on the safety culture and RE.  
2. Collectivism: better communications among groups and individuals helps in 
monitoring system functions and anticipating future threats; therefore, they have 
a positive impact on safety practices and RE. 
3. Uncertainty avoidance: contradict flexibility however help organisations to learn 
from previous failure and successes.     
4. Masculinity: KSA scores 60 for this dimension; this diminution could work both 
ways since risk taking behaviour could increase the flexibility; however, the 
emphasis on production could lead to minimising safety margins.  
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 Regarding power distances, the data shows conflicting responses to the hypothesis. 
Although the responses point to the existence of a hierarchical structure and well 
defined roles for employees; employees believe that management look after them 
regarding safety decisions. Evidence of two-way communications between managers 
and operators were found. For instance, the majority of the responses indicated that 
managers encourage employees to participate in safety related decisions. Further 
analysis revealed positive responses that have affirmed top management commitment to 
safety. Moreover, the data shows that the organisation is willing to change plans to 
accommodate‎threats‎to‎employees’‎safety. Most respondents agreed that safety comes 
first and managers encourage them to stop operations if there is a risk of injury with no 
conditions. Although this contradiction to the hypothesis maybe explained by other 
dimensions (e.g. collectivism), the data shows no evidence of a negative correlation of 
high power distance on resilience. Our conclusion is that this diminution is closely 
related‎to‎higher‎managements’‎commitment‎to‎safety.‎If‎top‎management‎is‎devoted‎to‎
the safety, then the enforcement of proper working standards becomes more effective.  
On the collectivism dimension, all the data shows a positive impact of this factor on 
resilience.  Collectivism seems to facilitate resilience abilities. The relationships among 
group members enhances good communication, which helps the group in responding to 
events quickly. The nature of the relationships also aids in conveying safety concerns to 
other members and managers informally. Collectivism also creates a healthy 
atmosphere for learning from others experiences and makes monitoring of 
organisational processes more efficient. The data supports the hypothesis of a positive 
impact from collectivism on resilience.  
 Considering uncertainty avoidance influences on resilience in the Saudi Arabian 
process industry, the data shows a negative impact.  Regulations within organisations 
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seem resistant to changes, which hinders flexibility. Employees are more comfortable 
working with existing procedures even if they have better ideas. Managers feel in 
control dealing with what they know instead of trying something new. The responses 
regarding this dimension also reveal a lack of proper knowledge of safety in these 
organisations. Learning from other experiences also appears to be limited and relies on 
employees’‎behaviour instead of changing the procedures.  Most of the responses have 
acknowledged the existence of outdated safety manuals but still used it anyway. Perhaps 
resistance to change and rigidity of the system are the most obvious factors relating to 
this dimension. Our evidence supports the negative influence of high uncertainty 
avoidance on the resilience. 
Regarding masculinity, the data shows supporting evidence to some extent. For instance, 
risk taking behaviour exists but could be used to increase performance or to stop 
operations in case of risk (as a safety-first measure). Competition exists, however there 
is more emphasis on the relationships among group members. Managers tend to be 
decisive but are willing to discuss safety plans with operators. Therefore, our data is not 
conclusive about the effect of this domain on resilience. 
To summarise, both field work (on-site observations and interviews) and surveys 
revealed interesting facts about the influence of national culture on safety and resilience 
in the Saudi Arabian process industry. The highlight of the findings indicates the great 
positive influence of collectivism on safety culture and resilience. We can generalise 
this result to conclude that the individualism index has an inverse relation with 
resilience and safety culture in societies. Regarding other cultural diminution, our find 
ings are not conclusive to conclude that there is a direct relationship with resilience 
abilities and organisational safety culture. We found evidence that high power distance 
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could have a positive impact on organisational safety in the case when the top 
management are committed to safe operations. We need to test the case where there is 
high power distance and low management commitment to safety to generalise the 
positive relationship. However, this might be impractical research since most 
organisations show (at least in public) their commitment to safety. Similar inconclusive 
results were found about the influence of masculinity on resilience and safety culture. 
The inconclusiveness regarding the masculinity dimension is explained by the average 
score of KSA in this dimension. Regarding uncertainty avoidance, the survey does show 
that a high score on this index correlates with higher resistance to change, therefore it 
impacts negatively on resilience. The results from the field work, on the other hand, 
gave no clear evidence for such an effect. Therefore, we conclude that to some extent 
uncertainty avoidance effects resilience and safety negatively.  
 
 
5.3.2 Resilience in Saudi Process industry: 
 
The introduction of system theory to accident models is relatively recent (a decade old). 
Using system theory offered a solution to paradoxes that safety theorists have struggled 
with for decades. To be precise, the previous models failed to address the non-linearity 
of accidents, or integrate the social and the technical components of organisations. The 
systematic models of accidents offered a comprehensive view by which socio-technical 
systems are analysed and understood. Furthermore, a systematic view shifts the stress 
from‎ systems’‎ components‎ to‎ understand‎ systems’‎ dynamics.‎ Systematic‎ models‎ of‎
accidents‎ emphasise‎ the‎ understanding‎ of‎ systems’‎ processes‎ and‎ the‎ interactions‎
between their function and the environment.  An example of systematic accident models 
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is System-Theoretic‎ Accident‎ Model‎ and‎ Process’‎ (STAMP)‎ by‎ Leveson‎ [127]. 
However, critics of such frameworks point to the complexity of systematic approaches. 
In addition, many have questioned the usefulness of such frameworks because it does 
not fit with the current practice of safety data collection and analysis. 
The Resilience Engineering framework has two main strengths. First, it can utilise 
organisations’‎ existing‎ ability‎ (learning,‎ responding,‎ monitoring,‎ and‎ anticipating)‎ in‎
order to perform more safely. Secondly, it defines complex functions using minimal 
description (e.g. input and output) and focuses on understanding the function and its 
interactions. In a recent addition to the RE framework, organisation these characteristics 
can be divided into four system types. These system types differ in the extent to which 
they meet the definition of a resilient organisation. This research aims to contribute to 
the discussions on safety by assessing a resilience engineering framework in the Saudi 
Arabian process industry. Most previous studies have been conducted in western 
cultures, this research validates the framework for a non-western culture. In addition, an 
understanding of the way Saudi notional culture influences safety culture and resilience 
abilities is a novel contribution to knowledge. Our assessment of resilience in KSA can 
be divided into two sections. The first is concerned with assessing the resilience abilities 
of the process industry in the country. The second section will classify the types of 
system that exist in the KSA environment. 
The survey used in this research measured the resilience option of four organisational 
abilities: learning, responding, monitoring, and anticipating. The analysis used the 
principle component analysis to identify the main contributing factors to these four 
abilities in KSA. Our analysis for the various factors related to these abilities were 
compacted into the following factors: adaptability, control, and awareness. The findings 
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are summarised in table 5.2. The analysis discovered the following aspects of resilience 
abilities: 
(1) Learning: the data shows that process companies in the Kingdom can learn from 
past experiences. However, this is done mainly through organisational channels 
of communication. Such a learning process is hard to observe at the governance 
level. The learning ability seems stronger at the operational level and gets 
weaker at the top level of the hierarchy. Therefore, small and medium size 
companies are more able to learn from incidents than large ones. The overall 
assessment of this ability is that it exists to some extent but it depends on the 
size of the organisation, flexibility, and organisational awareness.  
(2) Responding: there are two types of responses in organisations: planned and 
unplanned. The survey shows that most planned responses are inadequate to deal 
with major accidents. The outdated safety procedures and lack of proper safety 
supervision provide the evidence for this failure.  On the other hand, the data 
indicated high adaptability and awareness to safety by the employees. Operators 
have a good idea on threat sources and have experience in dealing with 
disturbances. The trade-off is mainly in favour of safety especially for operators 
and supervisory levels. The analysis shows a strong relationship between this 
ability and a good level of communications among group members. This could 
be explained by the collectivism aspect of culture that exists in the kingdom. 
Our conclusion supports the existence of a good response ability in the process 
industry.  
(3) Monitoring: the data shows that the process industry has a good ability to 
monitor the function of the organisations. Well defined roles existed and defined 
control for organisational processes helps in this respect. The survey shows good 
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control over safety management systems exists and employees follow 
organisational guidelines. Therefore, we conclude that monitoring ability is good 
in the KSA process industry. 
(4) Anticipation: this ability scores low in the data, where safety systems in the 
industry is not equipped to deal with a changing environment. The survey shows 
lack of trust amongst employees in their organisations to deal with pressure 
(internally and externally). Many also have indicated the absence of planning for 
future threats. This, in fact could be related to time-orientation diminution where 
the field study revealed a short-term planning orientation. Although, accidents 
are fundamentally unforeseeable, anticipating risks and threats to safety prepares 
the organisation better to deal with mishap consequences. Our conclusion is that 
anticipation is low in the Saudi Arabian energy sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table ‎5-2 Potential of resilience engineering in the Saudi Arabian Process industry. 
Resilience Abilities Summary of the findings 
Learning 
Experiences are shared on the operators’ level, but organisational 
system is resistant to change. 
Responding 
Planned responses are inadequate to deal major accidents, however 
there is good adaptability to disturbances (unplanned responses are 
good). 
Monitoring Good control over work processes and ability to monitor organisational 
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functions. 
Anticipation 
Local ability to recognise deviations in the organisational functions and 
changes in the environment. 
 
The Resilience Engineering framework relies on the integration of these four abilities to 
distinguish between the four types of systems. So far, we have found evidence that 
process industry has the ability to monitor, respond, and learn. In our view, anticipation 
is not well integrated into the system. The assessment is that the energy sector can react 
appropriately to mishap events. Industrial complexes use efficient communication to 
assess the current situation and prevent a serious situation from escalating. For the case 
of mishap risk, the company is able to intervene to minimize undesirable outcomes. The 
existence of good monitoring and responding abilities helps industries to survive 
accidents and get back to a normal operational state. However, these two abilities are 
used passively, where reactions are not well planned. Such an approach to safety will 
sooner or later lead to major accidents where the organisation may not be able to 
maintain its existence. The learning ability is used in the process industry to improve the 
way they monitor their systems and react to events. Experiences are shared between 
employees, and safety meetings emphasise evaluating mistakes and spread awareness 
about how to avoid them. Nevertheless, this knowledge is not used to build early 
intervention mechanisms. The weakness of the anticipating ability limits the decisions 
available to reactionary measures and procedures (a fire fighting approach). Risks can 
be dealt with through mitigation, transfer, avoidance, and acceptance. Without 
anticipation decisions are limited to either avoiding the risk or accepting them. Early 
intervention and forecasting changes allow the decision maker to mitigate the threats 
before they disrupt the operational mode. We note that organisations in the process 
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sector are unaware of changes in the environment, which place the system at greater risk 
of mishaps.  
Bearing in mind the former assessment, the Saudi Arabian process industry is of the 
second type. Figure 5.1 illustrates resilience types in the Saudi Arabian Process industry. 
Such a system can react appropriately when something happens, not least if it is 
something unexpected. Reactions to previous disturbances are used to learn how to 
improve the way to monitor and react. The data supports this conclusion, where we 
extracted the main three factors influencing resilience. Efficient communication and 
information availability contribute the most to resilience abilities within the system. 
These two factors contribute the most to organisational monitoring, learning, and 
responding abilities; whereas the lack of preparedness have a negative impact on 
resilience. This kind of resilience is casual and not sustained. Saudi Arabia seems to 
have causal resilience; where employees appear to have resilient traits with lack of 
systematic organizational control. In addition, learning from incidents and accidents has 
to be extended to make systematic changes to the safety system. In order to survive, 
organisations have to be able to be aware of changes and make plans to exploit, mitigate, 
or transfer them. Therefore, we recommend industries in KSA to be aware of deviations 
in the business environment and drifts of its own functions. Building a stronger 
anticipation ability in an essential skill to deal with stresses and manage them efficiently. 
Further recommendations will be presented in the conclusion chapter next where we 
will be discussing the system as a whole. 
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Figure ‎5-1 Resilience system type - showing position ofthe Saudi Arabian Process industry. 
 
5.4 Comparison with other studies: 
 
In this section, we will discuss the comparison with other studies on the influence of 
national culture on safety climate and resilience. First let us compare the cultural 
dimensions in KSA with other countries that will be discussed in this section.  Chart 5.2 
draws comparisons between cultural dimension indexes in KSA, Iran, US, UK, Japan, 
and China. Many studies have concluded the influence of national culture and 
organisational safety culture. Among these, Ralston et. al. (1997) have studied the 
impact of national culture on managerial work values  [128]. The paper focuses on 
contrasting the underlying differences between Eastern and Western cultures especially 
regarding individualism index and openness-to-change. The authors argue that 
collectivist society could lead to poor performance. Therefore, countries that scores high 
on the individualism index, such as the US, will out preform countries with low scores 
such as Japan and China. Our findings from Saudi Arabia contradict this conclusion, 
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where low individualism contributes the most to safety culture in the industry. However, 
this could be explained by looking at other findings of the paper [128]. Ralston et. al. 
looks into some sub-dimensional factors including security, which measures the 
motivational goal to maintain the safety, harmony, and stability of a society or 
relationship, and of self. The results from the security factor indicated that collectivist 
societies (China and Japan) scores significantly higher than individualistic culture (US). 
Our study actually supports these findings since we investigated the impact of Saudi 
national culture on organisational safety climate.  
A more recent study that investigated the role of national culture in determining safety 
performance was conducted by Mearns & Yule (2009) [129]. The paper compares 
power distance, individualism, and masculinity in the oil and gas industries for different 
countries including the UK. The authors concluded that masculinity and power distance 
is a significant predictor of risk taking behaviour. The study also emphasized the role of 
top management commitment in influencing the adoption of safer behaviours. Evidence 
from our study supports the significance of power distance as a predictor of safety 
performance. However limited evidence in our data supports the role of masculinity. 
This could be explained by the higher masculinity score of the UK when compared with 
KSA. The difference in the power distance indexes could also explain the observation 
on the subject of management commitment. Mearns & Yule noted that workers in the 
UK (score 35 in power distance index) perceived management commitment to be low; 
whereas in our study we note that worker perceived high management commitment 
associated with high power distance in KSA (score 95). This might support the Mearns 
& Yule view that management commitment is more important than the power distance 
index. 
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Figure ‎5-2 Cultural dimensions comparison between Saudi Arabia, Iran, US, UK, Japan, and China (The 
Hofsted Center, 2016).   
 
On the topic of resilience abilities in different cultures, fewer studies have been 
conducted in different industries. Here we point to Jeffcott et al (2006), where 
flexibility, learning, and commitment were investigated in the UK railway companies 
[130]. The study noted the role of centralisation of decision making in contradicting the 
creation of rigid processes within organisations. In the UK railway example the study 
points to the effect of centralised management in discouraging frontline operators in 
participating efficiently in safe culture. In our study (in KSA) we found that centralised 
decision-making does not necessarily lead to less flexibility.  We find that management 
commitment to safety plays a major role in creating a flexible safety culture. Therefore, 
when looking at Jeffcott et al. (2006) assessment of top management commitment to 
safety, senior managers in the UK were more committed to production than safety. This 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Power Distance Individualism Masculinity Uncertainty
Avoidance
Time
Orientation
Indulgence
Cultural Dimensions Comparison 
Saudi Arabia Iran United States United Kingdom Japan China
153 
 
supports the conclusion of the existence of a correlation between top management 
commitment to safety and the creation of a good safety culture and resilience. The 
difference between them could be explained by different scores of national cultural 
indexes between the two countries. In our study the management commitment to safety 
was linked to high power distance, average masculinity, and low individualism; where 
the UK has a low power distance and high masculinity and individualism. In KSA, the 
collectivism has contributed the most to the top management commitment to safety; 
therefore, managers in the UK could be less committed as a result of high individualism.  
Jeffcott el al. (2006)‎ have‎ highlighted‎ employees’‎ feeling‎ of‎ lack‎ of‎ engagement‎ and‎
support‎ by‎ their‎ line‎managers.‎ “line‎managers‎ were‎ distracted‎ by‎ concerns‎ for‎ their‎
own‎ personal‎ accountability,‎ more‎ so‎ than‎ had‎ been‎ the‎ case‎ under‎ BR”‎ [130]. In 
addition,‎ the‎ authors‎ have‎ noted‎ “poor‎ communication and trust in the subordinate-
supervisor‎relationship”.‎Contrary to common belief, this evidence indicates the positive 
role of collectivism in creating a resilient system.  
On the topic of learning ability, the UK railway companies seem to have an advantage 
over the KSA process industry. The UK companies have mechanisms to ensure 
systematic efficient learning (e.g. anemones reporting system); whereas in KSA, safety 
concerns are discussed in random meetings and mainly after mishap events. The 
learning ability is somewhat hindered by the process industry in KSA; however, this 
could be understood since the history of industrial development in the country is 
relatively new, when compared with the UK. Moving a culture closer to KSA, Shirali et 
al. (2012) have studied the challenges in building resilience engineering in the Iranian 
chemical plant [131]. The study supports several findings from our data. First, the 
general conclusion that safety management strategies (in Iran as in KSA) are based on a 
static and linear approach. The second similarity is regarding the lack of anticipation 
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ability in both countries. Other points of agreement include the use of outdated safety 
procedures and manuals, and the role of religion. The main difference between our 
study and Shirali et al. (2012) seems to be the management attitude when it comes to 
sacrificing safety for production. Shirali et al. (2012) noted that managers of chemical 
plant‎ always‎ favour‎ production‎ over‎ safety.‎ “Production‎ is‎ always‎ a‎ winner‎ because‎
some of the plant managers believe that safety is a big barrier against progress for 
production‎goals”‎[131]. In our study, we have evidence supporting the commitment by 
managers‎to‎the‎concept‎of‎‘safety‎always‎comes‎first’.‎However,‎in‎Shirali‎et al. (2012) 
managers seem to neglect that concept in reality under the influence of required 
production goals. In general, both studies (in KSA and Iran) agree on the existence of 
resilience abilities in both countries with expiation of the foresight and anticipation 
ability.  
 
Since there are many similarities between the Saudi safety culture and neighbouring 
countries, how do our findings compere to other studies in the Kingdom? Most of the 
studies on safety culture in KSA focuses on the construction industry.  Al Haadir and 
Panuwatwanich have the critical success factors for safety program implementation 
among construction companies in Saudi Arabia [10]. The study conclusions suggested 
seven critical factors that can account for 80% of the successful implementation of 
safety programs including management support, clear and reasonable objectives, 
teamwork, and effective enforcement. Some of these factors could relate to our 
awareness and preparedness (such as clear objectives) or control (such as effective 
enforcement). The long list of the study factors (15 factors) include communication, 
which is emphasised in this study.  Al Haadir and Panuwatwanich also agree on the 
relatively low assessment of overall safety in KSA.  In a different study, Jannadi and 
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Bu-Khamsin (2002) have investigated safety factors considered by industrial contractors 
in KSA [9]. These factors include: management involvement, personal protective 
equipment, emergency/disaster planning & preparation as the most important main 
factors influencing the industrial construction contractor safety performance. Our study 
has also emphasised the role of management commitment (involvement) and the 
importance of building the anticipation ability in order to prepare and plan for future 
events. Our results seem to have a lot in common with other studies from KSA, 
however our findings cannot be generalised to other sectors in the Kingdom. I believe 
that different sectors have enough differences that they should be manifested in different 
safety culture.  
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6 Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary:  
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The safety climate in KSA is characterised by high power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance, above the average masculinity, and low individualism. The collectivism is 
the most influential dimension to safety culture in the process industry there. The other 
dimensions have a negative impact on safety culture. In the kingdom, top management 
commitment to safety moderates the power distance effect, where high commitment can 
contribute positively to the safety culture. Regarding resilience, the process industry is 
of the second type of the resilient system. The industry has good monitoring and 
responding abilities; however, the learning ability needs improvement. It is also 
necessary to build the ability to anticipate risks and plan for the long term. The main 
contributing factors to resilience are effective communication, information availability, 
control over work tasks, and dealing with external pressure. In KSA, there are good 
communication channels and control over workflow; however, information about safety 
is unsuitable to deal with disasters. Companies working in the process industry are 
unaware of changes in the environment and unable to foresee drifting of its own 
functions. Evidence was found to link national culture to the potential of resilience. 
Effective communications and collectivism plays a constructive role in building 
resilience. Therefore, the general conclusions could be summarised into the following 
points: 
  Influence of distinctive patterns of the collective value systems in different 
countries on organisational safety culture. 
 National culture influences individual behaviour towards safety.  
 Collectivism has a positive effect on safety culture and safety performance. 
 
 Management commitment has influence on safety culture and system 
resilience.  
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 Effective communication, information availability, control over work tasks, 
and dealing with external pressure are the main contributing factors to 
resilience in the KSA process industry. 
 
 Process industry in the KSA is characterised with resilience of the second 
type where there is good ability to respond and monitor but low ability to 
learn or anticipate.    
 
6.1 Introduction:  
 
This research started by presenting the development of safety approaches. In the early 
stages, industrial processes were simple and people used common sense to avoid 
accidents. The early attempts to build safety mechanisms relied on investigating the 
causes of accidents and then taking preventive actions against its reoccurrence. The 
domino model (by Heinrich, 1931) is a prime example for this approach [3]. Such an 
approach emphasizes robust control over previous causes of mishaps to ensure a safer 
future. As the industrial revolution emerged, industrial systems grew to become more 
sophisticated. New industries with heavy machinery to improve production efficiency 
led to an increased number of accidents. The simple linear approach to safety has 
proven to be impractical in such contexts. Business interests in increasing productivity 
led to the development of management science including safety management. The 
paradigm of safety had to shift from being passive to become proactive. With this shift, 
researchers started to redefine safety and continue to develop new tools to help 
organisations to minimise the risks of mishaps. Many tools were devolved to 
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accommodate the evolution of industrial systems. Companies started to identify risks 
beforehand and devote resources to mitigate them.  Safety started to become part of the 
organisational management system and the quality of the products.   
Studies have identified three levels of safety which are: personal, process (engineering), 
and organisational. The majority of companies were fixated on tackling the personal 
(individual human error) while scientists have emphasised the contribution of process 
and social aspects of organisations. Building on that, many studies were conducted to 
understand the nature of accidents in complex systems. During that time, researchers 
were puzzled by the inevitability of accidents in sociotechnical systems. Complex 
systems appear to have non-linear nature that links micro elements with macro changes; 
which cannot be understood by using a linear approach. Complexity beyond a certain 
level cannot be explained or controlled by upward causation. Qualitative causality can 
help in understanding the outcomes of an accident; however, fail to disclose correlations 
and interactions of a system as a whole. It was clear that complex industrial systems 
count on the interactions between technical, human, social, organisational, and 
environmental components. Recent efforts have resulted in introducing new ways of 
thinking about safety.  However, these attempts still lack maturity on a comprehensive 
theoretical basis.  
The BP Gulf of Mexico event is an illustration of the failure of traditional safety 
management systems. It also indicated major weaknesses of the linear approach in 
general. Investigations of previous accidents appear to point at the same factors over 
and over again. This was obvious when comparing accident reports of the Macondo 
blowout in 2010 with the five-years-earlier explosion at Texas City. Investigators 
pointed at systematic failures of the safety management system, poor judgment, 
inadequate enforcement of procedures, and inadequate adjustment. All these factors are 
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results of inadequate control of the system. Since many mishaps have happened to 
numerous other organizations across various industries that uses the casual approach 
(e.g. Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989) or Fukushima nuclear accidents (2011)), this points 
to the failure of the linear approach. The fundamental inadequacy of the way these 
companies implemented the casual model or the casual approach itself reveals the need 
for new ways of thinking about accidents. 
In conclusion, we still believe that not all accidents are preventable; however, accident 
models help us in preventing them to a large extent. The decreasing numbers of fatal 
disasters is evidence of the usefulness of safety science.  Accident models provide the 
following advantages: 
 Understanding accident phenomena more profoundly.  
 Avoiding preventable accidents to a large extent.   
 Equip us better to deal with risks, stresses, and undesirable outcomes. 
 
6.2 Resilience Engineering: 
 
Over the last decade, accident modelling starts to find theoretical grounds using system 
theory. The systematic approach to accident modelling is a promising method with 
which to view the phenomena. The strengths of this approach being derived from 
shifting the focus towards the system as a whole. Understanding the organisation as an 
open system with dynamic interactions is a more appropriate approach in describing 
sociotechnical environments. Industrial facilities in a modern world are very complex 
and cannot be defined in terms of their component parts only. The systematic approach 
goes beyond the linear approach to accommodate the non-linear, non-static nature of 
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accident causation. It broadens the horizon to include processes, interactions within an 
organisation, and exchanges with the environment. Although some have criticised this 
approach for being too complex; a proper level of analysis is required to overcome the 
growing complexity of industrial systems. Another criticism to the systematic approach 
relates to the practicality of these models. The tools used in most industrial sectors to 
control and measure safety were developed based on the Heinrich sequential model of 
accidents. Multi-linear tools have proven to be suitable to some extent in specific 
situations. The capacity of these tools, however, to describe and accommodate the 
complexity of real life is very limited. We recognise that systematic tools and 
frameworks are still underdeveloped. However, new frameworks started to emerge in 
order to address the complexity and practicality of systematic accident modelling.  
One of the promising frameworks that has been developed recently is Resilience 
engineering (RE). This framework shifts the focus from the individual level to the 
process engineering aspect of safety. Resilience engineering views organizations as 
non-linear dynamic systems. Accidents are viewed as emergent properties of a system; 
hence, it is difficult to foresee it. This approach redefines safety as accidents that did not 
occur and acknowledge the fact that different parties may have a different view of risks. 
The essence of resilience is to use the intrinsic ability of an organisation (system) to 
maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which allows it to continue operations 
after a major mishap and/or in the presence of a continuous stress. Therefore, breaking 
the pattern of thinking of safety as an unchanging state and paying more attention to 
how factors interact within a complex system is central to RE. The core concept of 
resilience is to adapt to changes and incorporate the ability to recover from mishaps 
quickly to a normal state of operation. This helps in creating a safer working 
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environment, at the same time keeping production rate at acceptable levels. In order to 
be resilient, a system or an organisation must have the following four qualities: 
• The ability to respond to regular and irregular threats in a robust, yet 
flexible manner. 
• The ability to monitor what is going on, including its own performance. 
• The ability to anticipate risks (threats events) and opportunities.  
• The ability to learn from experience. 
The Resilience engineering framework introduces a different set of principles and 
instruments to accident modelling. The breadth-first principle, for instance, provides an 
understanding of the everyday functioning of a system. It helps in developing a 
balanced level of analysis that captures the essence of the system and all its functions.  
The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) is a risk assessment tool offering 
a simple representation of complex organisational functions. It helps in assessing the 
variability of multiple functions of the system that combine and interact in unexpected 
ways. In addition, Resilience Assessment Grid (RAG) is a practical tool to be used by 
managers to check resilient performance at the organisational level. It provides visual 
representation of the four basic abilities potentials. Tools under this framework continue 
to evolve to attend to various industrial sector requirements.  
The broad-spectrum of resilience engineering is one of the main strength aspects of this 
framework; however, it continues to evolve as a standalone concept separate from 
safety. Although it was originated to deal with safety, resilience concepts appear to have 
more to do with organisational performance in general. Risks can have positive or 
negative outcomes; therefore, threats and opportunities are viewed as two sides of a coin. 
The benefits of assessing hazards are easily extended to evaluate opportunities. Keeping 
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the system in a dynamic equilibrium improves performance in general including the 
safety of the system. From a safety point of view, resilience engineering is a promising 
framework because it: 
 Takes a holistic view of the system. 
 Deals with the nonlinear dynamics of accidents.  
 Deals with various aspects of organisations (e.g. social, technical, and processes). 
 Increases organisational safety performance and resumes the normal state of 
operations after disturbances. 
 Monitors safety and observes deviation of organisational functions. 
For these reasons, we find resilience concepts are of great benefit to the safety of the 
process industry and the energy sector. The safety of industrial complexes in KSA is of 
particular interest, since the history of the industries there are less than a decade old. 
Companies appear to commit to safety passed on a desire to avoid risk of accidents 
without governmental guidelines regarding health and safety. This makes KSA an 
interesting case to test and validate the resilience engineering framework. The findings 
of this study will provide a starting point for future work across industry and give 
insight into safety climate and industrial safety in the kingdom. Safety professionals and 
managers could make use of this study to better understand safety culture in the 
kingdom and use its organisational features to improve performance. 
 
 
 
6.3 Safety in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 
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The development of safety practices in KSA industries makes it an interesting case to 
assess safety. The energy sector is the backbone of the Saudi economy. The Kingdom 
possesses a quarter of the‎ world’s‎ proven‎ oil‎ reserves,‎ and‎ is‎ the‎ world’s‎ largest‎
producer‎ and‎ exporter‎ of‎ oil.‎The‎ country’s‎ estimated‎ oil‎ reserves‎ are‎more‎ than‎260‎
billion barrels. Most are located in the Eastern Province, including the largest onshore 
field in Ghawar and the largest offshore field at Safaniya in the Arabian Gulf. Saudi 
refineries produce around 8 million barrels of oil per day, and there are plans to increase 
production to around 12 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia is also developing its 
additional energy resources – natural gas that once were flared off from oil wells, it is 
now collected and used, and the Kingdom has become a producer of refined oil products 
and petrochemicals such as kerosene, diesel oil, and‎ gasoline.‎ Since‎ the‎ 50’s,‎ many‎
industries started to thrive in support of the oil and gas industry. We focus in this study 
on these supporting industries including refineries, petrochemicals, manufacturing, and 
the like. On the contrary to the oil industry, the supporting industries were developed 
and manged by the private sector. Due to the absence of national industries (until 
recently), coherent legislation governing safe practices are still unavailable. 
Governmental companies were started by international organisations with an established 
safety culture and standards. After nationalising these companies, they built on these 
practices their policies regarding health and safety codes of practise. Among these 
policies is choosing contractors with a significant commitment to safety standards. The 
development of supporting industries in KSA is quite different from other sectors in the 
country (e.g. construction). Therefore, the assessment of safety in the process industry 
makes a curious case to study.   
Previous studies on the application of RE includes nuclear power plant and electricity 
distribution, aviation and the chemical industry. Regarding major hazard process 
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industries, a few studies were conducted on the oil and gas industry, refining plant, and 
offshore helicopter transportation system. This study is focused on assessing the 
potential of RE in the energy sector in a different cultural context. It moderates RE 
framework to establish system based indicators specific to the process industry. It 
provides an understanding of resilience by analysing the dynamics by which cultural 
factors influence organisational safety. These main factors will be extracted and could 
be used by professionals to improve safety. In addition, this is the first study on RE in 
Saudi Arabia; therefore, it adds to the body of knowledge on resilience engineering and 
safety in Saudi Arabia. The main question in this paper is: what are the main 
contributing factors to safety (and resilience) in the process industry in KSA? We 
choose to conduct the study in KSA because it is the largest producer and exporter of oil 
around the world. In addition, since the majority of the studies on resilience has been 
conducted in a Western culture, testing RE concepts in different culture could provide 
insights into cross cultural application of the framework. In general, this research can 
support the efforts of adopting RE concepts in the Middle East and help in reducing 
occupational injuries in the process industries.   
In order to assess the safety climate in the process industry in Saudi Arabia, this study 
uses qualitative methods for different purposes. In the first part of the study, qualitative 
methods were used to gain background knowledge and investigate some aspects of the 
problem. Literature review, informal interview, and on-site observation were essential 
to design the experiment. All former methods were used as an exploratory and 
explanatory means. The literature review revealed a gap of knowledge regarding the 
safety climate in the kingdom. Previous studies on KSA organisational safety focused 
on construction, manufacturing, and industrial contractors; none of which discussed 
accident models. These studies were mainly conducted using a linear view of safety 
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where accident causes were identified. Furthermore, the dynamic by which cultural 
diminution influences safety practices were not explored before. Therefore, the first part 
of this study explored the safety climate in KSA and analysed the national culture 
influence on organisational safety. 
The analysis revealed interesting relationships between cultural dimensions and 
organisational‎safety.‎According‎to‎Hofstede’s‎cultural‎dimension‎model,‎Saudi‎Arabia‎
scores high on power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and collectivism dimensions. The 
country also scores average regarding indulgence and masculinity dimensions. Since 
Hofstede’s‎model,‎many‎cross-cultural studies have supported the influence of national 
culture on safety. Our analysis supports the findings of Haukelid (2008) of the existence 
of associations between national culture and safety [59]. The field work revealed an 
inverse relationship between organisational safety culture, scores of power distance, and 
masculinity dimensions. The effect of power distance appears to be moderated by top 
management commitment to achieve high standards of safety. In general, the higher the 
power distance the harder it is for employees to engage constructively in improving 
safety. Masculinity also encourages risk taking behaviour where safety standards could 
be compromised in favour of achieving task goals. On the positive side, there is positive 
correlation between organisational safety culture and the collectivism score. The social 
support and good communication between group members creates a healthy working 
environment. Employees feel comfortable discussing workplace risks with managers 
and have co-workers support when faced with difficulty. Regarding uncertainty 
avoidance, the field work did not support the hypotheses of correlation between this 
dimension and the safety culture in the organisation. Although a high uncertainty 
avoidance score can result in rigidity of the system, our findings regarding safety 
aspects indicated flexibility of employees (managers and operators) to alleviate mishap 
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risks. Overall, our findings sustain the existence of correlation between the Saudi 
national culture and safety culture in the process industry. Based on these findings, we 
predict the existence of correlation between national culture and resilience at 
organisations. Therefore, the second part of the study was designed to measure the 
potential of resilience in the Saudi process industry and extract the main contributing 
factors in this context. Resilience abilities and the main contributing factors are then 
analysed taking account of the effects of national culture.  The general conclusions 
about the influence of national culture on organisational safety culture can be 
summarised as follows:  
 Evidence supporting the influence of distinctive patterns of the collective 
value systems in different countries on organisational safety culture. 
 National Culture influences individual behaviour towards safety.  
 Collectivism, contrary to the common believe, has positive effect on safety 
culture and safety performance. 
 Management commitment to safety has greater influence than expected on 
safety culture and system resilience.  
 
6.4 Potential of resilience in the process industry:  
 
In order to assess the potential of resilience a quantitative method in the form of a 
survey was used. The questionnaire targeted employees and managers working in 
petrochemical, energy, process, extraction, and utility sectors. The survey was 
developed based on Hollnagel et al. (2011) to explore 22 factors of interest to improve 
safety [19]. The study uses a scale of 6 to measure participant attitude towards resilience 
factors within their companies. The majority of responses were collected online, and 
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hard copies were distributed and collected personally. Factor analysis (FA), was used as 
an exploratory and confirmatory quantitative tool. The Principle Component Analysis 
(PCA) technique helped in identifying core factors contributing to safety and in 
explaining the underlying trends between the 22 factors of resilience. The result of the 
analysis was then compared with findings from other studies from the industry. 
Initially, 320 surveys were sent out targeting chemical plant, energy companies, and 
organisations working in the extraction of oil and gas. Respondents were mainly males 
working as managers, engineers, and front-end operators. A total of 119 responses were 
considered to be legitimate for this study. The KMO measure indicated a mediocre 
adequacy for sample size and null hypothesis proved the existence of correlation among 
the variables (factors). The initial results established the seven-factors solution that 
explains 67% of the total variance within the data set. The seven contribution factors are: 
 Time to reflect on planning. 
 Management support.  
 Communicating new information and changes to plans. 
 Ability to adapt to unexpected situations. 
 Ability to communicate efficiently. 
 Risk assessment ability. 
 Readiness for future events. 
Further analyses were conducted to determine appropriate number of components to 
extract. The further study showed an optimum four components solution that explains 
65.6% of the total variance within the data set. The optimization process underlines the 
importance of the following contributing factors: 
 Efficient communication. 
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 Information availability. 
 Control over work tasks. 
 Ability to deal with external pressure. 
The highlight from the data collected could be summarised as follows: Over three-
quarters (78%) of the responders can communicate their plans efficiently with their 
colleges. Communication contributes to resilience by offering a fast and reliable channel 
to change plans and discuss issues as they arise. Another factor that had the highest 
agreement‎ among‎ respondents‎ (but‎ low‎ loading‎ weight)‎ is‎ employees’‎ ability‎ to‎
anticipate problems before they occur. The results show an overwhelming majority, of 
around 85%, agree on their ability to detect planning failure. Subsequently, the 
information availability is a crucial aspect of resilience. Our data shows that around 68% 
of the respondents appear to believe they have all the information they need to carry out 
their tasks. Regarding control and time to finish work tasks, 66% are managing to finish 
whatever plans they started. On the down side, employers in KSA seem to be less 
prepared for unexpected external pressure. This was reflected in the data with 75% of 
responses‎having‎doubts‎about‎their‎organization’s‎ability‎to‎deal‎with‎external‎pressure.‎
One‎ last‎ significant‎ finding‎ is‎ regarding‎ employees’‎ level‎ of‎ confidence‎ in‎ the‎ future‎
occurrence of mishaps, 38.7% feel that it could happen soon.   
These four factors have had the most correlation from the data collected. Efficient 
communication has the most loading factors; which is in agreement with our field work. 
During the observation and interviewing, this aspect was observable in the form of 
informal communication between employees and a sense of group identity. This factor 
relates directly to the organisational ability to monitor and respond. In addition, it 
improves the learning ability through sharing knowledge and experiences. We find this 
factor highly correlated with the low index of individualism in the country. This is 
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further support of our hypothesis of the influence of national culture on organisational 
resilience. Another factor that supports the evidence for national culture influence on 
resilience is control over tasks. From a cultural point of view this factor relates to power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance. Theoretically, we hypothesised that control over 
work must be stronger since in high uncertainty avoidance societies the culture is to 
maintain a high degree of control to avoid ambiguity. The data reflects this point, where 
respondents prefer to have more information about task goals and risk sources. This 
leads us to the information availability factor where our data contradicts the finding 
from the observation stage. Safety instructions were outdated and many managers know 
little‎about‎safety‎regulations.‎Employees’‎knowledge‎of‎work‎place‎threats‎could‎have‎
been through safety training; however, we found that training courses were not of the 
required standards. The Information availability factor relates to the ability to learn and 
anticipate. The findings point to a lack of long term planning or awareness of changes in 
the environment. The low quality of information available revealed a lower anticipating 
ability in the process industries.  
Although the results indicated resilient behaviour among participants, the informal 
interview and the on-site observation revealed an unawareness of the resilience concept 
or new approaches to safety. Most of the safety practices are outdated and support the 
linear tactics to safety. Likewise, safety management systems and manuals seemed to be 
out of use. During the informal interview, many employees criticised the safety manuals 
and the lack of investment in new technologies. Employees appear to have concerns 
about their safety in the workplace; however, it was not reflected into their practices. 
Short-cuts are common; and informal communication seemed to be the preferred 
channel to interact and cooperate. Change in plans and work related issues are 
communicated informally (besides the formal channels). When the study was piloted, 
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there‎was‎a‎need‎to‎add‎a‎“not‎applicable”‎option‎to‎some‎of‎the‎resilience/safety‎factors. 
In addition, the pilot study reflected the sensitivity to translating questions into the 
native language (Arabic) of the respondents. The informal interviews and the pilot study 
helped in acquiring background knowledge, overall safety claimant, and feedback to 
improve the experimental design. 
The general conclusion of this study indicates the existence of resilience behaviour in 
the Saudi Arabian energy sector. The resilience of the system is of the second type; 
where the system is able to monitor, respond, and learn to a certain extent. The process 
industry in the Kingdom needs to improve its ability to learn by creating mechanisms to 
integrate knowledge from past experiences to modify codes of practice on a systematic 
level and modify long term plans accordingly. By doing so, resilience of the third type 
could be achieved. In addition, there is a substantial need to engineer the anticipation 
ability into process companies. The linear approach to safety that disregards deviations 
in its own functions and interactions with changing environments is not sufficient to 
manage safety properly. This ability could be engineered through acquiring awareness 
of changes and plan in advance to exploit opportunities or mitigate threats. On the 
question‎ of‎ “What‎ are the main contributing factors that help industrial systems to 
restore‎ normal‎ state‎ operation‎ in‎ KSA?”‎ The‎ analysis‎ revealed‎ that‎ efficient‎
communication, information availability, ability to deal with external pressure, and 
control over work tasks as the main contributing factors of RE in the KSA process 
industry.  
 
6.5 Contribution to knowledge:  
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This research contributes to knowledge by understanding the way national culture 
affects both resilience and safety culture in industrial complexes. It furthers the 
knowledge about safety climate and organisational safety in the KSA. In addition, it 
links national culture dimensions to the potential of resilience in organisations; which 
means that resilience varies across-cultures. The four main factors influencing resilience 
abilities were identified and could be used by professionals in the energy sector to 
engineer resilient systems. The systematic approach to model an accident is relatively 
new but it has great potential for improving safety in the industry.   
  The study concludes that national culture is an essential part of resilience of industrial 
systems and safety in general. The findings of this research support the Haukelid (2008) 
view that organisational cultures outdo classic safety control tools. Strong culture 
directs the attention to basic shared values and common goals; which could mature into 
an innate regulation mechanism. Only organisations that genuinely believe that its 
employees are the greatest resource can develop such capacity. This was reflected in our 
study by a strong correlation between top management commitment to safety and 
resilience in the process industry. However, sometimes commitment to safety 
contradicts businesses core values of delivering the maximum profit to its shareholders. 
The paradox of trading off safety for profits appears to be at the centre of discussion 
once again.  In addition, many have argued that culture creation is a bottom up process; 
therefore, only members within the organisation can create it. Top management can 
influence this culture but not manage it. Furthermore, many reports indicated a mistrust 
between industries and labour unions, which widens the gap and urges for greater 
efforts to develop a safe culture. Resilience engineering is a useful tool to complement 
existing safety systems within organisations. It shifts the attention towards process 
engineering safety instead of individual human error.  
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Reason‎(1998)‎stated‎“accident‎models‎can‎only‎be‎judged‎by the extent to which their 
application enhances system‎safety”.‎The‎linear‎approach‎still‎pushes‎for‎more‎complex‎
systems by incorporating additional defence lines and factors into the organisational 
safety structure. This has made these models difficult to comprehend and work with. 
However, it was the only way to go; therefore, these models (on the theory level) and 
regulation (on legislation level) has become, in a way, a barrier to getting the job done. 
The employee finds them redundant therefore they tend to find a better way to carry out 
the tasks. The management sees them as event reports and more paper work to get done. 
The supervisors look at them as standard checklists that need to be followed literally. 
On the other hand, resilience engineering offers a new way of thinking about accidents, 
however it still lacks a coherent theoretical basis. The concept focuses more on the 
process level safety; which is a shift from the individual level safety that is commonly 
implemented within the industry. In addition, the constructs of resilience are still vague, 
therefore measuring its potential is open to debate. On the plus side, resilience concepts 
rely heavily on system ability to adapt, but adaptability exists in different systems with 
different variations and up to a certain limit. Those limits are called safety margins. 
Safety margins seem to have a great‎ impact‎ on‎ the‎ system’s‎ ability‎ to‎ adapt‎ to‎ its‎
environment. After ten years of developing the main framework, no conclusive 
evidence was found to support the framework ability to prevent mishap. Future work 
should study long term gains of engineering resilience into companies. Such study will 
provide conclusive evidence regarding the gains of using a resilience engineering 
framework.    
This work adds to the knowledge on safety management in Saudi Arabia and resilience 
engineering literature in general. On a theoretical level, the resilience engineering 
concept could be defined as the margins of safety. The larger the margin the easier for 
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an organisation to adapt and resume a normal state of operation after an accident. The 
main findings of this study modify the current framework of resilience engineering to a 
specific industry. Efficient communication, information availability, ability to deal with 
external pressure, and control over work tasks are the most relevant factors in the Saudi 
context. There are limited publications on the Saudi context, this work gives an insight 
into that culture and allows for further studies to be conducted.  This is the first research 
assessing RE in KSA, the findings provide a starting point for further studies and 
applications in the Saudi context. In addition, it provides managers with an insight into 
the safety climate in the process industry. 
 
6.6 Future work: 
The findings indicated an influence of power distance on safety culture, however this 
dimension seems to be moderated by management commitment to safety. In fact, when 
comparing this result with other studies, we find greater evidence supporting the role of 
management commitment to safety in organisational safety and resilience. Therefore, 
future work should investigate how management commitment to safety (as separate 
concept/factor) influences resilience and safety culture. In addition, among the 
interesting findings of this study was the impact of collectivism on both system 
resilience and safety culture. Our findings implied the role of collectivism on improving 
communication and relationships between group members, as well as between line 
managers and operators. Other studies have hypothesised the negative impact of 
collectivism on safety culture due to high conformity, which leads to groupthink. 
However, we argue that collectivism could lead to higher participation of front line 
operators in decision making regarding safety.  Therefore, further studies should explore 
the influence of individualism on risk-taking decisions in different cultures to 
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understand the dynamics between individualism and safety. Furthermore, the 
comparison between the process industry and construction industry has revealed some 
differences regarding factors influencing safety performance and organisational culture. 
For this reason, more studies need to be conducted across-industries to understand how 
these factors change in various sectors. This will also help to obtain coherent 
understanding of the safety climate in the KSA.   
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 استبيان عن مرونة الشركة 
 
 عن الاستبيان:
) من gnireenignE ecneiliseRالسلامة والامان في المؤسسات الصناعية. يتناول الاستبيان مستوى مرونة المؤسسة الادارية (هذا الاستبيان هو جزء من بحث علمي يهدف الى تحسين مستوى 
احي المرنة الادارية. الرجاء تعبئة الاستبيان ء المؤسسة في احد نومنظور العاملين فيها. لمرونة المؤسسة دور هام في تهيئتها للتعامل مع الحوادث. ينقسم هذا الاستبيان الى ستة اجزاء، كل جزء يقيس ادا
 بأقرب رأي يمثل وجهة نظرك.
  دقائق. 01يستغرق اكمال هذا الاستبيان حوالي  
 معلومات شخصية:
 
 المسمى الوظيفي *: .......................................................
 
 أكثراو  55 o 45-54 o 44-53 o 43-52 o 42-81 o *:الفئة العمرية 
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 اختياري): ......................................................الاسم (
 الجنسية (اختياري):  ....................................................
 عدد سنوات الخبرة (اختياري): ........................................
 ..........................................................الدرجة العلمية: 
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 الاستبيان:
 غير موافق بشدة غير موافق محايد وافقم وافق بشدةم التزام الإدارة: 
  o  o  o  o  o مديري يقدر مجهودي في العمل .1
  o  o  o  o  o احصل على التقدير من مديري امام زملائي في العمل .2
العلني يزيد من مكانة الموظف بين في رأيي، التقدير  .3
 زملائه
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o الانتاجية تحتل الاولوية في نظر الادارة .4
في حال وجود خطر محتمل، استطيع التوقف عن العمل واحث  .5
 زملائي على التوقف عن العمل
  o  o  o  o  o
في حال وقوع حادث ما، الادارة تبحث عن الاشخاص  .6
 اسباب الحادثالمسؤولين عن الحاث لا عن 
  o  o  o  o  o
الادارة توفر وسائل سلامة كافية وتحاول تحسينها بشكل  .7
 مستمر
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o مديري مدرك لنواحي الخطر التي قد تؤدي لتوقف الانتاج .8
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  o  o  o  o  o مديري مهتم بتوجيهي للقيام بعملي بشكل سليم وامن .9
 
 موافق بشدةغير  غير موافق محايد وافقم وافق بشدةم ادارة السلامة: 
اذا كان لدي (او احد زملائي) مخاوف تتعلق بالسلامة،  .01
 استطيع مناقشتها بصراحة مع مديري
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o الادارة توفر وسائل للإبلاغ عن المشاكل المتعلقة بالسلامة .11
  o  o  o  o  o مديري يتقبل الاخبار السيئة بدون عصبية .21
  o  o  o  o  o للتحسين مستوى السلامةالإدارة تشجع على ابتكار وسائل  .31
  o  o  o  o  o الادارة تستمع للموظفين وتشركهم في اتخاذ القرارات .41
  o  o  o  o  o التوقف عن العمل عند وجود خطر محتمل، ينبغي .51
في مسائل السلامة، الادارة تشرك الجميع الموظفين بدون  .61
 تميز
  o  o  o  o  o
اجتماعات الموظفين من مختلف الاقسام والمستويات يحظرون  .71
 عن السلامة
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o روح الفريق والتعاون متوفر في القسم الذي اعمل به .81
  o  o  o  o  o السلامة جزء من تقييم ادائي .91
  o  o  o  o  o المعاملات الورقية تساعد في تحسين الاداء الخاص بالسلامة   .02
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 غير موافق بشدة غير موافق محايد وافقم وافق بشدةم المعرفة: 
  o  o  o  o  o ادرك العواقب المترتبة على فشلي في اتمام مهامي  .12
عند وجود خلل ما في احد الاجهزة، يجب ان اتحدث مع  .22
 المسؤولين عنه في الشركة
  o  o  o  o  o
عند وجود خلل ما في احد الاجهزة، يجب تحليل اسباب  .32
 الخلل ومناقشتها مع الاخرين في الشركة
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o الاخطاء والمخاطر مع زملائي مهمفي رأيي، مناقشة  .42
في حال حدوث مشكلة ما، يتم اتخاذ اجراءات لتلافي حدوث  .52
 المشكلة في المستقبل
  o  o  o  o  o
بشكل عام، اسباب الحوادث لا تعتمد على تاريخ الحوادث  .62
 في الشركة
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o اعتقد ان زملائي يجتهدون في التعلم من اخطاءهم  .72
الشركة دورات (برامج) تدريبية تحث على الاعتماد لدى  .82
 على الذات في التعلم
  o  o  o  o  o
يوجد لدى الشركة دورات (برامج) تدربيه مجدولة ومعلومة  .92
 للمهتمين
  o  o  o  o  o
عند التحاقي بالعل، تم تدريبي للقيام بهامي بشكل صحيح  .03
 وامن
  o  o  o  o  o
لتلافي  من خلال خبرتي، استطعت التعرف على طرق جديدة .13
 حدوث الاخطاء في مكان عملي
  o  o  o  o  o
كتيب التعليمات والارشادات قديم وغير ملائم للقيام  .23
 بالأعمال بشكل سليم
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o استخدام كتيب التعليمات والارشادات غير ملزم في شركتي .33
 391
 
  o  o  o  o  o تعليمات الامان تحدث بشكل دوري .43
  o  o  o  o  o السلامة كجزء من وظيفتهالشركة لديها شخص مسؤول عن  .53
 
 غير موافق بشدة غير موافق محايد وافقم وافق بشدةم الغموض: 
  o  o  o  o  o الادارة تتوقع مني القيام بأكثر من مهمه بنفس الوقت .63
  o  o  o  o  o المهام التي اقوم بها لها اكثر قد تتعارض في اهدافها .73
القيام  علي انجاز بعض المهام بدون شرح كافي عن كيفية .83
 بها
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o السلامة مقدمة على الانتاج .93
  o  o  o  o  o لدي وقت كافي للقيام بمهامي .04
  o  o  o  o  o القيام بمهامي بشكل امن قد يزيد من تكلفة الانتاج .14
  o  o  o  o  o الموظفين في الشركة يحصلون على تدريب كافي عن السلامة .24
  o  o  o  o  o زملائيتأثير تدريبات السلامة على تصرفات  المس .34
  o  o  o  o  o اعلم الطرق جيدة وامنه للقيا بمهامي  .54
  o  o  o  o  o في حالات الطوارئ، يسهل اتباع ارشادات السلامة .64
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  o  o  o  o  o انا على اطلاع جيد بما بمصادر الاخطار في مكان عملي .74
 
 غير موافق بشدة غير موافق محايد وافقم وافق بشدةم الاستعداد: 
و تعليمات الادارة مناسبة ويمكن ارشادات السلامة  .84
 استخدامها في المستقبل
  o  o  o  o  o
عقد اجتماعات و ورش عمل عن السلامة هو حل مناسب  .94
 للاستعداد و تلافي الحوادث في المستقبل  
  o  o  o  o  o
افضل مناقشة مخاوفي المتعلقة بالسلامة مع زملائي  .05
 والادارة
  o  o  o  o  o
الموظفين على البحث عن مكامن من المهم ان تحفز الادارة  .15
 الاخطار في المستقبل
  o  o  o  o  o
من المهم وضع ميزانية محددة لتحسين مستوى السلامة و  .25
 التعامل مع المشاكل المتوقعة ضمن هذا الاطار 
  o  o  o  o  o
  o  o  o  o  o دئما هناك احداث غير متوقعة تحدث في مكان عملي .35
  o  o  o  o  o وقوع حادث في مكان عملي متوقع بشكل كبير .45
  o  o  o  o  o الادارة تتعامل مع موضوع السلامة بجدية .55
الشركة تحتاج خطة شاملة للتعامل مع الحوادث المتوقعة  .65
 في المستقبل
  o  o  o  o  o
 
 غير موافق بشدة غير موافق محايد وافقم وافق بشدةم المرونة: 
لدى الشركة موارد كافية للتعامل مع الاحداث غير  .75
 المتوقعة بشكل فَعال
  o  o  o  o  o
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انا افضل التضحية بالإنتاج في سبيل القيام بمهامي  .85
 بطريقة امنة
  o  o  o  o  o
في حالات الطوارئ، يجب اخذ موافقة الادارة قبل القيام  .95
 بعمل يضر بإنتاج الشركة 
  o  o  o  o  o
يوجد في الشركة ارشادات للتعامل مع تغير خطط الانتاج  .06
 المفاجئة
  o  o  o  o  o
على التعامل مع الضغوطات (الداخلية لدي الشركة القدرة  .16
 والخارجية) بنجاح
  o  o  o  o  o
بعد وقوع حادث ما (لا سمح الله)، لدى الشركة القدرة على  .26
 العودة للاستقرار بشكل سريع 
  o  o  o  o  o
 
  
 شكرا على مشاركتك في هذا الاستفتاء.
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Appendix C: Seven Factors Solution Results 
 
GET 
  FILE='F:\Chapters\Chapter_R\Analisis_11_06_2015\My_Sheet_09_06_2015.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT. 
FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 
  /MISSING PAIRWISE 
  /ANALYSIS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 
  /PRINT INITIAL CORRELATION KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /FORMAT BLANK(.30) 
  /PLOT EIGEN 
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(7) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
Factor Analysis 
Notes 
Output Created 06-APR-2016 17:43:22 
Comments  
Input Data F:\Chapters\Chapter_R\Analisis_11_06
_2015\My_Sheet_09_06_2015.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
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Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
122 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing MISSING=EXCLUDE: User-defined 
missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used PAIRWISE: Correlation coefficients for 
each pair of variables are based on all 
the cases with valid data for that pair. 
The factor analysis is based on these 
correlations. 
Syntax FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 
Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 
  /MISSING PAIRWISE 
  /ANALYSIS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 
Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 
Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 
  /PRINT INITIAL CORRELATION 
KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /FORMAT BLANK(.30) 
  /PLOT EIGEN 
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(7) 
ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.94 
Elapsed Time 00:00:01.20 
Maximum Memory Required 58024 (56.664K) bytes 
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Correlation Matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Correlation 1 1.000 .566 .312 .138 .180 .041 
2 .566 1.000 .083 .165 .337 -.011 
3 .312 .083 1.000 .466 .033 -.012 
4 .138 .165 .466 1.000 .019 .347 
5 .180 .337 .033 .019 1.000 .035 
6 .041 -.011 -.012 .347 .035 1.000 
7 .063 -.017 .095 .412 .029 .514 
8 .390 .218 .165 .201 .239 .388 
9 .013 .181 -.116 -.058 .137 -.046 
10 .138 -.070 .115 .004 -.053 .298 
11 .210 .073 -.110 .122 .211 .378 
12 .313 .211 .053 .229 .368 .234 
13 .169 .110 -.064 .188 .040 .381 
14 .166 .410 .058 .313 .100 .155 
15 .138 .089 .031 -.035 -.091 .032 
16 .278 .377 .146 .093 .155 .095 
17 .265 .206 .120 .172 .126 .214 
18 .132 .152 .350 .396 .050 .149 
19 .190 .125 -.104 .061 -.034 .180 
20 .143 .071 .179 .292 -.099 .489 
21 .260 .081 .006 .023 .032 .529 
22 .237 .262 .001 .018 .252 .355 
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Correlation Matrix 
 
7 8 9 10 11 12 
Correlation 1 .063 .390 .013 .138 .210 .313 
2 -.017 .218 .181 -.070 .073 .211 
3 .095 .165 -.116 .115 -.110 .053 
4 .412 .201 -.058 .004 .122 .229 
5 .029 .239 .137 -.053 .211 .368 
6 .514 .388 -.046 .298 .378 .234 
7 1.000 .398 .027 .295 .379 .335 
8 .398 1.000 .128 .230 .324 .380 
9 .027 .128 1.000 .076 .216 .104 
10 .295 .230 .076 1.000 .333 .102 
11 .379 .324 .216 .333 1.000 .234 
12 .335 .380 .104 .102 .234 1.000 
13 .412 .385 .229 .336 .424 .365 
14 .171 .167 .221 .050 .210 .062 
15 .074 .029 .204 .212 .240 -.004 
16 .069 .140 .077 .100 .217 .124 
17 .310 .288 .106 .257 .278 .250 
18 .228 .270 -.042 .079 .190 .107 
19 .308 .138 .338 .228 .267 .026 
20 .520 .348 .125 .362 .226 .268 
21 .461 .347 -.068 .392 .171 .341 
22 .135 .384 .191 .096 .083 .131 
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Correlation Matrix 
 
13 14 15 16 17 18 
Correlation 1 .169 .166 .138 .278 .265 .132 
2 .110 .410 .089 .377 .206 .152 
3 -.064 .058 .031 .146 .120 .350 
4 .188 .313 -.035 .093 .172 .396 
5 .040 .100 -.091 .155 .126 .050 
6 .381 .155 .032 .095 .214 .149 
7 .412 .171 .074 .069 .310 .228 
8 .385 .167 .029 .140 .288 .270 
9 .229 .221 .204 .077 .106 -.042 
10 .336 .050 .212 .100 .257 .079 
11 .424 .210 .240 .217 .278 .190 
12 .365 .062 -.004 .124 .250 .107 
13 1.000 .165 .223 .032 .461 .125 
14 .165 1.000 .017 .312 .232 .187 
15 .223 .017 1.000 .435 .173 -.026 
16 .032 .312 .435 1.000 .271 .247 
17 .461 .232 .173 .271 1.000 .113 
18 .125 .187 -.026 .247 .113 1.000 
19 .396 .278 .330 .102 .334 .042 
20 .511 .215 .092 .038 .333 .288 
21 .420 .048 .034 -.019 .251 .079 
22 .133 .243 .147 .334 .080 .201 
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Correlation Matrix 
 
19 20 21 22 
Correlation 1 .190 .143 .260 .237 
2 .125 .071 .081 .262 
3 -.104 .179 .006 .001 
4 .061 .292 .023 .018 
5 -.034 -.099 .032 .252 
6 .180 .489 .529 .355 
7 .308 .520 .461 .135 
8 .138 .348 .347 .384 
9 .338 .125 -.068 .191 
10 .228 .362 .392 .096 
11 .267 .226 .171 .083 
12 .026 .268 .341 .131 
13 .396 .511 .420 .133 
14 .278 .215 .048 .243 
15 .330 .092 .034 .147 
16 .102 .038 -.019 .334 
17 .334 .333 .251 .080 
18 .042 .288 .079 .201 
19 1.000 .193 .041 .057 
20 .193 1.000 .517 .201 
21 .041 .517 1.000 .475 
22 .057 .201 .475 1.000 
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KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .638 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 727.215 
df 231 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
1 1.000 .758 
2 1.000 .742 
3 1.000 .714 
4 1.000 .754 
5 1.000 .714 
6 1.000 .692 
7 1.000 .652 
8 1.000 .525 
9 1.000 .506 
10 1.000 .523 
11 1.000 .679 
12 1.000 .637 
13 1.000 .669 
14 1.000 .687 
15 1.000 .712 
16 1.000 .748 
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17 1.000 .490 
18 1.000 .548 
19 1.000 .643 
20 1.000 .671 
21 1.000 .841 
22 1.000 .825 
 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance 
1 5.247 23.849 23.849 5.247 23.849 
2 2.281 10.370 34.219 2.281 10.370 
3 1.994 9.063 43.282 1.994 9.063 
4 1.629 7.407 50.689 1.629 7.407 
5 1.320 6.000 56.689 1.320 6.000 
6 1.211 5.504 62.193 1.211 5.504 
7 1.046 4.753 66.945 1.046 4.753 
8 .896 4.071 71.016 
  
9 .798 3.626 74.643 
  
10 .732 3.326 77.969 
  
11 .693 3.149 81.117 
  
12 .659 2.995 84.112 
  
13 .555 2.523 86.635 
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14 .515 2.341 88.976 
  
15 .447 2.033 91.010 
  
16 .413 1.877 92.887 
  
17 .406 1.848 94.735 
  
18 .362 1.647 96.382 
  
19 .283 1.287 97.668 
  
20 .234 1.062 98.730 
  
21 .155 .703 99.433 
  
22 .125 .567 100.000 
  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 23.849 3.861 17.548 17.548 
2 34.219 2.138 9.719 27.267 
3 43.282 1.908 8.675 35.942 
4 50.689 1.824 8.292 44.234 
5 56.689 1.763 8.014 52.248 
6 62.193 1.680 7.638 59.886 
7 66.945 1.553 7.059 66.945 
8     
9     
10     
11     
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12     
13     
14     
15     
16     
17     
18     
19     
20     
21     
22     
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 .473 .479 
   
-.417 
 
2 .370 .703 
    
-.306 
3   -.596 .384    
4 .423 
 
-.547 .419 
   
5  .437 
 
-.501 -.307 
 
.343 
6 .624 -.393 
   
.315 
 
7 .661 -.381 
     
8 .657 
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9   .533     
10 .465 -.330 
  
.327 
  
11 .561 
     
.489 
12 .517 
  
-.385 
 
-.323 
 
13 .675 
      
14 .418 .359 
   
.451 
 
15   .504 .335 .436   
16 .366 .546 
  
.371 
 
.328 
17 .572 
    
-.309 
 
18 .386 
 
-.440 .301 
   
19 .420 
 
.524 .344 
   
20 .666 -.355 
     
21 .597 -.362 
 
-.418 .337 
  
22 .461 
  
-.389 .396 .502 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a
 
a. 7 components extracted. 
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Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1    .813    
2   .363 .664 
   
3  .633 -.312 .418 
   
4  .817 
     
5     .801 
  
6 .675 
     
.339 
7 .691 .332 
     
8 .474 
   
.403 
  
9   .668 
    
10 .588 
    
.394 
 
11 .375 
   
.488 .422 
 
12 .369 
   
.644 
  
13 .694 
 
.342 
    
14  .385 .649    .300 
15      .807 
 
16      .674 .346 
17 .428 
  
.346 
   
18  .695 
     
19 .309 
 
.654 
    
20 .744 
      
21 .763 
     
.407 
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22       .852 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 10 iterations. 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 .741 .317 .289 .274 .306 .234 .210 
2 -.638 .209 .239 .563 .276 .204 .242 
3 -.005 -.666 .573 -.122 -.020 .454 -.081 
4 -.079 .559 .263 -.093 -.538 .363 -.426 
5 .081 -.154 -.509 .202 -.444 .530 .438 
6 -.108 .201 .346 -.501 -.195 -.158 .717 
7 -.142 .188 -.289 -.542 .552 .510 -.050 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Appendix D: Four Factors Solution Results 
 
FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 
Q20 Q21 Q22 
  /MISSING PAIRWISE 
  /ANALYSIS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 
Q21 Q22 
  /PRINT INITIAL CORRELATION KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /FORMAT BLANK(.30) 
  /PLOT EIGEN 
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(4) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
 
 
Factor Analysis 
Notes 
Output Created 06-APR-2016 17:50:11 
Comments  
Input Data F:\Chapters\Chapter_R\Analisis_11_06
_2015\My_Sheet_09_06_2015.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
122 
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Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing MISSING=EXCLUDE: User-defined 
missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used PAIRWISE: Correlation coefficients for 
each pair of variables are based on all 
the cases with valid data for that pair. 
The factor analysis is based on these 
correlations. 
Syntax FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 
Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 
  /MISSING PAIRWISE 
  /ANALYSIS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 
Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 
Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 
  /PRINT INITIAL CORRELATION 
KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /FORMAT BLANK(.30) 
  /PLOT EIGEN 
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(4) 
ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.20 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.19 
Maximum Memory Required 58024 (56.664K) bytes 
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Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Correlation 1 1.000 .566 .312 .138 .180 .041 
2 .566 1.000 .083 .165 .337 -.011 
3 .312 .083 1.000 .466 .033 -.012 
4 .138 .165 .466 1.000 .019 .347 
5 .180 .337 .033 .019 1.000 .035 
6 .041 -.011 -.012 .347 .035 1.000 
7 .063 -.017 .095 .412 .029 .514 
8 .390 .218 .165 .201 .239 .388 
9 .013 .181 -.116 -.058 .137 -.046 
10 .138 -.070 .115 .004 -.053 .298 
11 .210 .073 -.110 .122 .211 .378 
12 .313 .211 .053 .229 .368 .234 
13 .169 .110 -.064 .188 .040 .381 
14 .166 .410 .058 .313 .100 .155 
15 .138 .089 .031 -.035 -.091 .032 
16 .278 .377 .146 .093 .155 .095 
17 .265 .206 .120 .172 .126 .214 
18 .132 .152 .350 .396 .050 .149 
19 .190 .125 -.104 .061 -.034 .180 
20 .143 .071 .179 .292 -.099 .489 
21 .260 .081 .006 .023 .032 .529 
22 .237 .262 .001 .018 .252 .355 
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Correlation Matrix 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Correlation 1 .063 .390 .013 .138 .210 .313 
2 -.017 .218 .181 -.070 .073 .211 
3 .095 .165 -.116 .115 -.110 .053 
4 .412 .201 -.058 .004 .122 .229 
5 .029 .239 .137 -.053 .211 .368 
6 .514 .388 -.046 .298 .378 .234 
7 1.000 .398 .027 .295 .379 .335 
8 .398 1.000 .128 .230 .324 .380 
9 .027 .128 1.000 .076 .216 .104 
10 .295 .230 .076 1.000 .333 .102 
11 .379 .324 .216 .333 1.000 .234 
12 .335 .380 .104 .102 .234 1.000 
13 .412 .385 .229 .336 .424 .365 
14 .171 .167 .221 .050 .210 .062 
15 .074 .029 .204 .212 .240 -.004 
16 .069 .140 .077 .100 .217 .124 
17 .310 .288 .106 .257 .278 .250 
18 .228 .270 -.042 .079 .190 .107 
19 .308 .138 .338 .228 .267 .026 
20 .520 .348 .125 .362 .226 .268 
21 .461 .347 -.068 .392 .171 .341 
22 .135 .384 .191 .096 .083 .131 
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Correlation Matrix 
 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Correlation 1 .169 .166 .138 .278 .265 .132 
2 .110 .410 .089 .377 .206 .152 
3 -.064 .058 .031 .146 .120 .350 
4 .188 .313 -.035 .093 .172 .396 
5 .040 .100 -.091 .155 .126 .050 
6 .381 .155 .032 .095 .214 .149 
7 .412 .171 .074 .069 .310 .228 
8 .385 .167 .029 .140 .288 .270 
9 .229 .221 .204 .077 .106 -.042 
10 .336 .050 .212 .100 .257 .079 
11 .424 .210 .240 .217 .278 .190 
12 .365 .062 -.004 .124 .250 .107 
13 1.000 .165 .223 .032 .461 .125 
14 .165 1.000 .017 .312 .232 .187 
15 .223 .017 1.000 .435 .173 -.026 
16 .032 .312 .435 1.000 .271 .247 
17 .461 .232 .173 .271 1.000 .113 
18 .125 .187 -.026 .247 .113 1.000 
19 .396 .278 .330 .102 .334 .042 
20 .511 .215 .092 .038 .333 .288 
21 .420 .048 .034 -.019 .251 .079 
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22 .133 .243 .147 .334 .080 .201 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 19 20 21 22 
Correlation 1 .190 .143 .260 .237 
2 .125 .071 .081 .262 
3 -.104 .179 .006 .001 
4 .061 .292 .023 .018 
5 -.034 -.099 .032 .252 
6 .180 .489 .529 .355 
7 .308 .520 .461 .135 
8 .138 .348 .347 .384 
9 .338 .125 -.068 .191 
10 .228 .362 .392 .096 
11 .267 .226 .171 .083 
12 .026 .268 .341 .131 
13 .396 .511 .420 .133 
14 .278 .215 .048 .243 
15 .330 .092 .034 .147 
16 .102 .038 -.019 .334 
17 .334 .333 .251 .080 
18 .042 .288 .079 .201 
19 1.000 .193 .041 .057 
20 .193 1.000 .517 .201 
21 .041 .517 1.000 .475 
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22 .057 .201 .475 1.000 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .638 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 727.215 
df 231 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
1 1.000 .475 
2 1.000 .646 
3 1.000 .597 
4 1.000 .658 
5 1.000 .497 
6 1.000 .574 
7 1.000 .611 
8 1.000 .519 
9 1.000 .374 
10 1.000 .365 
11 1.000 .404 
12 1.000 .438 
13 1.000 .597 
14 1.000 .363 
15 1.000 .454 
217 
 
16 1.000 .488 
17 1.000 .376 
18 1.000 .459 
19 1.000 .569 
20 1.000 .601 
21 1.000 .672 
22 1.000 .414 
 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance 
1 5.247 23.849 23.849 5.247 23.849 
2 2.281 10.370 34.219 2.281 10.370 
3 1.994 9.063 43.282 1.994 9.063 
4 1.629 7.407 50.689 1.629 7.407 
5 1.320 6.000 56.689   
6 1.211 5.504 62.193   
7 1.046 4.753 66.945   
8 .896 4.071 71.016   
9 .798 3.626 74.643   
10 .732 3.326 77.969   
11 .693 3.149 81.117   
12 .659 2.995 84.112   
13 .555 2.523 86.635   
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14 .515 2.341 88.976   
15 .447 2.033 91.010   
16 .413 1.877 92.887   
17 .406 1.848 94.735   
18 .362 1.647 96.382   
19 .283 1.287 97.668   
20 .234 1.062 98.730   
21 .155 .703 99.433   
22 .125 .567 100.000   
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 23.849 3.949 17.951 17.951 
2 34.219 2.586 11.752 29.704 
3 43.282 2.419 10.996 40.699 
4 50.689 2.198 9.990 50.689 
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
10     
11     
12     
13     
14     
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15     
16     
17     
18     
19     
20     
21     
22     
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
1 .473 .479   
2 .370 .703   
3   -.596 .384 
4 .423  -.547 .419 
5  .437  -.501 
6 .624 -.393   
7 .661 -.381   
8 .657    
9   .533  
10 .465 -.330   
11 .561    
12 .517   -.385 
13 .675    
14 .418 .359   
15   .504 .335 
16 .366 .546   
17 .572    
18 .386  -.440 .301 
19 .420  .524 .344 
20 .666 -.355   
21 .597 -.362  -.418 
22 .461   -.389 
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Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a
 
a. 4 components extracted. 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
1  .600   
2  .699   
3    .764 
4    .774 
5  .697   
6 .745    
7 .732    
8 .513 .478   
9   .543  
10 .537    
11 .447  .425  
12 .419 .506   
13 .672  .372  
14   .420 .335 
15   .672  
16  .390 .490  
17 .374  .420  
18    .646 
19   .707  
20 .717    
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21 .751    
22  .581   
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 
1 .754 .429 .389 .311 
2 -.636 .665 .282 .271 
3 -.048 -.076 .725 -.683 
4 -.158 -.606 .494 .603 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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